Power, Patents And Peer-Review: Essays In Applied Microeconomic Theory by Atal, Vidya
 
Power, Patents and Peer-Review: Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory
by Vidya Atal
This thesis/dissertation document has been electronically approved by the following individuals:
Basu,Kaushik (Chairperson)
Bar,Talia (Minor Member)
Mitra,Tapan (Minor Member)POWER, PATENTS AND PEER-REVIEW:
ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMIC THEORY
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Vidya Atal
August 2010c ° 2010 Vidya Atal
ALL RIGHTS RESERVEDPOWER, PATENTS AND PEER-REVIEW:
ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMIC THEORY
Vidya Atal, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2010
My dissertation is a collection of four essays in applied microeconomic theory.
The ﬁrst chapter develops a theory of female labor supply in a general equi-
librium framework where decisions are taken by the households and the power
distribution among the members is determined endogenously. It is shown
that female labor supply can take different shapes due to the structural dif-
ferences between economies, and multiple equilibria might occur in the labor
market. Policy implications of tax-beneﬁts, subsidies for labor-saving house-
hold durables, and reservation for women at employment are worked out. The
results found here resonate well with previous empirical ﬁndings and suggest
additional testable implications.
In the next chapter, Talia Bar and I study and criticize the current patent sys-
tem in the United States, particularly, prior art search and its disclosure policy.
To determine patentability, inventions are evaluated in light of existing prior art.
Innovators have a duty to disclose any prior art that they are aware of, but have
no obligation to search. We identify conditions in which innovators have no
incentive to search. Search intensity increases with R&D cost, the examination
intensity, and patenting fees. In the later half of the chapter, we study deter-
minants of patent quality and the volume of patent applications. We model
a policy reform proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. Introducing
a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications and the incidence of badpatents. We claim that innovators with high ex-ante probability of validity will
more likely apply to the more valuable patent-tier, but sorting in the dimension
of economic signiﬁcance is not obvious.
The last chapter provides a theoretical model for analyzing the behavior of
peer-reviewed journals. It ﬁnds that, apart from natural human errors, inefﬁ-
ciencies arise purely for reasons of inter-journal strategic behavior. Speciﬁcally,
as a result of competition, journals tend to set their quality cut-off points exces-
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viiiCHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
An economic agent, be it an individual in a household or a ﬁrm in a mar-
ket, is usually interested in enhancing its power and domain of control in order
to use these to increase its pay-offs. The nexus between power and utility is
different for different kinds of agents and can take complex forms at times. For
example, in a household, a woman can acquire more power by bringing in to the
household a larger share of the household income; and this, in turn, can enable
her to buy the kind of goods she considers valuable for the household. In par-
ticular, the amount of labor a woman supplies depends on the intra-household
bargaining power of the woman, which, in turn, is inﬂuenced by the amount of
labor she supplies. On the other hand, a ﬁrm in a monopolistic market can have
more market-power and control by having more valuable patents and this can
inﬂuence its decision to invest in R&D and ﬁle for patents. In my dissertation, I
analyze these and other kinds of interaction between power and control, on the
one hand, and market outcomes and earnings, on the other, in three chapters.
1.1 Chapter Two: A Theory of Female Labor Supply
This chapter of my dissertation studies the nature of female labor supply in an
economy and how it is affected by policy reforms and technological advances.
It also studies the nature of female power within the household. Both these
topics interact with each other and the aim of the chapter is to analyze this in-
teraction in a setting more general than has been attempted thus far. In this
chapter, I construct a comprehensive model of the status of women and the
behavior of female labor in the market place. The aim is to understand the na-
1ture of female labor supply in a set-up where the decision to work is not that
of the woman herself but of the household to which she belongs. The set-up
used is a very general one, where market wages of both men and women are
fully ﬂexible and inﬂuence each other. Interesting implications emerge from the
recognition that the more a woman contributes to the family income, the more
power she gains; and, as the power of the woman increases in the household,
she has more freedom to do what she prefers – house-work or outside job. It is
shown that female labor supply can take different forms due to structural differ-
ences between economies, and the occurrence of multiple equilibria. The latter
implies that, two economies, similar in every fundamental aspect, might end
up at two different equilibria and thus they may look very different in behav-
ioral terms. Effects of children and technological improvement on female labor
supply are also studied. Policy implications of tax-beneﬁt programs, subsidies
for labor-saving household durables (like cooking oven), facilitating availability
of drinking water and reservation for women at work-place are worked out as
well. The results found here resonate well with the range of empirical ﬁndings
reported in the literature.
1.2 Chapter Three: Current Patent Policies And The Reform
Proposals
The next chapter of my dissertation is based on papers that I have written with
Talia Bar. It has two parts. The ﬁrst part studies and criticizes one particular fea-
ture – the prior art search and its disclosure – in the current patent system in the
United States. The second part analyzes a proposal of the patent system reform
2– a two-tiered patent system, in existence of a negative externality imposed by
bad patents on the value an innovator gets for holding a good patent.
1.2.1 Prior Art – To Search or Not to Search
To determine patentability, inventions are evaluated in light of existing prior art.
Innovators have a duty to disclose any prior art that they are aware of, but have
no obligation to search. This section studies innovators’ incentives to search
for prior art, and their search intensities and timing. We distinguish between
early state of the art search–conducted before R&D investment, and novelty
search–conducted right before applying for a patent. We identify conditions in
which innovators have no incentive to search for prior art. Hence the entire
responsibility of searching for any invalidating prior art passes to the patent
examiner and, given the backlog of patent applications, examiners do not spend
enough time on each application. Thus the economy may end up having a lot
of bad patents. We ﬁnd that the search intensity of applicants increases with the
R&D cost, the examiners’ expected search effort, and with patenting fees. We
also ﬁnd that innovators prefer to correlate their search technology with that
of the patent ofﬁce. In light of our model, we discuss the implications of some
proposed policy reforms.
1.2.2 Patent Quality and a Two-Tiered Patent System
This part of the chapter provides an equilibrium model of the patent system. We
studydeterminantsofpatentqualityandthevolumeofpatentapplications. The
3value of a patent for innovators may depend on the overall quality of granted
patents, which in turn depends on the volume of applications, as well as on the
examinationprocess. Itisfoundthat, inequilibrium, anincreaseinpatentingfee
reduces the number of patent applications and increases the quality of patents.
Interestingly, a more stringent examination process can have ambiguous effects
on the volume of patent applications. We study the effects of patent system
reforms on the equilibrium volume of applications and on patent quality. We
model and evaluate a reform proposal that has recently captured the attention
of policy makers to establish a two-tiered patent system in which applicants
can choose a more costly and more stringent examination process – ”gold-plate
patents”. It is developed on the founding idea of a two-tiered patent system
as described by Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat (2005). Introducing a second
patent-tier can reduce patent applications, and the incidence of bad patents.
We claim that innovators with high ex-ante probability of validity will more
likely apply for the gold-plate patents, but sorting in the dimension of economic
signiﬁcance is not obvious.
1.3 Chapter Four: Do Journals Accept Too Many Papers?
The ﬁnal chapter of my dissertation provides a theoretical model for analyzing
the behavior of peer-reviewed journals. There has been rising concern about
the ﬂaws in the peer review system. Due to errors in the refereeing process,
many papers of good quality get rejections from journals. The reverse mistake
of accepting papers that ought not to be set in print also no doubt occurs. It
is demonstrated in this chapter that, apart from natural human errors, inefﬁ-
ciencies can arise purely for reasons of inter-journal strategic behavior. Speciﬁ-
4cally, it is shown that, as a result of competition to improve their ranks, journals
tend to set their quality cut-off points excessively low. Apart from these speciﬁc
ﬁndings, this chapter also tries to contribute to providing a general theoreti-
cal structure for analyzing journal behavior – a subject that has not received as
much attention as it should.
5CHAPTER 2
A THEORY OF FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY
”Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus.” – John Gray (1992)
2.1 Introduction
There exist differences between the preferences of men and women. These lead
them to take different decisions in similar situations. Many empirical stud-
ies ﬁnd that giving household subsidies to a woman rather than a man leads
to different outcomes in the household expenditures, notably, child nutrition
and schooling (see Senauer, Garcia & Jacinto, 1988; Hopkins, Levin and Had-
dad, 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Handa, 1999; Duﬂo, 2003; Gitter and
Barham, 2008). Recently, there have been empirical studies suggesting differ-
ences in the household-decisions that can be attributed to differences in the
power distribution between husbands and wives within households (Felkey,
2005; Lancaster, Maitra and Ray, 2006; Gitter and Barham, 2008). It is, therefore,
necessarytostudytheeconomicissuesdrivenbydecisionsofwomenseparately
from those inﬂuenced by men; labor supply is one such decision.
Labor supply plays a very important role in an economy’s development.
A robust and ample labor force promotes development, and development, in
turn, feeds back on labor market conditions. Studying the behavior of labor
market can give rise to important policy implications. There have been many
studies focusing on labor supply and in recent times, there has also been a fair
amount of research on female labor supply in particular. Most of these studies
are, however, empirical (Blundell, Ham and Meghir, 1987; Arellano and Meghir,
61992; Nakamura and Nakamura, 1994; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Greenwood,
Seshadri and Yorukoglu, 2005). The theoretical foundations of this topic has not
been well explored in the existing literature and this chapter attempts to make
amends for that.
The goal of this chapter is to develop a general theory of female labor
supply—a theory that shows how the nature of female labor supply can take
different forms and shapes due to cultural or structural differences between
economies. Hence similar policies might have different economic implications.
Therefore, before considering any proposal for policy reforms for raising female
labor force participation, it is necessary to understand its behavior in that par-
ticular economy.
Usually a woman’s labor supply decision is not taken by herself alone. All
adult members of the household, and especially the adult males would typically
participate in this decision. To study the behavior of female labor supply, it is
thus important to understand the household’s decision making process. On
one hand, a working woman’s income adds to the household’s total income
which increases the collective utility; on the other hand, working outside leaves
a woman with less time to spend on household-work which in turn decreases
household-utility. Therefore a woman’s labor supply decision depends on the
collective utility of the household, the power distribution between the members
of the household and, of course, the market wages. The power of a woman
may be determined endogenously. The more a woman contributes to the family
income compared to the other members of the family, the more power she gains;
again, as the power of the woman increases in the household, she has more
freedom to do what she prefers—household work or outside job.
7This chapter works with a general equilibrium model in which consumption
and female labor supply decisions are made by households and power is deter-
mined endogenously. The producers employ both men and women to produce
the consumption good; and households own equal shares of proﬁts earned by
the ﬁrms. Using this model, it is shown that female labor supply can be in-
creasing, or decreasing, or backward-bending, with respect to a rise in the mar-
ket wage rate. Under some circumstances, multiple equilibria might occur in
the female labor market so that two economies with exactly same fundamental
characteristics might end up at two very different equilibria: one with a high
female labor force participation and the other with a low participation. Some-
times multiple equilibria might occur within households which give rise to the
female labor supply taking the form of a correspondence. In such a situation,
a slight rise in female labor demand may cause a huge increase in female-labor
employment.
The chapter also derives some important comparative statics results and pol-
icy implications. It is found, somewhat unsurprisingly, that women reduce their
labor force participation when they have child-birth, or if they have children
with disabilities. I also study the effects of technological innovations of con-
sumer durable goods, which help in reducing household work, on the female
labor supply and women’s time spent on house-work. I ﬁnd that, as a result,
women tend to work more outside home since household work becomes less
labor-intensive. The model also follows us to study the policy implications of
tax-beneﬁt programs and reservation for women. These are found to have am-
biguous effects. It can be shown, using the model in this chapter, that the effects
of these policies on female labor force participation are not necessarily posi-
tive, contrary to what we would be led to believe if we rely solely on intuition.
8Even in economies with similar fundamental characteristics, the equilibrium
female labor force participation may rise in one and fall in the other as a re-
sult of tax-beneﬁts given to women or work-place reservation policy for them.
This occurs because of the multiplicity of equilibria. Although only one pol-
icy implication—reservation for women—is actually worked out in a general
equilibrium framework where there exist some substitutability between female
labor and male labor, it is argued that all other results hold in the general set-up.
There is a growing literature on collective models of household behavior
(Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992, 1994; Vermeulen, 2002; Lundberg, 2005).
However, very few papers relate female labor to the structure of household de-
cision making. Francois (1998), Basu (2006) and, hopefully, mine are contribu-
tions to this. Francois’ (1998) paper was focused on gender discrimination. He
showed that even in the absence of any gender-speciﬁc inefﬁciencies, gender
discrimination in the labor market may arise just “from the interaction between
women and men within the household.”
The model developed in the present chapter is more closely related to the
one in Basu (2006). Using a collective utility model, he showed how a house-
hold might end up with multiple equilibria while choosing the effort-level of
the woman for working outside home. However, he assumed that wages are
ﬁxed which can be justiﬁed as long as we are considering one household at a
time. One household (consisting of one woman) cannot have any signiﬁcant
impact on the wages. But when we aggregate all the household decisions to get
the total female labor supply, we cannot take female and, for that matter, male
wages to be ﬁxed because market wages are determined endogenously. They
depend on the labor demand and the total labor supply. Allowing wages to
9vary, it can be shown that the multiplicity of household equilibria described in
Basu’s model might vanish. And, more interestingly, we might have multiple
equilibria in the female-labor market although there is a unique equilibrium for
each of the identical households.
2.2 The Model
There are N identical households in a society. Each household consists of two
adults: a male (m) and a female (f). They have different utility functions. How-
ever, they take the household-decisions collectively. Their objective is to max-
imize a weighted average of the utility each of them gets from their collective
decisions. The weights depend on the power distribution in the household. Let
 2 [0;1] denote the power of the woman in the household. Hence (1   ) is the
power of the man. Following the arguments of Agarwal (1997) and Basu (2006),
it will be assumed that this index of power is endogenous to the household, that
is, while  inﬂuences household decisions, the decisions in turn inﬂuence : The
woman may gain more power by earning money from an outside job and thus
increasing the total household income; on the other hand, she can choose to do
more what she likes—outside job or household work—if she has more power.
This endogeneity of power is not at odds with empirical ﬁndings; see Bittman,
England, Sayer, Folbre and Matheson (2003). Let e 2 [0;1] denote the woman’s
effort put to work outside home and h 2 [0;1] be her effort on household work,
(e + h) 2 [0;1]: Let  denote the woman’s pain or disutility from outside job in
terms of household work, i.e., the pain from working for one hour outside is
equivalent to the pain from working  hours in the household,  > 0: Basically,
working at home or outside are perfectly substitutable choices for the woman
10and  works as a preference parameter here. Hence working one hour outside
is equivalent to working  hours at home.
Let w be the market wage rate for female labor and ﬁx, for the time-being,
the wages for men at w: Unlike Basu (2006), wages in this chapter are not ﬁxed.
This allows us to study the labor markets, especially the female labor supply
and to do comparative statics in a general equilibrium framework. I initially
assume that the labor markets for women and men are two completely separate
markets independent of each other—changes in the wages and employment in
one has no inﬂuence on the other. This of course is not true in reality and later
on I relax this assumption to allow for dependence between them. To focus on
the analysis of female labor supply, assume that the man always puts effort 1
for outside work.
Let x be the consumption good and normalize its price at 1. For technical
ease, assume that there is only one consumption good and both agents gain
some utility from it. Let vi (:) denote the utility of a person of gender i 2 fm; fg
from the household work done by the woman and assume v0
i (:) > 0;v00
i (:)  0:
Let us denote the pain caused by i’s effort on outside work by ci (:), where c0
i (:) >
0;c00
i (:)  0; i.e., the disutility increases at an increasing rate. Now we can write
down the utility functions for the female and the male in a household in the
following form:
uf (x;e;h) = x + vf (h)   cf (h + e);
um (x;h) = x + vm (h)   cm (1):
Assume that v0
f (1) > c0
f (1);i 2 fm; fg; i.e., for all h; the woman’s marginal utility
fromherworkathomeismorethanhermarginaldisutilityfromthat. Thisguar-
antees that the optimum choice of e and h by the household are such that h > 0
11and (e + h) = 1; i.e., the woman puts her entire effort 1 on work—household and
outside. Let
uf (x;h) = uf (x;1   h;h):
Hence the household’s objective is to choose (x;h) or, equivalently, (x;e) such
that the weighted average of the utilities of the man and the woman
U (x;h) = uf (x;h) + (1   )um (x;h) (2.1)
= x + 
h
vf (h)   cf ( + (1   )h)
i
+ (1   )[vm (h)   cm (1)]
is maximized subject to the household’s budget constraint
x  w + (1   h)w:
Since the household’s collective utility is strictly increasing in x; the budget
constraint will hold with equality. Substituting for x from the budget constraint,
let
e ui (h) = ui (w + (1   h)w;h);i 2 fm; fg;
e U (h) = e uf (h) + (1   )e um (h):
Hence, e U (h) is maximized w.r.t. h 2 [0;1]: Therefore, when the woman’s power
is  and the market wage rate for her labor is w; the collective utility maximizing
effort (e) by the woman for her outside job is given by the solution of the ﬁrst
order condition:1
w = 
h
v
0
f (h) + (   1)c
0
f ( + (1   )h)
i
+ (1   )v
0
m (h) (2.2)
or;w = 
h
v
0
f (1   e) + (   1)c
0
f (1 + (   1)e)
i
+ (1   )v
0
m (1   e):
The equation above gives us the household-utility maximizing effort supplied
by the woman for outside job, e; as a function of  for a given wage w :
e = e(;w):
1If w < 
h
v0
f (1) + (   1)c0
f (1)
i
+ (1   )v0
m (1); then e = 0:
12Implicitly differentiating the ﬁrst order condition (2:2); ﬁnd that
@h
@
> 0
 
or;
@e
@
< 0
!
if and only if
@uf (x;h)
@h
>
@um (x;h)
@h
or; MRS
h;x
f > MRS
h;x
m ;
where MRS
h;x
i is person i’s marginal rate of substitution between the woman’s
household work and the consumption good. The above statement simply
means that if the woman’s marginal rate of substitution between her house-
hold work and the consumption good is more than that of the man’s, i.e., if the
woman prefers working at home more than the man likes her household work,
then the more power she gains, the more she can choose to work at home.
The woman can acquire more power by earning more. Suppose the power of
a woman () in the household depends not only on the relative wages she earns
compared to the man

ew
w

; but also on the prevailing relative market wage for
female labor

w
w

: If w
w is very high, then even a woman who does not actually
go outside for a job (i.e., e = 0), can enjoy a pretty high power by the mere
availability of a very good outside option. On the other hand, if w
w = 0 (or a very
low value), then the woman cannot gain a lot of power by working outside even
for full-time. Therefore, since w is ﬁxed, we can write the power of a woman ()
as a function of (e;w) so that  is increasing in e and as w increases,  shifts up.
 = (e;w):
Deﬁnition 1 A household equilibrium in this model, for a given market wage rate for
female labor w; is described by (e (w); (w)) where
e
 (w) = e(
 (w);w);
13
 (w) = (e
 (w);w):
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium in the female labor market, or simply market equilibrium,
occurs when total female labor supply equals the demand for female labor.
Let LD
f (w) be the female labor demand when market wage rate for female
labor is w and let LS
f (w) be the female labor supply at that wage rate. Hence,
given that there are N identical households (and thus N women) in the econ-
omy, from the household equilibrium described above, we can say that the total
female labor supply in the economy is
L
S
f (w) = N  e
 (w):
Therefore, the market equilibrium is given by the equilibrium wage rate for
female labor w such that
L
D
f (w
) = N  e
 (w
):
Next, I shall assume the single crossing property between the man’s and the
woman’s indifference curves. By this, I mean to assume either of the following
two cases. In case I, MRS
h;x
f > MRS
h;x
m for all h so that the indifference curves of
the woman for her household work and consumption good are always steeper
than those of the man. As a result, the household’s collective utility maximizing
effort supplied by the woman for outside job (e) is decreasing with her power:
@e
@ < 0. In case II, I assume exactly the opposite, i.e., MRS
h;x
f < MRS
h;x
m for all
h which means steeper indifference curves for the man compared to those for
the woman. Hence, in case II, the more power she gains, the more she chooses
to work outside: @e
@ > 0: Let us analyze these two cases in the following two
sections and describe the household equilibrium and female labor market equi-
librium in each case.
14Figure 2.1: Unique household equilibrium in Case I
2.2.1 Steeper Indifference Curves of Women than Men’s
In this case, the woman’s marginal rate of substitution between her household
work and consumption good is more than that of the man. Since the woman
likes working at home more than the man likes her household work, the house-
hold’s collective utility maximizing effort supplied by the woman for outside
job decreases as her power increases: @e
@ < 0: However, the woman can acquire
more power by working more outside (thus earning more): @
@e > 0: Thus, plot-
ting e(;w) and (e;w) in the e  space, it is easy to see that there exists a unique
household equilibrium in this case, as shown in Figure 2.1.
To ﬁnd the market equilibrium, we ﬁrst need to construct the female labor
supplyfromthehouseholdequilibriaatdifferentmarketwagesforfemalelabor.
From the ﬁrst order condition of the household’s utility maximization problem
15Figure 2.2: Changes in household equilibrium with increase in w
given by Equation (2:2); it is easy to check that
@e
@w
> 0:
We can think of it as a substitution effect of a price-rise. The market wage-rate
w is nothing but the price of working one hour at home for the woman. Hence,
as a result of a rise in wages, she will want to work less at home and work more
outside. There is a “power-gain effect” as well. As we have argued earlier, the
more the market wage is, the more power the woman earns:
@
@w
> 0;
andthemorepowersheearns, thelessshewantstoworkoutside. Therefore, the
total effect of the increased wages on her outside work choice is ambiguous. As
the wage-rate for female labor rises, both e(;w) and (e;w) shift up in the e   
space. This may cause e to either increase or decrease or remain unchanged. If
e (w) increases as w increases, then the female labor supply curve is increasing
16Figure 2.3: Multiple equilibria in female-labor market
as usual. But if e (w) decreases as w increases, then interesting outcomes may
occur since the female labor supply curve is now decreasing. In Figure 2.2 we
can see a situation where the effort-level in the household-equilibrium falls as
female-wages increase.
This may give rise to a downward sloping or backward bending supply
curve for female labor. Assuming downward sloping demand curve for female
labor, we might have multiple equilibria in some situations in the female la-
bor market although there exists a unique household equilibrium.2 One such
situation is shown in Figure 2.3.
Therefore, two economies, similar in every fundamental aspect, might end
up at two different equilibria and thus they look very different from outside in
terms of the outcome. One of them might have a very high female labor force
2I have elsewhere, along with co-authors, established a different setting where, again with
feasible wages, one gets multiple equilibria though through a very different mechanism (Atal,
Basu, Gray and Lee, 2010).
17participation in equilibrium and low market wage rate. And in the other one,
women may spend more time at household work in equilibrium although the
market wage rate is very high.
2.2.2 Flatter Indifference Curves of Women than Men’s
Recall that, in this case, when the marginal utility from the outside job for the
woman is more than the marginal utility of the man for her effort put outside,
then as the power of the woman increases, her effort supply for outside job in-
creases: @e
@ > 0: Since both the “power-earning curve” (e;w) and “effort supply
curve” e(;w) are increasing in this case, we might have multiple equilibria in
a household as shown in Basu (2006). Plotting e(;w) and (e;w) in the e   
space as we did earlier, we can get the following ﬁgure which shows one such
instance where for a given wage w for female-labor, there exist three household
equilibria: E1 = (e1;1);E2 = (e2;2) and E3 = (e3;3):
As we did in the previous case, let us now ﬁnd the market equilibrium in this
case. For that, we need to construct the female labor supply ﬁrst, that is, allow
the wages to change and check what happens to the household equilibrium.
If we incorporate changes in wages for female-labor, the multiplicity of
household equilibria might not exist even in the example shown in Figure 2.4.
To see this, ﬁrst note that as wage-rate w increases, the power-earning curve
(e;w) shifts up and the effort-supply curve e(;w) moves to the right (or down)
(see Figure 2.5) since for w00 > w0; we have

 
e;w
00
> 
 
e;w
0
for all e and
e
 
;w
00
> e
 
;w
0
for all :
18Figure 2.4: Multiple household equilibria in Case II
Hence the equilibrium effort-levels e1 and e2 come closer and e2 and e3 move
farther apart. After a sufﬁcient increase in w; two of the three equilibria E1 and
E2 vanishand the householdends up at the uniqueequilibrium with a very high
effort-level e: Similarly, for sufﬁciently low wages for female-labor, the house-
hold may have a unique equilibrium with very low effort-level. Since for wages
in some particular range we might have multiple equilibria for each household,
the female labor supply for each household in such a situation is given by a
correspondence as shown in Figure 2.5.
If all the households choose exactly the same equilibrium at a given wage,
then the total female labor supply looks exactly like the effort supply correspon-
dence for each household (as in Figure 2.5). The total labor supply is N times the
effort exerted by the woman from each household where N is the total number
of households in the society. In this case, a slight rise in female labor demand
might give a huge boost to the female labor force participation (in hours). In
19Figure 2.5: Changes in household equilibria with increase in w and female
labor supply correspondence per household
20Figure 2.6: Tax-beneﬁt to the employers for employing women at work
may give a huge boost to female labor force participation
Figure 2.6, consider a situation where an economy starts with a labor demand
LD
f0 and it is at a low participation equilibrium Lf0. Then, due to a tax-beneﬁt to
the employers for employing women at work, suppose the demand for female
labor shifts up to the one given by LD
f1 in Figure 2.6. As a result, the economy
reaches at a new equilibrium Lf1 where both the supply and demand for fe-
male labor are much more compared to the initial equilibrium causing a major
increase in female labor force participation (in hours). In fact, in this case, if
the government decides to rescind on the policy slowly, i.e., by gradually re-
ducing the tax-beneﬁts so that the demand for female labor moves back to the
initial one, the economy may end up being at the high participation equilibrium
instead of the low one where it originally started.
Instead of all households behaving the same way, if households are assigned
one of the multiple equilibria in appropriate proportions, then the total female
21Figure 2.7: Continuum of equilibria in female-labor market
labor supply correspondence (denoted by LS
f) looks like the one in Figure 2.7.
For each w for which there exist multiple equilibria in the household, the total
female-labor supply can be any rational number between Nemin (w) and Nemax (w)
where emin (w) is the minimum effort-level supplied by a woman at wages w
according to the multiple household-equilibria and emax (w) gives the maximum
effort-level by a woman in the household-equilibrium for the same wages. If N
is very large, then since rational numbers are dense on real line, the total female
labor supply correspondence LS
f has a thick area as shown in Figure 2.7. Let LD
f
be the demand curve for female-labor which is down-ward sloping. Then, from
Figure 2.7, it is evident that a society might have a continuum of equilibria in
the female labor market.
In the entire analysis above we have seen some situations where multiple
equilibria may occur in the female labor market and in some other instances
we may have a continuum of equilibria. However, all these analyses have been
22done keeping the labor market for men out of the picture. We assumed that
movements in the labor market for women does not have any impact on the
market wage for men. I shall relax this assumption later in Section 2.6 and
analyze in a general equilibrium framework.
2.3 Children and Female Labor Force Participation
While studying women and their labor force participation (as hours of work
outside home), one usual question arises always: how does it change when
women have kids? Many people have studied empirically the effect of children
on the work choices of the mothers (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1994; Porter-
ﬁeld, 2002; Boushey, 2008). All of them, unsurprisingly, found a negative im-
pact, specially when a child is young or with disabilities. Young children or
children with disabilities usually require more attention of their mothers com-
pared to the older healthier children. Hence a woman with a young child3
(along with the entire household) face more difﬁculties if the woman spends
more time for the outside job. The marginal utility of the household from the
woman’s household-work is now larger than before. Hence the household ends
up choosing more time at house-work (and less time outside) for the woman.
To see this outcome from the model in this chapter, suppose a new baby is
born. Although it is unrealistic to assume that newborn babies will consume
the same good as adults, for algebraic simplicity, let us assume that the baby
also gets some utility from the household consumption good x: Let vb (h) be the
utility the child gets from the mother’s house-work, v0
b (:) > 0 and v00
b (:)  0:
3Note that fertility is exogenous in this model.
23Hence the total utility of the child from the consumption good and the mother’s
house-work is given by
ub (x;h) = x + vb (h):
Let b be the importance the baby’s preferences get in the household-utility, and
thus (1   b) and (1   b)(1   ) are the weights attached with the woman’s and
the man’s utilities, respectively, in the household. Therefore, the collective util-
ity of the household becomes
b U (x;h)
= bub (x;h) + (1   b)
h
uf (x;h) + (1   )um (x;h)
i
:
Since the income of the family does not change, the budget constraint remains
unchanged. Hence, as we have done earlier, the ﬁrst order condition of the
household’s collective utility maximization problem is
w = bv
0
b (h) + (1   b)
h

n
v
0
f (h) + (   1)c
0
f ( + (1   )h)
o
+ (1   )v
0
m (h)
i
= b
@ub (x;h)
@h
+ (1   b)
"

@uf (x;h)
@h
+ (1   )
@um (x;h)
@h
#
:
Therefore, if b > 0 and if the marginal utility of the baby is more than the
marginal utility of the rest of the household from the woman’s house-work,
i.e., if
@ub (x;h)
@h
>
"

@uf (x;h)
@h
+ (1   )
@um (x;h)
@h
#
;
which is usually expected in case of young children or children with disabili-
ties, then the household’s utility maximizing effort supply of the woman falls
or e(;w) shifts left. We are not done yet. To ﬁnd out the effect on the female
labor supply, we have to ﬁnd out what happens to the household equilibria.
From Figure 2.1 in Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2.4 in Section 2.2.2, it is easy to check
that given w; equilibrium effort supply (and thus total female labor supply) falls
24as e(;w) shifts left.4 Hence, the model in this chapter is able to establish, the-
oretically, the same result as expected by all intuitively and shown empirically,
that existence of children, who need more attention of their mothers, reduces
the female labor supply.
2.4 Technological Improvement and Household-work
In the 20th century and late 19th century, following the industrial revolution,
people observed a huge technological revolution in their homes. The introduc-
tion of household consumer durables like washing machine, vacuum cleaner,
refrigerator, etc. made the household work a lot easier. Hence, many people
argued, women could spend less time at household and work more outside. In
1912, Thomas Edison said in an interview that “(t)he housewife of the future
will be neither a slave to servants nor herself a drudge. She will give less atten-
tion to the home, because the home will need less; she will be rather a domestic
engineer than a domestic labourer, with the greatest of all handmaidens, elec-
tricity, at her service. This and other mechanical forces will so revolutionize the
woman’s world that a large portion of the aggregate of woman’s energy will be
conserved for use in broader, more constructive ﬁelds.”
However, there has been a debate among social scientists over this issue.
Some ﬁnd that, as a result of the technological revolution, women indeed spent
less time in the household and labor force participation had increased (Ger-
shuny and Robinson, 1988; Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu, 2005). Others,
on the other hand, show evidence that this was not the case. Vanek (1974) ar-
4In Figure 2.4, e2 (the equilibrium effort supply in the middle one of the three equilibria, E2)
goes up, but we can ignore it since it is an unstable equilibrium.
25gued that women’s time spent on household work has increased marginally
since the revolution. Bittman, Rice and Wajcman (2004) showed that “domestic
technology rarely reduces women’s unpaid working time and even, paradoxi-
cally, produces some increases in domestic labour.” It would be interesting what
theory would have to say on this matter and that is what I proceed to investigate
now.
First of all, recall the ﬁrst order condition from the household’s collective
utilitymaximizationproblemaftersubstitutingfor x fromthebudgetconstraint:
e u
0
f (h) + (1   )e u
0
m (h) = 0;
where
e ui (h) = ui (w + (1   h)w;h);i 2 fm; fg:
Suppose  is a parameter in the model. Then, for ﬁnding the comparative statics
results of  on h; we have to differentiate the ﬁrst order condition given above5
with respect to :
@
@
h
e u
0
f + (1   )e u
0
m
i
+
h
e u
00
f + (1   )e u
00
m
i dh
d
= 0
or,
h
e u
00
f + (1   )e u
00
m
i dh
d
=  
@
@
h
e u
0
f + (1   )e u
0
m
i
:
This implies, sincee u00
i < 0 for i 2 fm; fg;
sign
 
dh
d
!
= sign
"
@
@

e u
0
f + (1   )e u
0
m
#
= sign
"
@
@
h

n
v
0
f (h) + (   1)c
0
f ( + (1   )h)
o
+ (1   )v
0
m (h)   w
i#
:
Technological improvement in household’s consumer durables helps in-
crease the efﬁciency at household work. Therefore, the output from the same
5Dropping the variables in the parentheses for ease of writing.
26Figure 2.8: Facilitating availability (or affordability) of household-labor
saving goods may give a boost to female labor force partici-
pation
time spent on the house-work is expected to be much more than before. Hence,
the marginal utility from the same time spent at house-work is now less than
before. This means, in terms of our model, a lower v0
i (:) for i 2 fm; fg: Since
we know that (e + h) = 1 always, it is easy to check that when  represents fall
in v0
i (:); then the collective utility maximizing effort (or time) spent at house-
work h falls. Therefore, according to our model, technological improvement in
household’s consumer durable goods causes an increase in female labor force
participation, as found in Gershuny and Robinson (1988), Greenwood, Seshadri
and Yorukoglu (2005).
This may give rise to important policy implications. Subsidizing consumer
durable goods that increase efﬁciency at household-work, for example wash-
ing machines, or facilitating the availability of drinking water, or any such im-
provement that is labor-saving in household-work, may raise the female labor
27supply and this might lead to a huge—in fact, disproportionate—increase in the
female labor force participation (in hours) in equilibrium. To see this, suppose
the economy has a backward bending female labor supply curve LS
f0 as in Fig-
ure 2.8 and initially the economy is situated at a low participation equilibrium

L0
f;w0

: Then suppose the government starts distributing washing machines or
cooking ovens at a subsidized rate. This leads to a rise in female labor supply
and it shifts right to LS
f1: As a result, as it can be seen in Figure 2.8, the econ-
omy reaches at a new equilibrium with a massive increase in female labor force
participation from L0
f to L1
f:
2.5 Effects of Tax Beneﬁt on Female Labor Supply
In many countries, there are policy programs specially aimed at increasing the
participation of women in the labor force. One of these policies include giving
tax-beneﬁts to women on their incomes. To see the implications of this policy in
our model, we can do similar exercise as we have done in the previous section.
In this case,  represents w because w is basically the net wage rate (gross
wage rate minus taxes) and a tax-beneﬁt simply means a rise in net wages. As
a result, from Equation (2:2); it is easy to ﬁnd that given ; the household’s util-
ity maximizing effort supply of the woman rises or e(;w) shifts right. Again,
since her net wage rate is now higher, she can gain more power from the same
amount of effort put on outside job, i.e., (e;w) shifts up. This exercise has been
worked out in Figure 2.2 in Section 2.2.1 and in Figure 2.5 in Section 2.2.2. From
these ﬁgures, it is evident that the equilibrium effort supply of the woman (and
thus total female labor supply) might go up or go down as a result of the tax-
28Figure 2.9: Introduction of tax-beneﬁt might have different effects at dif-
ferent equilibria
beneﬁt to women. Note that since a tax-beneﬁt of value  on net wage-rate w is
equivalent to a rise in the net wage rate by the same amount, the entire female
labor supply curve (or correspondence) shifts down by that amount:
L
S
f (w + ) = f LS
f (w);
where LS
f and f LS
f denote the female labor supply before and after the introduc-
tion tax-beneﬁt, respectively. Hence, in an economy with a backward-bending
female labor supply curve as shown in Figure 2.3 and multiple equilibria in the
female labor market, introduction of a tax-beneﬁt program for women might
have different outcomes depending on which market equilibrium the economy
is at. In Figure 2.9, we can see that a tax-beneﬁt causes an increase in female
labor force participation (in terms of hours) in one equilibrium (from L2
f to f L2
f),
whereas, in the other equilibrium, it falls, f L1
f < L1
f: There have been many empir-
ical works for measuring the effectiveness of some tax-beneﬁt programs (Eissa
29and Liebman, 1996; Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998; Grogger, 2003). Most
of them ﬁnd a positive impact on women’s labor force participation. Eissa and
Liebman (1996) found that for one group of women, the effect is positive and for
another group of women, it is zero. But, to the best of my knowledge, the neg-
ative impact of tax-beneﬁts on the equilibrium female labor force participation
has not been observed by any empirical work yet.
2.6 Dependence between Labor Markets of Men and Women:
The General Equilibrium Framework
In the previous sections, the female and male labor markets were treated as
two completely separate markets, changes in one having no inﬂuence on the
other. In this section, I allow for some substitutability between male and female
labor. Let us bring in the production side as well to get the demand for labor. In
the partial equilibrium framework one done in Basu (2006), we don’t consider
all the economic agents in the economy and thus we might miss the feedback
effectsfromthem. Hencewemightover-estimateorunder-estimatesomepolicy
implications which is misleading for the government while considering a policy.
Therefore, it is necessary to study the policy issues in the general equilibrium
framework.
Suppose there are N identical households (each consists of a man and a
woman) who own M identical ﬁrms producing the consumption good x with
equal share of proﬁts. As before, let x be the numeraire good in this model, i.e.,
price of the consumption good is 1: Let wf be the wages for female labor and
wm be the wages for male labor. Assume that the man always works full-time
30outside, however, the woman’s effort for outside job (e) is chosen in the house-
hold equilibrium by maximizing household utility. The utility functions take
the same form as before (given by equation (2:1)), but the budget constraint is
now different. Each of the N household’s objective function is
max
x0;e2[0;1]
U (x;e) = uf (x;e;1   e) + (1   )um (x;e)
subject to the budget constraint
x 

wm + ewf

+
M
N


wf;wm

where  is the proﬁt of each ﬁrm. Typically, because of the dependence of the
budget constraint on the non-wage income , we should have a family of la-
bor supply curves (each curve indexed by the  level). However, in this case,
the household-utility maximizing labor supply will be independent of the level
of non-wage income. This arises because we have a utility function which is
quasi-linear in the consumption good, and we are assuming an interior solu-
tion. That is, any increase in non-wage income (wage rates being given) would
be fully reﬂected in a corresponding increase in the consumption good, x, to
restore budget equality.
As found in Section 2.2, the ﬁrst order condition of the household’s collective
utility maximization problem is given by
wf = 
h
v
0
f (1   e) + (   1)c
0
f (1 + (   1)e)
i
+ (1   )v
0
m (1   e)
which in turn gives us the effort supplied by the woman for outside job, e; as a
function of  for a given female-wage wf :
e = e

;wf

where
@e
@
7 0
31accordingly as
@uf (x;e;1   e)
@e
?
@um (x;1   e)
@e
for all e:
Suppose the power of a woman () in the household depends on her total
earnings relative to the man
ewf
wm

and also on the prevailing relative market
wage
 wf
wm

: At very high relative wages, the woman can exercise a lot of power
in the household even though she does not actually go outside for a job (i.e.,
e = 0) just because she has a very good outside option available. On the other
hand, if relative wages are very low, then the woman cannot gain a lot of power
by working outside even for full-time. Therefore,
 = 
 
e;
wf
wm
!
:
A household equilibrium in this model, for given wages

wf;wm

; is de-
scribed by

e 
wf;wm

; 
wf;wm

where
e
 
wf;wm

= e


 
wf;wm

;wf

and

 
wf;wm

= 
 
e
 
wf;wm

;
wf
wm
!
:
Hence, since the man always goes out to work for the entire 1 unit of time, the
total supply of female and male labor in this economy are
L
S
f

wf;wm

= N  e
 
wf;wm

;
L
S
m

wf;wm

= N:
Now let us look at the producers’ side. Suppose that there exists some sub-
stitutability between male labor and female labor. Each one of the M identical
producers choose the amount of inputs (or the two kinds of labor) to maximize
proﬁt:
 = F

Lf;Lm

  wmLm   wfLf;
32where F
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
is the production function with two inputs—female labor and
male labor, with positive marginal products.6 Assuming decreasing returns to
scale in both the inputs or a strictly concave production function, i.e.,
@2F
@L2
f
< 0;
@2F
@L2
m
< 0 and
@2F
@L2
f
@2F
@L2
m
>
 
@2F
@Lf@Lm
!2
:
Therefore, solving the two ﬁrst order conditions of the proﬁt maximization
problem, we get the demand for both kinds of labor by each ﬁrm:
@F

Lf;Lm

@Lf
= wf and
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@Lm
= wm
) Lf = Lf

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
and Lm = Lm

wf;wm

:
Concavity of the production function guarantees downward sloping labor de-
mand curves with an upward shift caused by the increase in wages for the other
kind of labor since male labor and female labor are substitutes to some extent.
Hence, the total demand for both kinds of labor is given by
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;
L
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
= M  Lm

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
:
Since the price of the consumption good is assumed to be 1; the equilibrium
of this model is described by the equilibrium wage rates for female and male
labor
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where the demand for labor equals its supply, i.e.,
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:
With this general equilibrium set-up in hand, note that, while studying the
6To avoid any kind of complementarity between the inputs, assume that the elasticity of
substitution is at least as much as 1; i.e.,

@F
@Lf = @F
@Lm

(Lf=Lm)   
d

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@Lm

d(Lf=Lm) :
33Figure 2.10: The general equilibrium
impacts of various changes like child-birth, technological improvement, or tax-
beneﬁts on female labor supply, as done in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 respectively,
it has been argued that only female labor supply gets affected and that leads to
a change in the equilibrium female labor force participation and female wage-
rate. Since the demand-side for both female and male labors remain unchanged,
the analysis leads to similar results in the current general equilibrium frame-
work as well. 7 If, however, labor-demand changes, the outcome may be dif-
ferent. For example, in case of technological improvement, if the production
technology also changes and becomes less female-labor intensive, then the de-
mand for female-labor decreases along with an increase in the supply (due to
theavailabilityoflabor-savinghouseholddurables), andhencetheoveralleffect
on the equilibrium participation rate becomes ambiguous.
7The direction of change will be the same, but the exact quantitative measurement of the
policy implications will be different between the partial and the general equilibrium ones.
342.7 Reservation for Women at Work
Although almost half of the population in the world is female, they occupy
a much smaller proportion of population in terms of employment. In 2000,
women held only 30% share of the total employed positions. The average
hourly wage-rate of women is just three-quarters of that of men. Aiming at re-
ducing the gender-inequality, various countries have been considering different
policies to increase female labor force participation and reduce the wage-gap.
They have been trying to do so by providing micro-credit facilities targeted at
women, facilitating vocational training programs, raising general awareness of
the society, and so on. In India, reservation of political posts for women is one
such policy. According to this, at least one-third of all the villages should have a
womanastheircouncil-leaders. Thishasledtoasigniﬁcantincreaseinwomen’s
involvement in as well as impact on policy-making (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo,
2004). This gives us a hint that a similar quota for women at work-places may
encourage female labor force participation and reduce the wage-gap between
men and women. Let us check the implication of this kind of a policy by using
the model in this chapter.
Suppose, initially, the economy was at a general equilibrium as described
in the previous section. Then the government makes a law by which the ratio
between the number of female employees to the number of male employees, at
each of the M ﬁrms producing the consumption good, has to be at least as large
as the fraction r 2 (0;1), i.e.,
Lf
Lm
 r:
As a result, the producer cannot always choose the proﬁt-maximizing levels of
both kinds of labor. When female wage-rate is high enough compared to the
35male wage-rate, then although proﬁt-maximization requires the ratio between
female labor and male labor to be strictly less than r; the producer cannot do that
due to the quota and in that situation, he simply maintains the ratio exactly. For
example, let us take a speciﬁc CES production function with decreasing returns
to scale:
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:
Let the quota for female employees be r = 0:36: Hence the ratio between the
demands for the two kinds of labor will be
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0:36 otherwise.
Therefore, a portion of the female labor demand curve shifts right when female
wages are high compared to existing male wages. And, for the similar reason, a
portion of the demand curve for male labor shifts down when male wages are
low. As a result, as evident from Figure 2.11, female labor force participation in
equilibrium may rise and the wage-gap between male labor and female labor
reduces.
However, wehavetobecarefulwiththispolicy. Aquotaforwomenatwork-
place does not necessarily raise female labor force participation. For example,
in case of a backward-bending female labor supply with an initial equilibrium
at the downward sloping part of the curve, see Figure 2.12, an upward shift in
the demand for female labor reduces the equilibrium participation rate. Also,
the wage-gap may not necessarily go down as a result of a quota for women at
work-places. If the productivity of women is sufﬁciently low compared to that
of men, then it might be more proﬁtable for a producer to cut the production
down rather than hiring more women.
36Figure 2.11: Effects of a quota for women at work-place on the general
equilibrium
Figure 2.12: Quota may reduce equilibrium female labor force participa-
tion
37Hence, if women’s empowerment is the objective of the policy-makers, then
reservation for women at work-place may be a policy they might consider.
However, if the goal is to increase the female labor force participation or reduce
the wage-gap, then they have to be careful.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to develop a theoretical model for studying the na-
ture of female labor supply in an economy. Since the labor supply decision of a
woman is taken by the entire household instead of just the individual herself, I
have considered a collective utility model to explain the behavior of female la-
bor supply. The power of the woman, and thus the power distribution between
all members of the household, has been taken to be endogenous here. Under
this setting, it has been shown that female labor supply can take various shapes
as the market wage rate changes. Sometimes multiple equilibria might occur in
the female labor market. Hence we can have different policy implications for
different economies depending on the behavior (or shapes) of their female labor
supply (and also their demand for female labor). Not only that, policy implica-
tions might differ for the same economy at different time-points depending on
the initial equilibrium before the policy-imposition.
In the entire analysis above, we have assumed similar characteristics for all
the households in an economy. We assumed that women have same efﬁciency-
level across all the households which is far from reality. Further research on the
theory of female labor supply can be done where women have heterogeneous
abilities. We can think of the scope of education as well in this context. Educa-
38tion can help an individual in acquiring more skill and thus gain more power to
bargain for higher wages from the employer. However, getting some education
is costly. Even if basic primary education may be freely available in many coun-
tries, acquiring education may involve an opportunity cost because of the time
spent for it. This might give rise to interesting outcomes in women’s partici-
pation decisions in skilled or unskilled labor force and the literacy rate among
them in an economy.
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42CHAPTER 3
CURRENT PATENT POLICIES AND THE REFORM PROPOSALS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on two papers I have co-authored with Talia Bar. The ﬁrst
part of this chapter studies and criticizes the prior art search and disclosure poli-
cies in the current patent system in the United States. The second part studies
the effect of bad patents in the economy, especially the negative externality im-
posed by them on the value of a good patent holder. We also model and analyze
a recent patent system reform proposal for setting up a two-tiered system.
3.2 Prior Art: To Search or Not to Search
The patent system was designed to provide incentives to innovate and to
disclose research ﬁndings. Two central conditions for patentability of an
invention—novelty and non-obviousness—are evaluated in light of the existing
prior art. Broadly speaking, prior art could refer to any prior knowledge. How-
ever, for the purpose of determining patentability, prior art is deﬁned in the U.S.
Patent Act by stating that an invention is not patentable if “the invention was
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the ap-
plicant for patent,” and if such knowledge existed more than one year before the
ﬁling of the patent (35 U.S.C. x102). According to Rule 56 of the Rules of Prac-
tice in Patent Cases (37 CFR x1.56), “each individual associated with the ﬁling
43and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in
dealing with the Ofﬁce, which includes a duty to disclose to the Ofﬁce all infor-
mationknowntothatindividualtobematerialtopatentability...”1 Thus, Rule56
requires a patent applicant and his representatives not to intentionally omit any
information they have that appears to be “by itself or in combination with other
information” relevant for determining patentability. Violation of Rule 56 is con-
sidered “inequitable conduct” in court. However, there is no duty to search for
prior art, only to disclose what is known. According to Cotropia (2007), “(t)he
immediate results from a ﬁnding of inequitable conduct create a tremendous
deterrent against nondisclosure,” and there is a “perverse incentive for the rel-
evant parties to remain ignorant about relevant information since the more the
party knows, the greater is their exposure under the doctrine.”
Patent examination is imperfect. Patents on “innovations” that are either
not novel or obvious are often granted. Had the examiner been sufﬁciently in-
formed, such patent would not have been granted. These “bad patents”—for
which invalidating prior arts exist but are not found—might curtail future in-
novation, unnecessarily limit market activities and unduly create welfare reduc-
ing market power. Bad patents are also likely to result in waste due to litigation
costs and disadvantage those who cannot afford it. Amid concerns over the
patent ofﬁce granting a growing number of bad patents, many have called for
reform of the patent system and proposed remedies, such as a patent opposition
system (Merges (1999)), patent bounties (Thomas (2001)), “gold-plate” patents
(Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat (2005)), and community patent review (Noveck
(2006)).
In August 2007, the United States Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO)
1SeeManualofPatentExaminingProcedurehttp://www.uspto.gov/web/ofﬁces/pac/mpep/
44published a set of new rules that included a requirement to submit, with any
application that has more than ﬁve independent claims or twenty-ﬁve total
claims, an examination support document (ESD) that contains a detailed prior
art search statement by the innovator. On October 31, 2007, just before the new
rules were set to become effective, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia issued a decision temporarily enjoining the USPTO from
implementing the new rules.2 On April 1, 2008, the court handed down a de-
cision that permanently blocks implementation of the USPTO’s proposed new
rules.3 These proposed rules could be seen as an attempt to shift the duty of
prior art search from examiners to innovators (at least in some instances).
According to Alcacer and Gittelman (2006), more than 500,000 utility patents
were issued by the USPTO between 2001 and 2003, of which, around forty per-
cent had all the prior art references inserted by the examiners. Additionally,
two-thirds of all the citations on an average utility patent are contributed by the
examiners. The goal of this section is to better understand innovators’ incen-
tives to search for (and thus reveal) prior art and the policy levers that affect
these incentives. We study the beneﬁts, intensity and the timing of prior art
search and the potential implications of related proposed policy changes.
Our analysis distinguishes between ex ante search (conducted before R&D
investment), which we refer to as “early state of the art search” and ex post
or “novelty search” (conducted after successful R&D but before ﬁling for the
patent). Early state of the art search might help avoid duplication when it is not
proﬁtable to duplicate (saving investment cost) and it could shape innovation
2Tafas v. Dudas, No. 1:07 Civ 846 (E.D. va. Oct. 31, 2007), see memorandum opinion 10-31-
2007, available at http://www.jsslaw.com/publications.aspx
3Tafas v. Dudas, No. 1:07 Civ 846 (E.D. va. Apr.1, 2008), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/04/tafas-v-dudas-p.html
45by guiding the researcher to a path that is more likely to be novel, whereas nov-
elty search can save on patenting costs. Since search lowers the probability of
being granted a patent, and even bad patents may be proﬁtable to the awardee,
an innovator might prefer to avoid or limit prior art search. We derive payoff
maximizing search intensities and compare them to the socially optimal ones.
We study prior art search strategies in a sequential decision process. In
the model, an innovator chooses her early state of the art search intensity be-
fore investing in R&D. She learns from search results and updates her belief on
patentability. As more search effort produces no invalidating prior art, she be-
comes increasingly optimistic. After this initial search, she decides whether to
invest in risky R&D. If R&D is successful, the innovator chooses the intensity
of novelty-search and ﬁles for a patent if no invalidating prior art was found.
At the patent ofﬁce, an examiner follows a pre-determined search routine and
grants the patent if no invalidating prior art was found.
We determine the innovators’ optimal prior art search strategies under dif-
ferentpolicyrulesandpatentexamination regimes. Weﬁndthattheinnovator’s
effort level is weakly increasing with the examiner’s expected search effort. In-
novators search more when R&D investment and patenting costs are higher.
We identify conditions under which an innovator would prefer not to search
at all. If the cost of patenting is sufﬁciently low compared to the gain from a
bad patent, then the innovators under-invest in search compared to the social
optimum. There are conditions under which a suitable patent fee can give inno-
vators incentives for optimal search.
Patent policy has long been a subject of interest and debate in the economic
literature. Such work examined various aspects of patent policy, for example,
46optimal patent length and breadth (Klemperer, 1990; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990),
the novelty or patentability requirement (O’Donoghue, 1998; Scotchmer and
Green, 1990), infringement and litigation (Chang, 1995; Crampes and Langinier,
2002). Prior art search and disclosure incentives have been discussed by many
legal scholars. Yet, these issues have received relatively little formal considera-
tion in the economic literature. To the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst model of
prior art search and disclosure is due to Langinier and Marcoul (2003). Their pa-
per examines “the strategic non-revelation of information by innovators when
applying for patents.” They recommended that a patent examiner should un-
dertake identical scrutiny effort on all patent applications irrespective of the
number of citations by the applicant. In our analysis, we assume this is the case.
Lampe (2008) also considers innovators’ incentives not to disclose prior art. He
predicts that innovators would conceal information about prior arts which are
most “closely related” to their invention and thus, the most important pieces of
prior art are not cited by the patent applicants.
In contrast to these contributions, our main focus is on the incentives to
search for prior art, its timing and intensity. In most of our analysis, inno-
vators comply with the duty to disclose, but they may choose not to search.
This premise is in line with the writing of legal scholars such as Thomas (2001):
“(a)lthough Rule 56 mandates that the applicants disclose known prior art, it
does not require them to search in the ﬁrst place. Coupled with the draconian
consequences of a holding of inequitable conduct, many applicants are discour-
aged from conducting prior art searches in the ﬁrst place.” Our private commu-
nications with innovators, IP attorneys and search experts also suggested that
more often search is strategically avoided rather than its results illegally not dis-
closed. We argue that in fact, even if the consequences of inequitable conduct
47are not severe, as long as prior art search requires effort, it is in the researcher’s
best interest to remain ignorant rather than search and conceal. Given no legal
obligation to search, a researcher would not have an incentive to invest in prior
art search in the ﬁrst place unless, in the event prior art is found, she would
change her actions—either not investing in this particular innovation, or not
ﬁling for the patent.
Caillaud and Duchˆ ene (2007) examine the impact of the patent ofﬁce on
ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate and to apply for patent protection, and the over-
load problem patent examiners face. They show that given imperfections in
the examination process, some granting of bad patents are inevitable. In their
model, innovators know the quality of their patents before deciding whether or
not to apply. In contrast, since we focus on incentives to search for prior art, in
our model innovators can learn about their innovations’ quality by investing in
prior art search. Caillaud and Duchˆ ene (2007) also consider the role of patent
fees as a policy instrument. They consider the effects of patenting fees on R&D
investment and on incentives to apply for patents. This chapter, on the other
hand, shows that patenting fees can also provide incentives to search for prior
art.
Finally, we mention that there is a relatively recent body of empirical re-
search on prior art search. From 2001, the USPTO began indicating which prior
art references were inserted by the examiner. This newly available data on prior
art enabled empirical analysis of prior art (see, for example, the contributions in
Sampat (2004), Alcacer and Gittelman (2006), Lampe (2008), Alcacer and Gittel-
man (2006) and Alcacer, Gittelman and Sampat (2009)). There exist some works
as well trying to improve our understanding about the operating procedure of
48the USPTO, for example, Cockburn, Kortum and Stern (2002) and Langinier and
Lluis (2009).
3.2.1 The Model
In our model, there is an innovator or a researcher (R) and an examiner (E). The
researcher has an innovation idea which she at ﬁrst believes to be patentable
with probability (1   ) 2 (0;1): With probability ; there exists invalidating
prior art. There is a ﬁxed cost for R&D denoted by I. R&D is risky, success
occurs with a probability  > 0: The innovator can apply for a patent on her
invention. A patent application costs P including patenting fees and legal costs.
We account for the cost of prior art search separately.
Patent applications are examined in the patent ofﬁce. We assume that the
patent ofﬁce commits to prior art search intensities and examiners pursue this
search.4 We model prior art search technology with a function F(X): If there
was no search by the innovator, then conditional on the existence of invalidat-
ing prior art, examiner’s search effort XE 2 [0;1) reveals it with a probability
F(XE) 2 [0;1]: This probability increases with search effort, F0(X) = f(X) > 0; at a
decreasing rate, F00(X) = f 0(X) < 0: We denote by (X) =
f(X)
1 F(X); the hazard rate of
the distribution F. We assume that the hazard rate (which represents the prob-
ability of ﬁnding invalidating prior art with effort X given that it is not found
with a lower search effort) is non-increasing. Search technology F likely varies
by ﬁeld. In matured technological areas, where a lot of the prior art is patented,
search is likely to be more efﬁcient than in areas where most of the prior arts are
not patented.
4We further discuss this assumption in Section 3.2.5.
49The researcher can also search for prior art. The researcher’s search technol-
ogycouldbecorrelatedwiththatoftheexaminer. Forexample, boththeinnova-
tor and the examiner might start with examining the USPTO database and use
similar keywords in their search. If the innovator’s search does not reveal prior
art and if the examiner follows roughly the same search path as the innovator,
then the examiner is not likely to ﬁnd any invalidating prior art either. How-
ever, having been exposed to different research related experiences (interactions
with colleagues, prior research or examination experience etc.), the researcher
and the examiner could be using different data sources, different search engines,
different search keywords and so on. Hence, our model accounts for the possi-
bility that search technologies of the innovator and the examiner are somewhat
but perhaps not perfectly correlated. To model varying levels of correlation, we
assume that with probability ; the innovator has the same search path as the
examiner, that is, examiner’s and researcher’s searches are perfectly correlated.
But, with probability (1   ); the innovator has a different search path which is
independent from that of the examiner. Search technologies are chosen by “na-
ture” (i.e. determined by events not in the researcher’s or examiner’s control),
but we discuss in Section 3.2.4 why researchers, if they can, might want to in-
ﬂuence the degree of correlation between their search and that of the examiner.
Search efﬁciency of the examiner and the innovator could also differ. For
simplicity, we take the same functional form for their search technologies F(:),
but differences in search efﬁciency can be captured by differences in search
costs. For the innovator, we assume that a search effort XR costs CR(XR) = XR:5
The examiner’s search cost is an increasing function CE(XE) for search effort XE.
5We assume here that search cost is incurred for a single innovation. It is possible however
that innovators experience returns-to-scale when they engage in multiple innovation projects.
The amount invested to search for prior art in one project can be used for another project as
well. This is beyond the scope of this chapter.
50When the examiner is less efﬁcient than the innovator, this cost can be higher
than XE. For a given amount of examination time allocated to each application,
examiner’s “effective” units of search effort XE would be lower in ﬁelds where
his search technologies are less efﬁcient, for example in emerging ﬁelds, where
much of the prior art is not patented and examiners are less experienced.
Accountingforinnovator’ssearchandthecorrelationinsearchtechnologies,
we ﬁnd that if the researcher’s search effort was XR and the examiner’s search
effort is XE; then the probability that the examiner ﬁnds invalidating prior art
(IPA) conditional on invalidating prior art existing but it was not found by the
innovator, is given by
p(XR;XE) = pr(E ﬁnds IPAj9 IPA and R did not ﬁnd it); (3.1)
or,
p(XR;XE) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(1   )F (XE) if XR  XE
(F(XE) F(XR))+(1 )(1 F(XR))F(XE)
1 F(XR) if XR < XE
: (3.2)
When  = 0; the search technologies are independent and the probability
that the examiner ﬁnds prior art conditional on its existence is
p(XR;XE) = F(XE) (3.3)
which only depends on the examiner’s effort. When  = 1; the search technolo-
gies are perfectly correlated and
p(XR;XE) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if XR  XE
F(XE) F(XR)
1 F(XR) if XR < XE
: (3.4)
In the perfectly correlated case, if the examiner’s search does not exceed that of
the innovator, then if the innovator does not ﬁnd any prior art, the examiner
does not either.
51We consider two stages of search. Early state of the art search, conducted
before R&D investment, and novelty search, conducted after success in inno-
vation but before ﬁling for a patent. Before investment in R&D, the researcher
chooses her early state of the art search intensity x1. Observing the results of
this initial search, she decides whether to invest in R&D. If any invalidating
prior art is found, she does not engage in research.6 When no invalidating prior
art is found, the researcher updates her belief that her innovation is patentable.
If innovation succeeds, the researcher chooses novelty search intensity level x2.
Search at this stage accumulates with the early state of the art search, that is,
conditional on the existence of invalidating prior art, if the innovator exerted
early search effort x1 and novelty search effort x2; then invalidating prior art is
not found with probability [1   F (x1 + x2)].7 After conducting novelty search,
the researcher further updates her belief on the patentability of her innovation
and chooses whether to ﬁle for a patent.
After the examination process, the patent examiner decides whether to grant
the patent. Since the examination process is not perfect, it is possible that bad
patents would be granted. A bad patent refers to a patent granted when in-
validating prior art exists but the examiner was not aware of it. The researcher
enjoys a beneﬁt G if she is granted a patent which is truly novel and a ben-
eﬁt g < G if she is granted a bad patent. An awardee may beneﬁt from bad
patents because of the reputation value of having a patent. Larger patent port-
folios can be useful in cross-licensing agreements with other ﬁrms or as signals
6We start by assuming that the innovator complies with the duty to disclose. Therefore, she
does not invest if she ﬁnds invalidating prior art. We argue in Section 3.2.5 that we do not need
this assumption.
7We implicitly assumed here, for simplicity, that the innovator’s available search technology
is the same before and after innovation. It is possible, however, that after successful innovation
the innovator knows more and is better able to search. We generalize the model to allow for
different search technologies ex-ante and ex-post under the assumption that  = 0 in Proposition
7 in Section 3.2.4 as well as in Section 3.2.6.
52to investors. Patents, even bad ones, may also deter competitors from use of
the innovation in fear of infringement suits, especially if the competitor is also
unaware of the existing invalidating prior art or is unable to cover large litiga-
tion costs. But, it is reasonable to assume that the value of a bad patent is lower
than that of a good patent since invalidating prior art can be exposed after its is-
suance. In particular, if a patent-holder plans to enforce it, the alleged infringer
would likely make an effort to prove it invalid.
3.2.2 Innovator’s Optimal Search
An innovator faces the following decisions: a choice of her early state of the art
search effort x1; investment decision, novelty search effort after innovation x2
and patent ﬁling. We derive the innovator’s optimal search effort for prior art
using backward induction.
Considerﬁrstasuccessfulresearcherwhodidnotﬁndany invalidatingprior
art and is facing the decision whether to ﬁle for a patent or not. If invalidating
priorartdoesnotexist, thentheinnovator’sbeneﬁtfromthepatentisG:Ifinval-
idating prior art exists (but the researcher’s search effort did not reveal it), then
the innovator’s expected beneﬁt from the patent application is

1   p(XR;XE)

g;
since with probability

1   p(XR;XE)

the patent examiner does not ﬁnd invali-
dating prior art either. Having invested search efforts x1 and x2 and not found
invalidating prior art (IPA), the innovator’s belief that such prior art exists can
be derived using Bayes’ rule:
q(x1 + x2) = pr(IPA existsjIPA not found) =
[1   F (x1 + x2)]
1   F (x1 + x2)
: (3.5)
Hence, the expected payoff from ﬁling for a patent on an innovation for which
53invalidating prior art was not found with search efforts (x1; x2) is
q(x1 + x2)

1   p(XR;XE)

g +

1   q(x1 + x2)

G   P   I   (x1 + x2): (3.6)
The ﬁrst two terms capture the expected beneﬁts from a bad or a good patent
application using updated belief, then we subtracted patenting costs, R&D costs
and search costs.8 Given that the cost of investment and search are already sunk
at this time, the innovator ﬁles for a patent only if
q(x1 + x2)

1   p(XR;XE)

g +

1   q(x1 + x2)

G  P: (3.7)
We now consider the choice of effort for validity prior art search, x2. The
innovator who has exerted effort x1 and yet did not ﬁnd any invalidating prior
art has the belief that such prior art exists with probability
q(x1) =
[1   F (x1)]
1   F (x1)
: (3.8)
This probability equals  if no search effort was exerted, it declines to zero as
x1 ! 1: That is, the innovator is increasingly optimistic that her innovation is
good the more search effort she exerted without ﬁnding invalidating prior art.
Let the net expected gain from a bad patent application be
B(XR;XE) = (1   p(XR;XE))g   P: (3.9)
Using our deﬁnition of p(XR;XE) from (3:2); we obtain
B(XR;XE) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
B + g if XR  XE
B +

1 F(XE)
1 F(XR)

g if XR < XE
; (3.10)
8Our analysis abstracts from the possibility that ﬁnancial constraints limit innovator’s ability
to search for prior art or alter the amount invested in the R&D project. While it is possible that
such ﬁnancial constraints are sometimes in effect, we believe it is a reasonable simpliﬁcation
because in many cases R&D investments are on a much larger scale than the costs of prior art
search. Basic prior art searches with search professionals cost $1000 on average. Such cost is not
likely to explain the large share of applicants who insert no prior art citations. Moreover, note
that, large ﬁrms, who are less likely to be budget constrained, are more likely not to include
prior art references (see Alcacer et al., 2009).
54where
B = (1   )(1   F (XE))g   P: (3.11)
The innovator will choose her novelty search effort x2 to maximize her ex-
pected payoff:
(x1; x2) = q(x1)
[1   F (x1 + x2)]
[1   F (x1)]
B(XR;XE)
+(1   q(x1))(G   P)   I   (x1 + x2): (3.12)
This payoff function is continuous in x2; it is everywhere differentiable ex-
cept at the kink x2 = XE   x1: For any given state of the art search x1; we can
derive the optimal level of novelty search x
2 (x1). In Lemma 1, we identify a
condition under which the innovator would not engage in novelty search be-
fore patenting. The proof of Lemma 1, and all other proofs, are provided in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1 For any x1; there is a unique level of novelty search x
2 (x1) that maximizes
(3:12). When the net beneﬁt from a bad patent is large enough (B  0); the innovator
does not invest in novelty search, x
2 = 0.
We now consider the decision to invest in R&D. Having invested x1 in early
state of the art search and not found invalidating prior art, the researcher invests
in R&D if

2
6 6 6 6 6 6 4q(x1)
h
1   F

x1 + x
2
i
[1   F (x1)]
B(XR;XE) + (1   q(x1))(G   P)   x

2
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 5  I: (3.13)
Let us assume that the expected beneﬁt from the innovation is high enough so
that the innovator invests in R&D if she found no prior art in her early search.
55A sufﬁcient condition (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix) for this to hold is:
[B + (1   )(G   P)]  I: (3.14)
This condition states that the expected beneﬁt from R&D investment, if the in-
novator does not search at all, exceeds its cost.
Consider now the choice of effort for initial prior art search, x1. Before con-
ducting any search, the researcher has a prior belief that with probability  there
exists prior art that can invalidate her innovation. Thus, her expected payoff
from the initial search is

 
x1; x

2 (x1)

= (1   )


 
G   P   x

2

  I

+ (3.15)
[1   F (x1)]
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 4
0
B B B B B B @
h
1   F

x1 + x
2
i
[1   F (x1)]
B(XR;XE)   x

2
1
C C C C C C A   I
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 5   x1:
Maximizing (3.15) with respect to early state of the art search intensity x1;
taking into account its effect on x
2 as derived in Lemma 1, yields the optimal
search intensities.9
We now identify some properties of optimal search efforts. Clearly the in-
tensity of search would depend on parameter values. In Proposition 1, we ﬁnd
that when innovator’s and examiner’s search technologies are not independent
( > 0); then there is a non-negligible range of parameter values for which the
innovator’s total search exactly matches that of the examiner. This result holds
because when ( > 0); equation (3.15) has a kink at XR = XE. For an intermedi-
ate range of B (net value of a bad patent) and I (R&D cost), innovator’s payoff
is maximized at this kink. If B is very low and I is large, innovator’s search
effort could exceed examiner’s effort while if B is high enough and I is low,
innovator’s search effort would be lower than the examiner’s.
9This proﬁt function is continuous. Search effort would never exceed the highest beneﬁt
G   P; hence x1 is bounded in [0;G   P]: Therefore, a maximum is achieved.
56Proposition 1 When  > 0; there is a range of parameter values for which the re-
searcher matches the examiner’s search effort:

x
1 + x
2

= XR = XE:
In Proposition 2, we ﬁnd conditions under which innovators have no incen-
tive to search for prior art.
Proposition 2 If the expected beneﬁt from a bad patent is large enough so that B 
max
n
  1
(0);
(0)I 1
(0)
o
, then the innovator would not exert any effort searching for prior
art, x
1 = x
2 = 0:
The innovator is more likely not to search for prior art at all when patenting
fee P is low and the examiner’s search effort is low, when the cost of investment
is small and the probability that invalidating prior art exists is small. There
are also ranges of the parameter values for which the innovator might search
either only before innovation (x
1 > 0 and x
2 = 0), or only prior to patenting
(x
1 = 0 and x
2 > 0). Intuitively, early state of the art search is more important
for innovations that require large R&D investment. If investment cost is large,
the innovator would never engage only in novelty search. Thus, if she has an
incentive to engage in novelty search, she must also have searched ex ante. On
the other hand, when investment cost is low, if the innovator has no incentive
to search ex post, then she has no incentive to search ex ante either.
Proposition 3 (i) When investment cost is high enough

I 
(1 )
(0)

, then an innovator
who has no incentive for an early search, has no incentive for a novelty search either:
x
1 = 0 implies x
2 = 0:
(ii) When investment cost is low enough

I <
(1 )
(0)

, then an innovator who has no
57incentive for a novelty search, has no incentive for early search either: x
2 = 0 implies
x
1 = 0:
3.2.3 Think Like an Examiner
In this section, we take the possibility of correlated search technologies into ac-
count. Empirical evidence by Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) point to a striking
similarity between the distributions of examiner and inventor citations, sug-
gesting a “tracking scenario.” Their paper suggests that “(a)ttorneys anticipate
citations most likely to be added by examiners, so that examiner and inventor
citations may come to resemble each other closely.”
A prior art search professional who took pride in his company’s ability to
“think like an examiner” motivated us to consider the possibility that correla-
tion in prior art search can arise strategically when innovators seek to correlate
their search effort with that of the examiner. If examiners follow a somewhat
predictable search technology, then the researcher has an incentive to choose a
search technology that is correlated with that of the examiner. In the industry,
this is also sometimes referred to as “being in alignment with” the examiner.
Wemeasuredthedegreeofcorrelationofinnovator’ssearchwithexaminer’s
search with the parameter : The higher is the ; the more correlated search
technologies are. In equation (3.2), we derived the probability that the examiner
ﬁnds invalidating prior art when it exists but was not found by the researcher
p(XR;XE). For ﬁxed search efforts, this probability decreases with the degree of
correlation : This implies that if g  0; then the net expected beneﬁt from a bad
patent B(XR;XE) increases with ; which in turn implies that for ﬁxed levels of
58search, the researcher’s payoff increases with correlation.
Proposition 4 If the gain from a bad patent is positive, g > 0; and the researcher
invests in search XR > 0; then her payoff is higher the more correlated her search is with
the examiner’s search (i.e. the higher ):
“Thinking like an examiner” increases the expected value of patent appli-
cation when invalidating prior art exists and thus increases the researcher’s
payoff. If the researcher could choose the level of correlation between search
technologies, then when g > 0; among equally efﬁcient search technologies, one
that is perfectly correlated with that of the examiner would maximize the re-
searcher’s payoff.
Varying levels of correlation in search technologies can affect the innova-
tor’s choice of search intensities. Let us consider, for simplicity, the levels of
early state of the art search when B > 0; in this case x
2 = 0 (see Lemma 1). The
effect of correlation on search depends on whether the optimal level of search
exceeds that of the examiner or not. For a researcher who (perhaps due to high
investment costs) invests in early state of the art search more than the exam-
iner, a more correlated search technology would reduce search. However, for
a researcher who exerts less than examiner’s effort, correlation increases search
efforts. Search is more beneﬁcial to the innovator in this situation because with
higher correlation, the examiner is less likely to ﬁnd invalidating prior art con-
ditional on the innovator not having found any. We summarize this discussion
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When B > 0; if innovator’s optimal early state of the art search exceeds
examiner’s search

x
1 > XE

; then it is (locally) decreasing with  (the measure of corre-
59lation between innovator’s and examiner’s search technologies); while if x
1 < XE; then
early state of the art search increases with correlation .
From a policy perspective, it might be possible for the patent ofﬁce to have
some control over level of correlation between search technologies. If it were
desirable by the patent ofﬁce to decrease correlation between search technolo-
gies, then this might be possible by making examination less predictable (for
example guiding examiners to search more for non-patented prior art and use
less conventional search technologies), reducing transparency about the exami-
nation process and perhaps signing contractual agreements with examiners that
limit their ability to work as prior art searchers in the private sector when they
leave the patent ofﬁce.10
For a given effort by the examiner XE; under the conditions of Proposition 5,
we show (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix) that
dp(XR();XE;)
d
< 0: (3.16)
This implies that less correlated search technologies (or lower ) result in a
higherconditionalprobabilityofrejectingabadpatent. Whenthesocialvalueof
a bad patent is negative, an increase in the probability of rejecting a bad patent
is socially desirable. Note, however, that in the range where search efforts in-
crease with ; innovator’s own search can lead to less bad applications. Hence,
we cannot unambiguously determine the effect of reduced correlation on wel-
fare.
10This idea would be similar to “non-compete clauses” or “covenant not to compete” which in
contract law refer to a contract by which an employee agrees not to pursue a similar profession
which competes with the employer.
603.2.4 Search Intensity and its Timing
In this section, we examine determinants of the timing and intensity of prior
art search. We ﬁrst examine factors that affect the level of early state of the art
search (x1) when B > 0 (which implies x
2 = 0).
Proposition 6 When B > 0; early state of the art search (weakly) increases with in-
vestment cost I; the probability of a bad patent ; patenting fee P and examiner’s search
intensity XE: Search (weakly) decreases with the value of a bad patent g: The value of a
good patent G does not affect prior art search effort.
Intuitively, early state of the art search helps the innovator to avoid invest-
ment in an innovation that is bad. Hence, the innovator has more to beneﬁt
from search the higher is the investment cost and the higher is the probability
that her innovation is bad. The innovator is less likely to search the more she
beneﬁts from a bad patent. The net beneﬁt from a bad patent decreases with
patenting fee and examination effort and it increases with g: Higher beneﬁts
from a good patent G make the innovator more likely to invest. However, as
long as this beneﬁt is large enough so that the investment condition holds, its
value will not affect search because conditional on the innovation being good,
invalidating prior art will not be recovered regardless of the level of search.
To further investigate the intensity of search and its timing, we specialize the
model to assume an exponential search technology function: F(X) = 1   e X;
where  > 0 is a constant hazard rate. The parameter  measures the ease of
locating invalidating prior art when it exists. For a given search effort x; the
higher  is, the more likely it is to ﬁnd an invalidating prior art when it exists. A
high  might, for example, prevail in ﬁelds where patenting is heavily relied on,
61more prior art is patented and is thus easier to ﬁnd.  may also be high for in-
novators who have multiple projects in the same technological area. Emerging
ﬁelds are expected to have search technologies with a low : We also focus on
the case of independent search technologies. This offers tractability as well as
a benchmark (and the limit as  ! 0). These simpliﬁcations allow us to derive
optimal search efforts and conduct a more comprehensive analysis of compara-
tive statics. In this setting, we can also more easily account for differences in ex
ante and ex post search technologies. We assume novelty search technology is
at least as efﬁcient as early state of the art search technology. Hence, the hazard
rate for novelty search is at least as large, n  s; where n and s are the hazard
rates for the novelty search technology and the early state of the art search tech-
nology, respectively. We begin with a discussion of our ﬁndings and summarize
them in Proposition 7 in the end of the section.
The intensity of search depends on the gain from a bad patent. In situations
when the applicant is expecting a large gain from a bad patent (g); she is less
inclined to conduct both early state of the art search and novelty search, that is,
x
1 and x
2 decrease if g increases. In a survey of R&D labs in the U.S. manufactur-
ing sector, Cohen et al. (2000) found that in complex industries ﬁrms are “much
more likely to use patents to force rivals into negotiations.” In such industries,
the size of the patent portfolio matters and ﬁrms are less likely than in discrete
technologies (e.g. drugs) to use a single patent to block a rival or to generate
licensing fees. In terms of our model, this seems to suggest a higher value of a
bad patent g in complex industries (as any single patent is not likely to be in-
volved in litigation). Hence our model predicts relatively less prior art search
in complex industries. To the extent that patent citations not inserted by the
examiner proxy the inventor’s prior art search, this prediction is supported by
62the empirical ﬁndings of Alcacer et al. (2009) who found that in complex tech-
nologies (such as computers and electronics), patents have a higher share of
examiner citation (which may indicate less search). Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2004) found that “litigation risk is much higher for patents owned by individu-
als and ﬁrms with small patent portfolios.” This suggests that small ﬁrms likely
have lower values of bad patent and therefore, our model predicts that all else
equal, small ﬁrms would search more for prior art. Indeed, the empirical work
of Alcacer et al. (2009) found that small ﬁrms and those who are less experi-
enced (measured by their number of patents) had a signiﬁcantly lower share of
examiner inserted citations.
For innovations that require high investments, the beneﬁt of early state of
the art search is higher. Early search can help save large R&D spending on du-
plication. As the cost of investment (I) rises, the intensity of early state of the
art search x
1 rises; this substitutes in part for the later novelty search, thus x
2
drops. Overall, there is more search (larger x
1 + x
2) for innovations that require
large investment. This suggests, for example, that for patents of pharmaceutical
drugs that are known to require large R&D investments, we should expect sig-
niﬁcant search effort, particularly early state of the art search. Indeed, Alcacer et
al. (2009) found that, compared to other ﬁelds, the share of examiner inserted ci-
tations was signiﬁcantly lower in the drug, medical and chemical ﬁelds. Sampat
(2005) also found that “the share of applicant inserted citations to U.S. patents
is signiﬁcantly higher for chemical and biomedical patents than for patents in
other technological ﬁelds. This is an intriguing result, especially in light of em-
pirical research suggesting that patents are more important as mechanisms for
appropriating returns to R&D in chemicals and pharmaceuticals than in other
ﬁelds.” Note that these technology areas are likely to be ones in which inno-
63vation requires large investments. Additionally, for a patent on an innovation
that is likely to be commercialized, we can expect a small value to a bad patent
due to the risk of infringement suits and the inability to enforce it. These two
forces (high I and low g) work in the same direction suggesting ﬁrms in the drug
industry would have more incentive to search for prior art.
In the current model, as long as the expected beneﬁt from innovation is high
enough so that the investment condition holds, the gross beneﬁt of a valid in-
novation, G; has no effect on search intensity.11 Intuitively, in our setting, search
affects payoff through its effect on the expected beneﬁt in the event that invali-
dating prior art exists. Thus the optimal searcheffortdepends on parameter val-
ues that play a role determining payoff in that event. This feature of the model
is not, however, in odds with empirical ﬁndings that more important patents
include more prior art citations (suggesting perhaps more prior art search), see
Sampat (2005) and Lampe (2008). Two of the parameters of the model, invest-
ment cost I and the value of a bad patent g; are likely to be related to the beneﬁt
from a valid innovation G. First, for the investment condition to hold, G needs
to be high enough compared to the investment cost. Hence, high-investment
patents likely also have a high value of a good patent. Second, the value of a
bad patent might also be related to the value of a good patent, but it is not clear
in what direction this relation goes. On one hand, it seems that owning intel-
lectual property rights on a more important innovation could be more valuable
and hence g is large for largeG: On the other hand, if an innovation is important,
it is also more important for others who would then have stronger incentives to
challenge the patent. Thus, there is likely to be more risk of litigation and expo-
sure of invalidating prior art after the granting of the patent and hence g can be
11In Section 3.2.6, we offer a generalization of the model in which search increases with G:
64small for large G:
All else equal, innovators tend to search more for prior art, both before in-
vestment and after investment but before patenting, when there is a higher
probability that invalidating prior art exists (). In some ﬁelds, like software
patenting, there may be a high probability that invalidating prior art exists, but
still low search efforts since at the same time investment cost is low and the
examiner’s probability of ﬁnding invalidating prior art is also low.
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition. In
the proof, we solve for the optimal search efforts and then derive comparative
statics with respect to various parameters of the model.
Proposition 7 Assume search technology is given by Fs(X) = 1   e sX for early state
of the art search and Fn(X) = 1   e nX for novelty search and assume  = 0 (i.e., search
technologies of the examiner and innovator are independent), then all else equal, optimal
search efforts weakly12 satisfy the following:
(i) As investment (I) rises, x
1 rises, x
2 falls, but

x
1 + x
2

rises.
(ii) As the value of a bad patent (g) rises, both x
1 and x
2 fall. Search is not directly
affected by the value of a good patent (G) if the investment condition holds.
(iii) As the patenting fees (P) rise or the examiner’s search effort (XE) increases, both
x
1 and x
2 rise.
(iv) As the probability of invalidating prior art () rises, x
1 and x
2 rise.
12By “weakly” we mean that when we say search effort “rises,” search effort could either
increase or remain unchanged. The qualiﬁcation accounts for ranges of parameters with corner
solution.
653.2.5 Policy Implications
Simple Interventions
Using our solution for the optimal search efforts as derived in the proof of
Proposition 7 (with exponential search technologies and independent search ef-
forts), we found that a decrease in the net expected beneﬁt from a bad patent
B would result in an increase in both the early state of the art search and nov-
elty search efforts, x
1 and x
2. The net expected value of a bad patent is given
by B =

(1   F (XE))g   P

which depends negatively on the patenting fee P and
on the examiner’s search intensity when reviewing applications XE. B also in-
creases with the value of a bad patent g: Hence, all else equal, in our simple
model, an increase in examiner effort or in the patenting fee would result in
higher search for prior art by the applicant. The three parameters that deter-
mine the net value of a bad patent XE;P and g can serve as policy levers to
inﬂuence search.
One element is common to several proposals to reform the patent system
and reduce the number of bad patents granted, namely, the patent ofﬁce should
gather prior art information from third parties. We do not describe any of the
suggested reforms in detail, but we brieﬂy discuss how these can be thought of
in terms of our model. Noveck (2006) advocates a “Community Patent Review”
system. In this proposal, for each patent application, there would be a window
of time during which patent examination is open to the public. Facilitating the
addition of prior art by the public pre-granting of the patent can be seen as an
increase in the probability that invalidating prior art would be detected when
it exists, that is, an increase in XE: Thomas’ (2001) proposal combines a pre-
66examination period in which informants might submit pertinent prior art, with
a bounty to any party who succeeds in providing invalidating prior art. The
bounty would be ﬁnanced by charging a ﬁne to the applicant, thus, in addition
to an increase in the probability of ﬁnding invalidating prior art XE; the expected
value of a bad patent B further decreases due to the possibility of being ﬁned
in the event such prior art is found. Merges (1999) considers the possibility of
establishing a patent opposition system. This would increase the probability
that invalidating prior art be revealed after the granting of a patent. Hence, it
can be seen as a decrease in the value of the patent conditional on it being a bad
patent, g:
All these proposals suggest a decline in the net expected beneﬁt of a bad
patent B, which would result in an increase in both early prior art search and
novelty search. Note, however, that we have taken the gross value of a bad
patent g to be ﬁxed. Improvements in the examination process as described in
the policy reforms mentioned could result in an increase in value of any granted
patent, including the value of a bad patent g; which in turn has a positive effect
on B: Hence, these policies would result in an increase in search efforts as long
as this latter effect is small enough not to offset the decline in B:
Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat’s (2005) “gold-plate” patent-reform policy
proposes that applicants should have an option to certify their patent with a
“gold plate” by opting for an examination procedure that would have more
careful examination (higher XE) for a higher patenting fee P: “Gold plated”
patents are likely to have signiﬁcantly higher value (ﬁrst, since the gold plate
would signal a more carefully examined patent; second, since the authors ex-
pect selection of higher value innovations for this option). Hence, an increase in
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is therefore ambiguous, but we expect it to be positive with a sufﬁcient increase
in patenting fee.
Finally, note that a policy intervention that weakens the presumption of va-
lidity would likely lower the value of a bad patent g and increase the incentive
to search.
Social Planner’s Problem
Thequestionweaddresshereisasfollows: ifahypotheticalsocialplannercould
mandate certain search intensities as well as disclosure of all relevant prior art,
then what would the social planner’s choice of search efforts be? We then com-
pare innovators’ search efforts to these “ﬁrst best” levels of search and discuss
policy levers that could motivate optimal search.
Innovators might not have socially optimal incentives to search since the
private values of innovations are different than their social values. First, an
innovator is unable to appropriate the full surplus generated by a novel inven-
tion. Hence, the social value of a true innovation is larger than its private value,
ˆ G > G: Second, while we argued that there are private beneﬁts to be made from
a bad patent, from a social point of view these beneﬁts are likely offset by losses
to others. Hence, we assume that the social value of a bad patent is lower than
its private value, ˆ g < g, and possibly, ˆ g < 0: Finally, an innovator’s patenting
fees P might be different than the social cost of patenting ˆ P. Assume a common
probability  that there exists invalidating prior art, and a common probability
of success in R&D, .
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as long as the examiner’s search technology is not more efﬁcient than the inno-
vator’s, the planner would put the burden of search entirely on the innovator
rather than on the examiner. Innovator’s search can help save investment costs
by avoiding duplication as well as patenting cost. Thus, it is better to ﬁnd inval-
idating prior art before patent application rather than after. The social planner’s
choice now amounts to applying our earlier ﬁndings on the optimal search ef-
forts only using the social parameter values ˆ g; ˆ P and XE = 0: We can then com-
pare the socially optimal search effort to that chosen by the payoff maximizing
innovator. In Proposition 8, we show that when the value of a bad patent for
the innovator net of patenting fee (g   P) is lower than the social net value of a
bad patent, innovators have too little incentive to search.
Proposition 8 If the cost of patenting is sufﬁciently low compared to the gain from
a bad patent such that

ˆ g   ˆ P

< (g   P), then the researcher always under-invests in
search compared to the socially optimal search level.
If the beneﬁts of innovation are high enough to ensure that the investment
condition (3.14) holds, patent policy could induce efﬁcient search with a high
enough patenting fee P = ˆ P+(g   ˆ g): This, however, is not likely to be a practical
policy to implement. First, because such patenting fees can be very high (when
the researcher’s private beneﬁt from a bad patent is signiﬁcantly larger com-
pared to the social value of a bad patent) which might lead to under-investment
in R&D. Second, because the right choice of patenting fees requires information
on the value of a bad patent as well as an ability to charge differentiated patent-
ing fees. It is impossible to do this for every single innovation. Patent policy
typically sets rules that apply to the universe of patent applications, or to large
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a uniform patent fee, with a lower fee for small innovators). Finally, as we will
see in Section 3.2.6, in reality, there may be situations where the innovator has
an incentive not to disclose prior art. Nevertheless, even if the ﬁrst best is not
feasible, patenting fees that depend on the technological ﬁeld could help induce
more search in ﬁelds where we suspect search is inefﬁciently low and where an
increase in fee would not signiﬁcantly lower the incentive to innovate.
Commitment to Examination Procedure
Our premise in this chapter is that the examination process is not inﬂuenced by
search and disclosure of prior art. This requires that the patent ofﬁce would be
able to commit to an examination process. The following questions thus arise.
Can the patent ofﬁce commit? Should the patent ofﬁce commit to an exami-
nation process that is independent of prior art disclosure? And if examiners
respond to applicants’ prior art, how would this affect the incentives to search
and disclose prior art?
We argue that it is reasonable to assume that the patent ofﬁce can commit
to a search process. The patent ofﬁce is a government agency and it interacts
with innovators repeatedly. Thus it is likely to be able to create a reputation
on examination procedures. The budget of the patent ofﬁce, the number of its
employeesandthetimeallocatedtopatentexamination(atleastonaverage)can
be made public. According to Cockburn et al., “examiners are allocated ﬁxed
amounts of time for completing the initial examination of the application, and
for disposal of the application.” Examiners can however average these times
over their case-loads. While individual examiners are heterogenous and may
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application not chosen by the innovator. Cockburn et al. also document that
“USPTO operates various internal systems to ensure “quality control” through
auditing, reviewing and checking examiner’s work.” Additionally, for the ﬁrst
several years of their career, examiners are routinely reviewed by a more senior
primary examiner. It seems reasonable that by and large the patent ofﬁce can
make sure its employees follow the guidance provided to them for examination
procedure and intensity.
Should the patent ofﬁce commit to an examination process that is indepen-
dent of prior art disclosure? Note that the innovator’s search effort cannot di-
rectly be observed by the examiner. Hence, the examiner could make search
contingent on the volume of prior art disclosure, but not on actual search effort.
Innovators are likely to strategically choose the amount of prior art they dis-
close if this could affect the intensity of examination to their beneﬁt. Langinier
and Marcoul (2008) focus on innovators’ strategic non-disclosure of prior art. In
their model, prior art disclosure by the innovator lowers the examiner’s search
cost and the examiner exerts more search effort the more prior art the inno-
vator discloses. Under this complementarity assumption on innovators’ and
examiners’ search efforts, they ﬁnd that “an examiner should not have different
scrutiny levels but rather, should commit to an equal screening intensity across
all applications. This simple rule has two advantages: ﬁrst, it requires a limited
commitment and, second, it induces truthful information transmission from ap-
plicants.”
If, instead, prior art disclosure by the innovator would induce less search by
the examiner, then the innovator might have an incentive to increase the vol-
71ume of prior art disclosed. More citations do not necessarily imply more search,
for a given search level, innovators could be more permissive in their decision
what to include as relevant citations. Concerns over excess disclosure of prior
art (although for a different reason) were raised in a symposium on the Federal
Circuit in March 2009. Senator Orrin Hatch (speaking on the issue of inequitable
conduct) said that “(e)xaminers are buried in references by patent applicants
for fear that they will be found to have withheld something. If the applicant
does anything to try to focus the examiner on the closest prior art, this is also
considered fodder for inequitable conduct claims.” Thus some innovators may
disclose excessive volumes of prior art, not all of it highly relevant. Assessing
the quality and relevance of prior art citations also requires examiner effort. The
volume of disclosure does not necessarily indicate higher search intensity. If ex-
amination procedure were to be tied to the level of disclosure, then, depending
on how examiners respond, this may create incentive to manipulate the level of
disclosure and the informativeness of the number of applicant added prior art
citations would be reduced.
3.2.6 Prior Art Disclosure
Existing literature has emphasized on the innovator’s strategic choice not to
disclose prior art. In Langinier and Marcoul’s (2003) work, the main driver of
thisincentiveistheirassumptionthathigherinformationtransmissionincreases
examiner’s search intensity. Lampe (2008) assumes that disclosure of prior art
information increases the probability that the applicant will be found to have
willfully infringed upon an existing patent. In the model we analyzed thus far,
innovators do not have an incentive not to disclose prior art, rather they might
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here and then suggest circumstances when strategic non-disclosure of prior art
may arise. We then pursue an extension of our model in which R&D process is
inﬂuenced by early state of the art search. In this case, strategic non-disclosure
of information may arise.
Ignorance is Bliss
Consider novelty search. Suppose a successful innovator is deciding how much
to invest in novelty search before the ﬁling of a patent application. Suppose
that the innovator could choose not to disclose prior art. The innovator would
engage in novelty search if this could save the cost of patenting in the event she
ﬁnds invalidating prior art. Such search is worthwhile only if she would refrain
from patenting in the event she ﬁnds invalidating prior art. If she is better off
patenting even when invalidating prior art is found (only not disclosed), then
sheisbetteroffnotsearchingforitintheﬁrstplace. Similarly, theinnovatoronly
engages in early state of the art search if she intends to save on R&D investment
in case invalidating prior art is found. She would not invest in search only to
ignore her ﬁndings.
The argument above relies on the assumption that ﬁnding prior art requires
a conscious effort. If, however, in some circumstances, innovators could stum-
ble on prior art without searching for it, an incentive not to disclose might arise.
If R&D investment is costly enough, still it is likely that if invalidating prior
art is found before investment then the innovator would not invest. But, if the
innovator unintentionally comes across invalidating prior art for innovations
that require only small R&D investment or after R&D investment is sunk, and
73if the expected value of a bad patent is positive, B  0; then an incentive not to
disclose prior art might arise. Recall, however, as we discussed in the introduc-
tion, that knowingly concealing prior art is considered inequitable conduct and
would be very risky practice on part of the innovators. Thus, in fact, innovators
could even have an incentive to make conscious efforts not to accidentally ﬁnd
prior art after innovation and prior to ﬁling for a patent.13
It is hard to tell empirically whether innovators strategically concealed prior
art or whether they did not search for it. The overwhelming proportion of
patents that have only examiner inserted citations (40% according to Alcacer
and Gittelman (2006)) seems to us as strong evidence of a weak incentive to
search for prior art. Sampat (2005) as well as Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) pro-
videevidenceonexaminers’andassignees’propensitytoaddassignee-assignee
selfcitations. Accordingto Sampat, “(t)hefact that examiners insert asigniﬁcant
share of self-citations provides prima facie evidence that a signiﬁcant share of
applicants do not search for, or fail to disclose, material prior art.” While such
cases may seem more likely consistent with non-disclosure (as one expects an
assignee to be aware of her own patents), other explanations are also plausible.
Some assignees (for example, big software companies) have a lot of patents and
they may not be fully aware of their own portfolios. Moreover, given that the
assignee is not likely to fear litigating herself, she might be less careful searching
her own patents. It is also possible that there is not always full agreement on the
relevance of previous patents. An assignee who is familiar with the details of
her own innovation may consider it sufﬁciently distant from the new invention
not to be material to patentability.
13As an anecdotal example, an individual in a high technological industry told us that some
companies in his industry block their employees’ access to the patent ofﬁce database to avoid
ﬁnding prior art and risk inequitable conduct allegations.
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In the model we analyzed in the previous sections, researchers never had an
incentive not to disclose prior art. This was partly because we abstracted from
some of the potential beneﬁts from prior art search, particularly in the early
stages of research. Prior art searches might help the innovator decide in what
direction research will go. Finding that one path of research is not novel can
lead the researcher to invest in another related direction. An early state of the art
search may help shape the innovation, not just decide whether or not to invest.
Hence, search can interact with the innovation process. With such additional
potential beneﬁts, an incentive not to disclose prior art may arise.
We illustrate this idea with a modiﬁed version of our model. Suppose the
innovator has two research paths to choose from. As before, the cost of inno-
vation in either path is I and the probability of success is : The prior probabil-
ity that invalidating prior art exists for the innovation pursued in path i is i;
i 2 f1;2g; with path 1 being the more promising choice, 1  2: We assume
that early search is not yet focused, early state of the art search effort x1 reveals
prior art relevant to either path with a probability Fs(x1) which satisﬁes the ear-
lier assumptions we made. If the search reveals no invalidating prior art, then
the researcher would invest in research path 1—the more promising direction.
If search reveals invalidating prior art on one path, then pursuing that path—
imitating it—costs less, Im < I; and uncertainty about the probability of success
is reduced, we assume the success probability becomes 1. If search reveals in-
validating prior art for one path but not the other, the researcher faces a choice
between investing in the path for which no prior art was found, or investing
in the bad path (which is now less costly and more certain) with the intention
75not to disclose the invalidating reference. If search reveals invalidating prior
art on both paths, the researcher could abandon the project, or invest with the
intention not to disclose.
The researcher decides whether or not to invest and which path to pursue.
We assume that the researcher can only pursues one path of innovation. If she
does not succeed with the path she chose or if she ﬁnds invalidating prior art
during the ex post novelty search, she abandons the project.
After successful innovation, the researcher chooses how much to invest in
novelty search before ﬁling for a patent. Novelty search technology can be
more focused than the early state of the art search as the researcher is more
informed at this point. Nevertheless, the earlier search effort still contributes to
noveltypriorartsearch. Wedenotethenoveltysearchtechnologyby Fn(X), with
Fn(X) > Fs(X) for any X > 0: To account for the contribution of the early state
of the art search to the novelty search stage, we express early search effort x1 in
terms of equivalent novelty search effort units as follows: an investment of x1
in search before R&D is equivalent to an effort e x1 which satisﬁes Fs(x1) = Fn(e x1);
that is e x1 = F 1
n (Fs(x1)). Hence, an innovator needing to decide how much to
invest in novelty search faces the same decision as if early search had the same
technology as novelty search Fn and she had exerted effort e x1:
We ﬁrst consider the choice of novelty search. If the researcher chooses path
i; then her expected pay-off from x2 is
(1   qi (x1))(G   P) + qi (x1)

1   Fn (e x1 + x2)


1   Fn (e x1)
 B   I   (x1 + x2) (3.17)
where
qi (x1) =
i [1   Fs (x1)]
[1   iFs (x1)]
: (3.18)
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x

2i (e x1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f  1
n

[1 iFn(e x1)]
 iB

  e x1; if B < [1 iFn(e x1)]
 i fn(e x1) ;
0; if B  [1 iFn(e x1)]
 i fn(e x1) :
(3.19)
Novelty search effortis the same function of early search effortas we derived
in the proof of Proposition 7.
Again, we assume a sufﬁcient condition for the researcher to invest in R&D:
[2B + (1   2)(G   P)]  I: (3.20)
Consider now the situation in which an early state of the art search has re-
vealed prior art to invalidate both research paths. In this case, the researcher
either abandons her innovation idea, or pursues it with the intension of not dis-
closing the invalidating prior art. Abstracting from the risks associated with
inequitable conduct, the researcher would invest with the intention not to dis-
close if the net expected value of a bad patent exceeds the cost of imitation,
B > Im:
Proposition 9 (i) If B < Im; then the researcher never has an incentive not to disclose
prior art. (ii) If B > Im; an incentive not to disclose invalidating prior art that was
revealed in early state of the art search may arise; in this situation, the innovator does
not invest in novelty search.
When the net value of a bad patent is low compared to the cost of imita-
tion, early state of the art search can help the innovator avoid “stepping on”
existing innovations and either choose a path that is more likely to be novel, or
avoidR&Dspendingaltogetherwhenbothpathsarenotnovel. Inthissituation,
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tor’s choice of path of investment and she avoids investing in a non-novel path.
However, when the net value of a bad patent is high compared to the cost of
imitation, early search can result in imitation and non-disclosure of prior art.
Considering the optimal choice of ex ante search, we ﬁnd, as in the earlier
version of our model, that there are parameter values for which the innovator
has no incentive to search for prior art: x
1 = x
2 = 0: Focusing on the range of
parameters for which the innovator does not imitate and only has an incentive
for early search, we derive comparative statics results that help us understand
the determinants of early search in the two paths model. We describe these
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Suppose 0 < B < Im (implying no imitation and no ex post search).
In an interior solution

x
1 > 0

; early state of the art search increases with investment
cost (I), examination effort (XE), the probability that path 1 is bad (1), patenting fee
(P) and the value of a good patent (G): Early state of the art search decreases with the
value of a bad patent (g): The increase in the probability that path 2 is bad (2) has an
ambiguous effect on x
1:
TheseresultsarethesimilartowhatwefoundinProposition7(whenwehad
a single path) except that in the two paths model, early state of the art search
increases with the value of a good patent, whereas in the single path model G
had no effect on search. Search in this version of the model helps shape the path
of innovation making it more likely to pursue a good path. This beneﬁt is more
signiﬁcant when the value of a good innovation is larger and which explains
why there is more incentive to search when the value of a good patent is larger.
783.2.7 Remarks
In this section, we strive to better understand what drives prior art search by
innovators. We focus on two motivations for search: innovators might engage
in early state of the art search to avoid spending on costly R&D, and/or con-
duct novelty search to save on patenting costs. While earlier work focused on
incentives not to disclose, we show that when revealing invalidating prior art
requires search effort, innovators may refrain from searching rather than avoid
disclosure. In the current patent system, where innovator’s net private beneﬁt
from a bad patent is likely to be higher than its social value, innovators have
too little incentive to search. Policy interventions that lower the net expected
beneﬁt of a bad patent would induce more search and may increase social wel-
fare. An increase in patenting fee, for example, would serve this purpose (as
long as it does not discourage innovation). Several recently proposed policy
interventions such as a patent-opposition system, community patent review or
patent bounties are likely to decrease the net value of bad patents. Thus, such
interventions not only make bad patents less likely to be granted, but also cre-
ate incentives for prior art search by innovators before ﬁling for a patent, which
would reduce the number of bad patent applications and increase the quality
of patents. Our analysis also found that innovators are better off if they can
correlate their search technology with that of patent examiners. Higher correla-
tion between innovators’ and examiners’ search technologies results in a lower
conditional probability of rejecting a bad patent application.
We also consider an extension of our model in which early state of the art
search can inﬂuence the choice of research path. Early search can help the inno-
vator avoid research paths that are not novel. When cost of imitation is low and
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paths with the intention of applying for the patent without disclosing invali-
dating prior art references. Hence, when early state of the art search shapes
innovation, incentives not to disclose prior art may arise.
Our analysis simpliﬁes on several dimensions that could be interesting for
future research. We assumed a simple state space—an invalidating prior art ref-
erence either exists or it does not exist. In reality, however, there could exist
prior art references that invalidate some but not all claims of a patent, or that
invalidate the patent in combination with other references but not alone. We
have also assumed a simple binary investment decision. However, ﬁnding re-
lated prior art before innovation can have an effect on the process and cost of
innovation. We provided one simple extension of the model in which search af-
fects innovation, but did not fully account for the possibility that innovators can
learn from others’ experiences and build on existing knowledge to lower costs
of innovation, even when this knowledge does not invalidate their own inno-
vation. Knowledge of patented prior art could also guide the innovator how to
innovate around or tailor the patent application so as not to infringe on existing
patents. Such additional beneﬁts from search might provide additional incen-
tives for ex ante search, but as the two-paths version of our model suggests,
possibly also additional incentives not to disclose prior art. Finally, we mention
that we have assumed that the patent ofﬁce commits to a uniform examination
process. A more careful look at the inside operation on the patent ofﬁce and its
relation to prior art search is another important direction for future work.
803.3 Patent Quality and a Two-Tiered Patent System
The quality of patents has been a subject of growing concerns. Bad patents—
patents that would have failed the novelty or non-obviousness patentability re-
quirements had their examiners been more informed—likely have adverse ef-
fects on our society. Patents, good or bad, have social costs. Patent holders can
exclude others from use of inventions which might hinder future innovations
and commercialization of products, or induce unnecessary costs of duplication
and inventions around the patent. In the case of good patents, such social costs
may be offset by the beneﬁts of increased incentives to innovate and to disclose
new information. But bearing the social cost of a patent can hardly be justiﬁed
for bad patents. Moreover, bad patents are presumably more likely to be asso-
ciated with litigation costs (see Merges, 1999 for a more detailed discussion on
the social costs of bad patents).
This chapter highlights an additional, largely overlooked, cost of bad patents
– the negative externality imposed by bad patents on other patent holders. We
argue that bad patents undermine the goals of the patent system because they
reduce the value of holding patents. Third parties (competitors, investors, etc.)
are likely less informed than the innovator about the probability of validity of
a speciﬁc issued patent, but they have an overall perception of patent quality.
How third parties perceive the quality of patents may affect a patentee’s abil-
ity to deter entry, negotiate licensing fees, bargain, or secure venture capital
funding. For example, if patent quality is perceived to be low, a potential en-
trant might be less worried about infringement and an investor might be less
impressed by the fact that a start-up company holds a patent. The quality of
patents can be thought of as the probability that an issued patent is good (or
81valid). If a patent system allows many bad patents, the perceived quality of
patents declines lowering the value of holding patents and thus limiting the
ability of the patent system to reward the true innovators.
This chapter studies the determinants of patent quality. Patent quality is
endogenously determined in equilibrium together with innovators’ decisions
whether to apply for a patent. In our model, every innovator has private infor-
mation on the ex-ante (before examination) probability of validity of his own
invention. A patent gives its owner a larger beneﬁt if others believe that patents
are of high quality. Quality depends on all innovators’ decisions to apply for
patents as well as on the examination process. For any given perceived patent
quality, we ﬁnd that innovators will apply for patents if the probability of valid-
ity of their patent applications exceed a certain threshold. An increase in patent
quality lowers the threshold. However, a lower threshold implies lower quality
because the pool of applicants becomes inferior. Hence, the quality of patents
and the decision to apply for patents are jointly determined in equilibrium.
We study the effects of patent system reforms on the volume of patent appli-
cations and on the quality of patents. Particularly, we examine how changes in
patenting fees and in the intensity of examination affect equilibrium outcomes.
We ﬁnd that an increase in patenting fee reduces the number of patent applica-
tions that have a low ex-ante probability of validity. It also increases the quality
of patents (that is, the probability that granted patents are good) and thus, their
value. Interestingly, making the examination process more stringent could have
ambiguous effects on the volume of patent applications. On one hand, stringent
examination reduces the probability of any applicant to receive a patent, which
deters low probability of validity applicants. On the other hand, the increase in
82expected patent quality makes holding a patent more valuable and thus more
attractive.
Concerns about the abundance of bad patents prompted several propos-
als for patent system reforms such as establishing a patent opposition system
(Merges (1999)), patent bounties (Thomas (2001)), “gold-plate” patents (Lemley,
Lichtman and Sampat (2005); Lemley and Lichtman (2007)), and community
patent review (Noveck (2006)). This section provides insights on the potential
effects of such policies. Particularly, we focus on a formal analysis of the Lemley
et. al. (2005) proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system which, according
totheauthors, “would dramaticallyimprovethequality ofeconomicallysigniﬁ-
cant patents.” In such system, applicants would be allowed to “gold-plate” their
patents by paying a higher fee and being subject to a more thorough review pro-
cess. This proposal has also attracted the attention of the new administration:
“[w]ith better informational resources, the Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce could
offer patent applicants, who know they have signiﬁcant inventions, the option
of a rigorous and public peer-review that would produce a “gold-plate” patent
much less vulnerable to court challenge. Where dubious patents are being as-
serted, the PTO could conduct low-cost, timely administrative proceedings to
determine patent validity.”14
This section formally models a two-tiered patent system and examines its
outcomes compared to the standard (single-tiered) system. We show that intro-
ducing a two-tiered system, in which the lower tier is the same as the original
patent system but a second more stringently examined patent tier is also of-
fered, results in a decline in the volume of patent applications, with low quality
14See Barack Obama on Technology and Innovation at
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/Fact Sheet Innovation and Technology.pdf
83applicants less likely to apply. The volume of bad patents issued would de-
cline for two reasons, the more stringent examination in the second tier, and
the reduced number of low ex-ante probability of validity applicants. Sorting of
applicants between regular and gold-plate patents depends on the innovator’s
ex-ante probability of validity. Innovators of higher ex-ante probability of valid-
ity are more likely to gold-plate their patents. The sorting of innovators between
the two tiers could additionally depend on the economic value of the invention.
Lemley et. al. (2005) hypothesized that economically signiﬁcant patents will
sort into the gold-plated tier. We examine this in the context of our model to
ﬁnd conditions under which this relationship holds. Finally, we study the effect
of changes in patent policy on the overall volume of patent applications and on
gold-plate patents.
This chapter relates to a large body of literature on innovation and patent
policy. An excellent review of many of these contributions can be found in
Scotchmer (2006). More speciﬁcally, this chapter contributes to a ﬂedgling body
of literature which recognizes imperfections in the functioning of the patent
examination process. Among such theoretical contributions is Caillaud and
Duchˆ ene (2007). They examine the impact of the patent ofﬁce on ﬁrms’ incen-
tives to innovate and to apply for patent protection, and the overload problem
patent examiners face. They show that given imperfections in the examination
process, some granting of bad patents are inevitable. They also consider the
role of patent fees as a policy instrument and examine their effects on R&D in-
vestment and on incentives to apply for patents. Langinier and Marcoul (2008)
concentrate on incentives to search and disclose prior art given an imperfect
examination process. Atal and Bar (2010) focus on innovators’ timing and in-
tensity of prior art search.
843.3.1 The Model
There exists a large heterogeneous population of innovators. Each innovator
hasoneinventionwhichischaracterizedbyaparameter 2 [0;1]thatrepresents
the ex-ante (before patent application) probability that the invention is good.
That is,  is the probability that there does not exist prior art that invalidates this
invention.15 Innovators’ types  are independently drawn from a distribution
described by the cumulative distribution function F () on [0;1]; and positive
density f () > 0:
An innovator can choose whether or not to apply for a patent. Patent appli-
cationfee isgiven by P:Anyapplication isexamined inthe patent ofﬁceto deter-
mine if it is patentable. For simplicity, we assume patentability only depends on
whether or not invalidating prior art is found in the examination process. The
examiner searches for prior art exerting search effort such that, if there exists
invalidating prior art, it would be found with a probability p: If no invalidat-
ing prior art is found, a patent is granted. Hence, a good innovation is always
granted a patent and a bad invention is granted a patent with probability (1 p).
By making the assumption that invalidating prior art is found with a proba-
bility p, we implicitly assume that the patent ofﬁce is committed to (in expecta-
tion) a uniform examination intensity. The patent ofﬁce is a government agency
and it interacts with innovators repeatedly. Thus it is likely to be able to create
a reputation on examination procedures. The budget of the patent ofﬁce, the
number of its employees and the time allocated to patent examination (at least
on average) can be made public. According to Cockburn et al., “examiners are
15Patent applications often include several claims. Validity is determined claim by claim. We
simplify here by assuming the patent is either valid—all its claims are valid—or it is not.
85allocated ﬁxed amounts of time for completing the initial examination of the ap-
plication, and for disposal of the application.” Examiners can however average
these times over their case-loads. While individual examiners are heterogenous
and may use different examination technologies, a patent examiner is assigned
to each application not chosen by the innovator. Cockburn et al. also docu-
ment that “USPTO operates various internal systems to ensure “quality control”
through auditing, reviewing and checking examiner’s work.” Additionally, for
the ﬁrst several years of their career, examiners are routinely reviewed by a
more senior primary examiner. It seems reasonable that by and large the patent
ofﬁce can make sure its employees follow the guidance provided to them for
examination procedure and intensity.
Patents are often used in negotiations with other ﬁrms, as signals to potential
investors, or to exclude others from use of the patented technology. We assume
that the value of a patent to an innovator depends on the quality it is perceived
to have by less informed third parties. Our model captures such dependence in
a simple stylized way. Let q be the probability that an innovation is good (i.e.,
there exists no invalidating prior art) conditional on it having been granted a
patent:
q = Pr
h
good patent j patent was granted
i
: (3.21)
We will refer to this probability as the perceived patent quality, or simply as patent
quality. An innovator does not know if he will be granted a patent and if the
patent is good, but he forms an expectation taking into account the ex-ante
probability of validity  and the examination process. Beneﬁts from good or bad
patents depend on perceived patent quality q: An innovator’s expected payoff
from a patent application is given by
V (;q) = G(q) + (1   )(1   p)B(q)   P (3.22)
86where G(q) and B(q) denote the beneﬁt from a patent as a function of perceived
quality q conditional on the innovation being good or bad respectively. We as-
sume G(q)  B(q)  0 for all q. The assumption that the beneﬁts from patents
are lower if the patent is bad could capture a probability that the patent would
be contested and fail to be defended. We also assume that the functions B and
G are differentiable and that the value of a bad patent is more sensitive to the
perceived quality of patents, B0(q) > 0;G0(q)  0: If perceived quality is low,
third parties may be more likely to contest the patent which would be more
detrimental to the holder of a bad patent. For a patent quality q = 1; we assume
B(1) = G(1); that is, if perceived patent quality is perfect, the values of a good
and a bad patent are the same. Finally, for simplicity, the value to the innovator
from an invention which is not protected by a patent is normalized to be zero.
3.3.2 The Single-Tiered Patent System
In this section, we examine the single-tiered patent system – the standard patent
system in which innovators face the decision to apply for a patent protection
or not to apply, but have no choice regarding the intensity of the examination
process.
Equilibrium
The decision to apply for a patent depends on the innovator’s expected beneﬁt.
The innovator applies for a patent if this expected beneﬁt exceeds that of not
applying, V (;q)  0: Using (3.22), we ﬁnd that for any quality q; there exists a
87cut-off probability 1(q) deﬁned by
1(q) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
1 if P > G(q)
P (1 p)B(q)
G(q) (1 p)B(q) if G(q)  P  (1   p)B(q)
0 if (1   p)B(q) > P
(3.23)
so that innovators with ex-ante probability of validity   1 apply for the patent
and those with  < 1 do not apply. If P > G(q); then patents are too costly and
no one applies for a patent. If P < (1   p)B(q); then patenting fee is low enough
and the expected beneﬁt of holding even a bad patent is high enough so that ev-
eryone applies for a patent. In the interior range, the threshold 1(q) decreases
with q; that is, the higher the perceived patent quality is, the more innovators
apply for patents. Particularly, more low ex-ante probability of validity appli-
cants would ﬁnd it worthwhile to apply.
Taking into account a threshold ex-ante probability of validity  above which
innovators apply for a patent, the probability that a granted patent is good is
given by
q1() = Pr(good j granted) =
Pr(good and granted)
Pr(granted)
=
R 1

e f

e 

de 
R 1

h
1   p

1  e 
i
f

e 

de 
:
(3.24)
This is the belief that an uninformed person has on the probability that a patent
is good. The possible values of q1 are in the range [E();1]: The lowest value
q1 = E() is obtained if all innovators apply for a patent and examiners never
ﬁnd invalidating prior art (p = 0); and the highest value q1 = 1 is obtained if the
examination is perfect (p = 1). Note here that when p < 1; the perceived quality
of patents increases with the threshold . A higher threshold implies an overall
better pool of applicants and thus a higher probability that a granted patent is
good.
88We now deﬁne an equilibrium in our model.
Deﬁnition 3 (Patenting Equilibrium) A patenting equilibrium is characterized by a
pair f
1;q
1g; such that


1 = 1(q

1) and q

1 = q1(

1): (3.25)
Innovators of type  > 
1 apply for a patent and innovators of type  < 
1 do not apply
for a patent. The equilibrium is interior when 
1 2 (0;1):
Our ﬁrst result establishes existence of an equilibrium and derives condi-
tions for an interior equilibrium where some but no all innovators apply for
patents. We also show that given our assumptions, when an interior equilib-
rium exists, it is unique.
Proposition 11 If P > G(1); then in equilibrium no one applies for a patent (
1 = 1). If
P < (1   p) B(q1(0)); then in equilibrium all innovators apply for a patent (
1 = 0). For
intermediate levels of the patenting fee, there is a unique interior equilibrium f
1;q
1g.
Detailed proofs are provided in the appendix. To prove this proposition, we
show that the equilibrium is deﬁned as an intersection between two functions
1(q) which is decreasing in q (because with a higher perceived quality more
innovators apply) and q1() which is increasing in  (because quality increases
when fewer low probability of validity applicants apply.) When these two func-
tions intersect, there is a unique interior equilibrium. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
equilibrium, it depicts the downward sloping 1(q); the upward sloping q1()
and their intersection which deﬁnes the equilibrium.
89Figure 3.1: Equilibrium in a single-tiered system
Policy Implications
The equilibrium pair f
1;q
1g depends on the patent policy parameters p (exam-
ination intensity) and P (patenting fee). Equilibrium also depends on the ben-
eﬁt functions G(:) and B(:). These functions reﬂect the economic value of the
innovation, and can be affected by patent policies that strengthen patent pro-
tection (such as increased patent breadth and longer patent term).16 In Propo-
sition 12, we examine the relationship between policy levers and equilibrium
outcomes. We examine how policy changes affect 
1 which determines the vol-
ume of patent applications
R 1

1
f()d

and the quality of patents q
1.
Proposition 12 In the range of an interior equilibrium, (i) the equilibrium volume of
patent applications decreases with patenting fee (P) and the quality of patents increases
16Patent breadth and patent length are extensively discussed in the literature on patents; see,
for example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue,
Scotchmer and Thisse(1998).
90with patenting fee; (ii) patent quality increases with the examination intensity (p) but
the effect of examination intensity on the equilibrium volume of patent applications is
ambiguous; (iii) a policy that strengthens patent protection to increase G(:) and B(:)
would result in lower patent quality and more patent applications.
The effect of an increase in patenting fee is intuitive. A higher patenting
fee makes patent applications less attractive as fewer low ex-ante probability
of validity innovators apply for the patent and thus the quality of patents in-
creases. The increase in patent quality makes applying for a patent more attrac-
tive, but not enough to reverse the decline in applications due to the increase in
fee. Figure 3.2 illustrates two equilibrium points E1 (p;P1) and E2 (p;P2) which
correspond to two systems with the same examination intensity p but different
levels of patent fee P1 < P2. A higher patent fee results in a shift of the curve
1(q1) to the right, but no change in the curve q1(1). The intersection E2 has less
applications (higher 1) and higher patent quality q1.
The effect of an increase in examination intensity is more complex. Figure
3.3 illustrates equilibria for two different examination intensities E1 (p1;P) and
E2 (p2;P) with p1 < p2. A higher examination intensity results in a shift of the
curve 1(q1) rightward, but also a shift up of the curve q1(1) to the right. The
equilibrium E2 (p2;P) has a higher patent quality q1; but the effect on patent ap-
plications is ambiguous. On one hand, tougher examination reduces the prob-
ability of any applicant to secure a patent, making a patent application less
attractive, particularly to low probability of validity innovators; on the other
hand, one can expect an increase in the perceived quality of patents due to the
tougher examination process making patent applications more attractive (when
innovators care about the perceived quality of a patent). The overall effect on
91Figure 3.2: Effect of an increase in patenting fee
Figure 3.3: Effect of an increase in examination intensity
92the volume of patent applications is ambiguous. If the beneﬁts from a patent
were not sensitive to perceived patent quality, then the increase in examination
intensity would only reduce the probability of securing a patent and hence the
volume of applications would decline. However, when the beneﬁt from a patent
is sensitive enough to perceived patent quality, then the volume of applications
might increase with examination intensity. The perceived quality of patents
must increase, whether or not the volume of application decreases. If perceived
quality were to decrease, there would necessarily be a decline in patent applica-
tions which in turn would imply higher quality.
Changes in the beneﬁt functions G(q) and B(q) change the function 1(q) but
do not have an effect on q1(): A strengthening of patent protection, for example
by increasing patent length or breadth, increases the conditional beneﬁt func-
tionsG(q)and B(q):Asaresult, moreinnovatorsapplyandthequalityofpatents
declines. In contrast, a post grant opposition system as proposed by Merges
(1999), or a weakening of the presumption of validity are likely to lower B(q):17
This will shift 1(q) up resulting in an equilibrium with less patent applications
and a higher patent quality. However, accounting for more invalidation of bad
patents post patent granting suggests an additional effect which is similar to
that of increased examination intensity. In this case, the combined effect would
be an increase in patent quality, but an ambiguous effect on the volume of ap-
plications.
Noveck (2006) advocates a “Community Patent Review” system. In this pro-
posal, for each patent application, there would be a window of time during
which patent examination is open to the public. Facilitating the addition of
17In the USA, patents are presumed valid. This implies that the burden of establishing inva-
lidity of a patent rests on the party asserting invalidity. We discuss this issue further in Section
3.3.3.
93prior art by the public pre-granting of the patent can be seen as an increase in
the probability that invalidating prior art would be detected when it exists, that
is, an increase in p: Hence, this reform is expected to result in an increase in
patent quality, but an ambiguous effect on the volume of patent applications. 18
Caillaud and Duchˆ ene (2007) propose a policy in which the patent ofﬁce
would penalize rejected applicants to induce more investment in R&D which is
assumed to increase the probability that the innovation quality is high. Thomas’
(2001) proposal combines a pre-examination period in which informants might
submit pertinent prior art, with a bounty to any party who succeeds in provid-
ing invalidating prior art. The bounty would be ﬁnanced by charging a ﬁne to
the applicant, thus, in Thomas’ proposal, a penalty for a bad patent is combined
with an increase in the probability of ﬁnding invalidating prior art p. In the con-
text of our model, a penalty for a bad patent PB would appear in the applicant’s
payoff function as
V (;q) = G(q) + (1   )(1   p)B(q)   (1   )pPB   P: (3.26)
The penalty for a bad patent results in a similar effect to that of an increase in
patenting fee P. Increasing the penalty will result in less patent applications and
higher patent quality. However, a one dollar increase in patenting fee would re-
sult in a larger reduction in patent applications and in the volume of bad patents
than the same increase in penalty. The reason is that the patent applicants in our
model do not know for sure if they have a good or a bad application. The ex-
ante probability of validity is ; and so, for any applicant, an increase of one
dollar in patenting fee results in an increase of one dollar in the cost of patent-
18Allowing public review also requires that the patent application be made public. In the
current US system, applications are typically published 18 month after the effective ﬁling date.
Ifin implementing this reformthis period is shortened, therewould be an additional ambiguous
effect on the value of patent applications which we have not accounted for.
94ing, while an increase of one dollar in the penalty for a rejected application only
results in an expected cost increase of (1 )p: We note however that our model
does not account for the effect fees might have on the incentive for R&D and
hence it does not fully capture the potential beneﬁts from penalties.
In Section 3.3.3, we will more closely examine one more policy reform, the
Lemley, Lichtman and Sampat’s (2005) proposal of a two-tiered patent system.
First, we turn to an examination of welfare and the optimal examination inten-
sity and patenting fee.
Welfare
Suppose that in terms of social welfare, the value of a good patent is at least
as large as its private value, e G(q)  G(q); and the social value of a bad patent
is lower than its private value, e B(q)  B(q). This depicts the idea that private
innovators cannot capture the full beneﬁts of their innovation, nor do they take
into account the social costs of bad patents. Social welfare in the single-tiered
system is
W =
Z 1
1
h
e G(q1) + (1   )(1   p)e B(q1)   c(p)
i
f()d (3.27)
where c(p) is the social cost of patent examination such that the probability of
ﬁnding an invalidating prior art is p if there exists any. Assume, for any 1;
welfare increases with patent quality.19 In an optimal policy with P > 0 and
1 > p > 0 that maximize the social welfare, the following conditions hold:
dW
dp
= 0 and
dW
dP
= 0: (3.28)
19This holds true when the social beneﬁt functions increase with quality e G0 (:) > 0; e B0 (:) > 0,
or when the weaker sufﬁcient condition
R 1
0
h
e G0 (q1) + (1   )(1   p)e B0 (q1)
i
f()d > 0 holds.
95Rearranging these ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain
@W
@q1
dq1
dp
+c(p)f(1)
d1
dp
=
Z 1
1
c
0(p)f()d+
h
1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1)
i
f(1)
d1
dp
:
(3.29)
and
@W
@q1
dq1
dP
+ c(p)f(1)
d1
dP
=
h
1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1))
i
f(1)
d1
dP
: (3.30)
These condition for an optimal policy reﬂects the balance between marginal
costs and marginal beneﬁts of changes in policy parameters. We focus on the
ﬁrst order condition with respect to patenting fee (3.30). The marginal bene-
ﬁts of an increase in patent fee include the increase in social beneﬁts due to the
increase in patent quality, as well as the saved examination costs on marginal
applicants. The marginal cost of the increase in patent fee is the lost surplus
from marginal applicants.
We make two observations based on the condition (3.30) for optimal patent-
ing fee.
Proposition 13 Given an examination intensity p; if patenting fee is chosen optimally,
then
(i) the net social surplus from the marginal applicant 1 is positive:
h
1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1)   c(p)
i
> 0; (3.31)
(ii) if the private expected beneﬁt of the marginal applicant exceeds the social beneﬁt
of his application, i.e., if
1G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)B(q1)  1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1); (3.32)
then the optimal patenting fee is larger than the cost of examination, P > c(p):
96The marginal applicant is the lowest probability of validity applicant 1,
who, in equilibrium, is indifferent between applying for a patent or not ap-
plying for a patent. The ﬁrst claim in the proposition follows immediately from
(3.30). The condition in the second claim (3.32) is more likely to hold when bad
patents are costly for the society and the volume of patent applications is high
(low 1). The condition holds, for example, if private and social beneﬁts of a
good project are the same, e G(q) = G(q); but bad projects have a lower social
value, e B(q)  B(q).
While examining the ﬁrst order conditions, as we did above, help under-
stand some of the forces involved, as a practical matter, patent policy is not
likelytobesettoitsoptimallevels. Lackofinformationandresourceconstraints
may be among the reasons why an optimal policy is not feasible, and in practice,
it is often more uniform than it should be from a social perspective.
3.3.3 Two-Tiered Patent System
In an article titled “What to Do about Bad Patents?” Lemley et. al. (2005) pro-
pose establishing a two-tiered patent system. The proposal was further dis-
cussed in Lemley and Lichtman (2007). Their rationale is that the two-tiered
system will allow the patent ofﬁce to “focus its examination resources on impor-
tant patents and pay little attention to the rest.” The two-tiered patent system
would give applicants a choice between a low cost patent application which
is not examined thoroughly, and a high cost patent application which would
be subject to a thorough examination and thus earn more presumption of va-
lidity by getting a “gold-plate” patent. They suggested that innovators would
97likely pay for serious review of their most economically important patents. This
self selection mechanism would allow the patent ofﬁce to focus resources on
most important patents (those whose innovators choose to gold-plate). In this
section, we extend our basic model to analyze a two-tiered patent system. We
examine innovators’ equilibrium selection of a patent tier and how it is affected
by patent policies. We establish conditions under which the conjectured posi-
tive correlation between economic value of an innovation and gold-plate patent
applications holds.
Extending the Model
We maintain most of our assumptions from the previous section, but now we
introduce the two-tiered patent system. Innovators can choose to apply for a
“regular” patent, or for a “gold-plate” patent. A gold-plate patent is associated
with a higher fee Pgp > Pr and a more thorough examining procedure pgp > pr.
We assume that pgp is sufﬁciently high (or B only moderately steeper than G) so
that
G
0 (q)   (1   pgp)B
0 (q) > 0: (3.33)
This condition will help us establish the existence of equilibrium in the two-
tiered system. The condition clearly holds when pgp = 1: Which patent was
granted is public information. The value of a patent to an innovator depends on
both its ex-ante probability of validity  and on the perceived quality of patents
of its tier – qr for a regular patent or qgp for a gold-plate patent. This dependence
arises for two reasons: the different examination intensities and the different
endogenously determined selection of patent applicants.
Given patent policy parameters and choices by all other innovators, an inno-
98vator whose ex-ante probability of validity is  and who applies for a patent-tier
i 2 fr;gpg; obtains a value:
Vi(;qi) = G(qi) + (1   )(1   pi)B(qi)   Pi: (3.34)
An innovator would ﬁle for a regular patent if the value of a regular patent
is greater than zero (value of not patenting), Vr(;qr)  0 and also greater than
the value of a gold-plate patent, Vr(;qr)  Vgp(;qgp):
Let us denote the set of innovators who apply for a regular patent by r and
the set of innovators who ﬁle for a gold-plate patent by gp. The probability that
a patent of type i 2 fr;gpg is good is then given by
qi = Pr(good j patent-tier i granted) =
R
if()d
R
i

1   pi(1   )

f()d
: (3.35)
Under the assumption of rational expectations, the probability qi is the be-
lief others hold about the quality of a patent-tier i: As before, we refer to qi as
perceived patent quality, or simply patent quality. We now deﬁne an equilib-
rium in our model. For simplicity (and without loss of generality), we assume
that when indifferent between patenting or not patenting, innovators choose to
patent and when indifferent between a regular patent and a gold-plate patent,
innovators apply for the regular patent.
Deﬁnition 4 A two-tiered patent system equilibrium is given by two disjoint sets of
innovators r and gp in [0,1] and patent qualities qr and qgp such that:
1. for all  2 r; Vr(;qr)  0 and Vr(;qr)  Vgp(;qgp);
2. for all  2 gp; Vgp(;qgp)  0 and Vgp(;qgp) > Vr(;qr);
993. qr and qgp satisfy equation (3.35).
The ﬁrst two conditions imply that innovators choose optimally between ap-
plying for a regular patent, a gold-plate patent or no patent; the third condition
states that expectations about patent quality are rational given all innovators’
choices and the existing patent policy.
The equilibria we identify are such that the sets r and gp can be deﬁned us-
ing thresholds so that high types apply for gold-plate patents, and intermediate
types apply for a regular patent.
Deﬁnition 5 (i) A “thresholds equilibrium” is a two-tiered patent system equilibrium
such that there exist 0      1 so that in equilibrium (;1)  gp; (;) 
r;(0;) and innovators with types (0;) do not apply for a patent.
(ii) A thresholds equilibrium is interior if 0 <  <  < 1.
In an interior threshold equilibrium, at least some innovators apply for each
patent tier, and some do not apply for a patent. In the next proposition, we
show that an equilibrium exists and that every interior equilibrium is a thresh-
old equilibrium.
Proposition 14 An equilibrium for the two-tiered system exists. Any interior equilib-
rium is a threshold equilibrium. Moreover, in the interior equilibrium, the probability
that a patent is good is higher for gold-plate patents, qgp > qr:
In the interior equilibrium, the innovator with ex-ante probability of validity
 is indifferent between applying for a regular patent and not applying for the
100patent at all. Hence, if qr is the equilibrium perceived quality of regular patents,
then Vr(;qr) = 0: An innovator with ex-ante probability of validity  is in-
different between applying for a regular patent and applying for a gold-plate
patent. Hence, Vgp(;qgp) = Vr(;qr). Payoffs Vr (:) and Vgp (:) are deﬁned in
(3.34). By the deﬁnition of interior equilibrium and by Proposition 14, to ﬁnd an
equilibrium, we need to ﬁnd , , qr and qgp such that the following system is
satisﬁed:
 =
Pr   (1   pr)B(qr)
G(qr)   (1   pr)B(qr)
;

 =

Pgp   Pr

 
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i
h
G

qgp

 G(qr)
i
 
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i;
qr =
R 
 f()d
R 


1   pr (1   )

f()d
;
qgp =
R 1
f()d
R 1

h
1   pgp (1   )
i
f()d
: (3.36)
The ﬁrst equation states the indifference of an applicant, with an ex-ante
probability of validity ; between applying for a regular patent or not applying;
the second states the indifference of an applicant, with an ex-ante probability of
validity ; between applying for a regular patent or for a gold-plate one; the
last two equations deﬁne perceived patent quality for regular and gold-plate
patents based on the equilibrium choices of innovators.
Consequences of Gold-plating Patents
In this section, we consider the effect of introducing gold-plate patents to a stan-
dard single-tiered patent system. As a benchmark for comparison of the two-
tiered patent system with the single-tiered patent system, we will assume that
101examination effort and patenting fee for the regular patent in the two-tiered
system remain the same as those in the single-tiered patent system. But in the
two-tieredsystem, theinnovatorshaveanadditionalchoice: theycangold-plate
their patents which provides a more thorough examination process at a higher
fee.
Suppose that in the single-tiered patent system, in equilibrium, innovators
with ex-ante probability of validity   1 apply for the patent, and average
patent quality is given by q1: Suppose now that the patent ofﬁce adopts the new
two-tiered system. Let us consider the effect of the availability of the second
patent-tier on the volume of patent applications and on the quality of patents.
Weassume(themoreinterestingcase)thatthenewsystemwouldresultinanin-
terior equilibrium, where both patent-tiers are applied for. As described earlier,
 and  denote the cut-off ex-ante probabilities of validity for regular patent
application and for gold-plate patents, respectively (see (3.36)). In the next
proposition, we show that the addition of the gold-plate patent option results
in a decline in the overall volume of patent applications (with less low quality
patentsbeingappliedfor). Whileregularpatentswouldbeoflowerqualitythan
a patent in the single-tiered system, gold-plate patents are of higher quality and
the overall quality of patents would increase as a result of this policy change.
The latter effect results from the decline in low quality patent applications as
well as the more thorough examination of gold-plate patents.
Proposition 15 Consider a single-tiered system with examination intensity p and a
patent fee P and consider a two-tiered system where regular patents have the same fee
and examination intensity as the single-tiered system (Pr = P and pr = p). Assume
each system has an interior equilibrium. Then, (i) in the two-tiered system, the vol-
102ume of patent applications is lower than in the single-tiered system ( > 1); (ii) the
perceived quality of a regular patent is lower than that of a patent in the single-tiered
system; (iii) the perceived quality of a gold-plate patent is higher; (iv) overall, there are
less bad patents in the two-tiered system.
A two-tiered system involves more intense examination. This potentially in-
creases the patent ofﬁce’s expenditure. If the gold-plate patent fee is set high
enough to cover the higher examination costs, the expenditure of the patent of-
ﬁce would not increase. For a very stringent gold-plate patent examination pro-
cess, this cost may be prohibitively high so that no interior equilibrium exists.
However, under reasonable technical conditions stated in the next proposition,
if the single-tiered system has an interior equilibrium and imperfect examina-
tion(p < 1), thenthereis a two-tieredpatent system with aninterior equilibrium
in which the expenditure of the patent ofﬁce does not exceed that of the single-
tiered system.
Proposition 16 Consider a single-tiered system with examination intensity p and a
patent fee P that has an interior equilibrium f1;q1g: Assume the Jacobian matrix of
the system of equations (3.36) has a positive determinant20 at the point ( = 1; =
1;qr = q1;qgp = 1): Then there exist pgp > p and Pgp > P such that the two-tiered
system, where Pr = P and pr = p, has an interior equilibrium in which the expenditure
of the patent ofﬁce does not exceed that of the single-tiered system.
To assure that the expenditure of the patent ofﬁce does not exceed that in the
single-tiered system, we could set gold-plate patent fee to cover the additional
20The Jacobian matrix is the matrix of ﬁrst derivatives of the system of equilibrium equations.
A positive Jacobian guarantees that the solution to the equilibrium equations system exists and
is locally unique.
103cost of examination: Pgp  Pr +
h
c

pgp

  c(p1)
i
: A sufﬁciently small increase in
examination intensity pgp in the second tier would allow a small enough gold-
plate patent fee so that there is an interior equilibrium in the two-tiered system.
Patent Policy and Its Effect on the Two-Tiered System
In this section, we consider the effect of changes in patent policy on the two-
tiered patent system, particularly, the effect of changes in patenting fees and the
intensity of examination on the volume of patent applications, on the choice be-
tween regular and gold-plate patents and on patent quality. Gold-plate patents
are intended to be ones for which the patent ofﬁce thoroughly examines the ap-
plications. To simplify the analysis while capturing this idea, we will consider
the extreme case in which examination of gold-plate patents is perfect, pgp = 1:
With such stringent examination, the perceived quality of gold-plate patents is
maximized, qgp = 1, since any bad application for a gold-plate patent is rejected.
The system of equilibrium equations (3.36) is then reduced to
 =
Pr   (1   pr)B(qr)
G(qr)   (1   pr)B(qr)
;

 =

Pgp   Pr

+ (1   pr)B(qr)

G(1)  G(qr)

+ (1   pr)B(qr)
;
qr =
R 
 f()d
R 


1   pr(1   )

f()d
:
There exists an interior equilibrium when there is a solution to the system
of equilibrium equalities with (;;qr) 2 (0;1)3. Interior equilibria exist for
some functional forms (G; B and F); and parameter values

Pgp;Pr; pr

; but not
always. From the second equilibrium condition, it is easy to see that a necessary
104condition for the existence of an interior equilibrium is that
G(1)  G(0) >

Pgp   Pr

: (3.37)
If this condition fails, then no innovator applies for a gold-plate patent. If inno-
vators’ payoffs are independent of perceived quality, then G(1) = G(0) and the
two-tiered system fails.
We now investigate how patenting fees Pgp and Pr and the examination in-
tensity for regular patents pr affect the (interior) equilibrium outcomes in the
two-tiered patent system. To simplify derivations, from now on, consider a lin-
ear model which is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6 (Linear model). In the linear model, innovator types are uniformly dis-
tributed: F() = ; beneﬁt-functions are linear: G(q) = (G +G0q) and B(q) =
(B + B0q); with parameters that satisfy (G +G0) = (B + B0) and 2G0  B0 > G0 > 0:
(Hence, the beneﬁt from a good patent is at least as high as that from a bad patent, these
beneﬁts are equal at q = 1, and B(q) is moderately steeper.)
Consider ﬁrst the effect of an increase in the fee for a gold-plate patent. With
a rise in cost of applying for a gold-plate patent, we can expect some applicants
to apply for a regular patent instead of a gold-plate patent. This would result in
a decline of gold-plate patent applications ( increases). Applicants who switch
from gold-plate patents to regular patents are of higher ex-ante probability of
validity than those who applied for regular patents in the ﬁrst place. Therefore
the perceived quality of regular patents (qr) increases. If beneﬁts from patent
applications did not depend on the perceived quality, there would be no reason
for the overall volume of patent applications to change. However, since bene-
ﬁts increase with perceived quality, with higher gold-plate patent fee there is an
105increase in perceived quality of regular patents which results in an increase in
regular patent applications also from marginally low quality holders (a decline
in ): Hence, overall there is an increase in the number of patent applications.
Because there is a decline in (stringently examined) gold-plate patents and rise
in low-quality applications, the number of bad patents granted increases. How-
ever, the quality of regular patents increases despite the possible increase in
number of applications.
An increase in the fee for a regular patent would make regular patents less
attractive for some high ex-ante probability of validity innovators who would
now prefer a gold-plate patent instead, as well as from some low ex-ante prob-
ability of validity innovators who would now prefer not to apply for a patent
at all. Therefore, the prevalence of bad patents would decline both due to the
decrease in applications by some low ex-ante probability of validity innovators
and because of the increase in applications for the more stringently examined
gold-plate patents. The perceived quality of a regular patent increases.
The effect of an increase in patent examination intensity is more complex.
On one hand, the increase in examination effort reduces the probability that a
patent is granted which lowers the value of applying for regular patents. On
the other hand, because patentees beneﬁt from a higher perceived value, if the
quality of patents increases with examination intensity, it would have a positive
effect on the value of applying for regular patents. In our analysis, the ﬁrst effect
(which makes regular patents less attractive) dominates for low ex-ante proba-
bility of validity innovators, thus there will be a decline in overall applications
for patents. As a result of the increase in examination intensity, there is an am-
biguous effect on the volume of gold-plate patent applications. The effect on the
106prevalence of bad patents with respect to examination intensity is negative and
on the perceived quality of a regular patent is positive.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 17 In the linear model, if regular patent examination intensity is not too
high (pr  1
2), and gold-plate patents are perfectly examined

pgp = 1

; then in an
interior equilibrium,
(i) the overall volume of patent applications increases ( declines) with gold-plate
patenting fees

Pgp

, it decreases with regular patents’ fees (Pr) and with the intensity
of the examination process (pr);
(ii) the volume of gold-plate patent applications increases ( declines) with the fees
of regular patents; it decreases with gold-plate patenting fees. The effect of the intensity
of examination of regular patents is ambiguous;
(iii) the quality of regular patents (qr) increases with gold-plate patenting fees, with
regular patents’ fees and with its examination intensity;
(iv) the prevalence of bad patents increases with gold-plate patenting fees and de-
creases with regular patents’ fees and with their examination intensity.
Presumption of Validity
The patent system is a part of the executive branch of the government. Its deci-
sions are subject to review by courts. Patent law states however that “a patent
shall be presumed valid” and that the “burden of establishing invalidity of a
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity” (35
107USC 282). Lemley and Lichtman (2007), in their examination of the two-tiered
patent system proposal discuss at length the issue of presumption of validity.
They suggest that in the two-tiered system, gold-plate patent holders should
enjoy a presumption of validity as their patents were thoroughly examined, but
patents in the other tier should not be presumed valid. They explain further
that “[w]e know far less than we should about how presumptions affect liti-
gation decisions. ... it is far from a simple matter to predict how changes in
a legal presumption would change actual case outcomes.” Our model of the
two-tiered patent system therefore focused on the main characteristics of the
two-tiered system – more thorough examination and higher fees for gold-plate
patents, but did not explicitly address the issue of presumption of validity.
Presumption of validity may, to some extent, have been captured in our
model by the fact that in our model we take into account perceived patent qual-
ity and its positive effect on the value of patents. Beneﬁt functions were as-
sumed to have the same functional forms G(q) and B(q); but gold-plate patents
have a higher perceived quality

qgp > qr

which we can think of as also captur-
ing a “presumption of validity”. Another way to think about modeling more
explicitly a legal change in presumption of validity is to assume different ben-
eﬁt functions in the two tiers Gi(q) and Bi(q) for i 2 fr;gpg; with higher beneﬁts
in the case of gold-plate patents because of the stronger presumption of valid-
ity. In our system of equilibrium inequalities, the change would be reﬂected in
the equation deﬁning —the threshold between types who apply for the regu-
lar and the gold-plate patents. For simplicity of the notation and analysis, we
chose not to incorporate this in the model. We conjecture that reducing pre-
sumption of validity for regular patents and increasing it for gold-plate patents,
to the extent that this is described by tier-speciﬁc values for holding a patent,
108is expected to make gold-plate patents at least marginally more attractive and
regular patents less attractive. As long as the difference in beneﬁts is not large,
we would not expect selection patterns into the two tiers to change.
Economic Importance and Gold-Plate Patents
Lemley et. al. (2005) stated that “most likely applicants would pay for seri-
ous review with respect to their most important patents but conserve resources
on their most speculative entries.” To examine this assertion in light of our
model, we ﬁrst need to ask what characterizes the economically “most impor-
tant” patents? If one thinks of these as being innovations that are ex-ante most
likely to be valid, then our previous analysis establishes the suggested relation.
This holds because we found that only innovators with a high enough ex-ante
probability of validity apply for a gold-plate patent.
However, economic importance is probably better interpreted in terms of
the economic value of the innovation rather than in terms of the probability of
it being good. In our model, the values of a patent conditional on it being good
or bad are given by the functions G(q) and B(q). We have assumed that these
two functions are increasing in the perceived quality of patents q, that the value
of a bad patent is steeper but that at q = 1; G(1) = B(1): What would distin-
guish the values associated with an economically important patent from a less
important one? It seems reasonable to assume that the value of the patent con-
ditional on it being good would be higher for an economically more signiﬁcant
patent. Denoting two innovations 1 and 2, the ﬁrst being more signiﬁcant, we
expect G1(q) > G2(q): It also seems reasonable that for economically signiﬁcant
innovations, the value of at least a bad patent is more sensitive to perceived
109Figure 3.4: Economically signiﬁcant patents
quality. This is because if the patent is economically signiﬁcant, a competitor
would have more to lose from being excluded and perhaps more to gain from
trying to invalidate it. How likely the competitor is to challenge the patent can
depend on the perceived value of patents. Hence, our second assumption is that
for economically signiﬁcant patents, B(q) is steeper

B0
1(q)  B0
2(q)

, and possibly
also G(q)

or, G0
1(q)  G0
2(q)

. For low perceived patent quality, the value of a bad
patent may be lower. But for high perceived patent quality, the value is higher:
B1(1) > B2(1): Figure 3.4 illustrates this comparison between the values of an
economically signiﬁcant patent and an economically insigniﬁcant one.
Proposition 18 If ”economic signiﬁcance” is characterized by higher beneﬁt functions
and steeper value of bad patents, the effect of economic signiﬁcance on the volume of
gold-plate patent applications is ambiguous.
We establish this ambiguity in the appendix using two numerical examples.
110In both examples, we assume a linear model. We vary the degrees of increase in
the beneﬁt and the change in slope of the function B(q): The examples establish
the ambiguity of the result on economically signiﬁcant patents – applicants with
economically more signiﬁcant patents are not necessarily more likely to apply
for gold-plate patents than the ones with economically less signiﬁcant patents.
We computed an equilibrium for innovations that are heterogenous in their
ex-ante probability of validity, but otherwise homogeneous. This best describes
a situation in which innovators and their competitors can observe innovations’
economicsigniﬁcance, evenifthepatentofﬁcedoesnot. Allowingheterogenous
beneﬁt functions would clearly make the analysis signiﬁcantly more complex.
However, to get a sense of what the potential effect of economic signiﬁcance
mightbewhenapplicantshaveheterogenousbeneﬁtfunctions, weconsidertwo
innovators’ choices given the equilibrium levels of perceived patent qualities
q
gp > q
r: The difference between each of the innovator’s beneﬁt in the two tiers
is
V(;qgp;qr) = 
h
G

qgp

 G(qr)
i
+(1 )
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i
 
h
Pgp   Pr
i
:
(3.38)
An innovator applies for a gold-plate patent when V(;qgp;qr) > 0: Suppose
that innovator 1 has an economically more signiﬁcant patent which is captured
as a parallel shift up of the beneﬁt functions compared to those of innovator 2:
G1 (q) = G2 (q) +  and B1 (q) = B2 (q) + : The effect of  on V(;qgp;qr) is
@V(;qgp;qr)
@
=  (1   )

pgp   pr

: (3.39)
This implies that for ﬁxed equilibrium levels of patent qualities, the innovator
with an economically more signiﬁcant patent might be less likely to apply for
111a gold-plate patent. As we discussed above, economic signiﬁcance might have
a more complex effect than the one we described here, but this provides an
intuition for the ambiguity of the result even if we were to allow heterogenous
patent values in the model.
3.3.4 Remarks
Patent policy reform has been a subject of intense policy debate in recent years.
The quality of patents is a central issue in this debate. This chapter sheds lights
on the determinants of equilibrium patent quality. In our model, the value of a
patent to an innovator depends on what a third party would perceive its quality
to be. This quality depends on overall patent applications and the examination
procedure. Hence, patent quality and innovators’ decisions to patent are de-
termined together in equilibrium. Bad patents impose an externality on good
patentholdersastheydecreasetheperceivedpatentquality andhencethevalue
of patents of all innovators.
We examined the effects of policy changes on patent quality and the volume
of patent applications. Intuitively, increasing patenting fees would lower the
volume of applications and increase patent quality. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that
making the examination procedure more stringent might result in an increase
in the volume of applications.
We formally examine a policy reform proposal of establishing a two-tiered
patent system. We show that such policy could result in a decrease in the vol-
ume of applications and in the probability that bad patents be issued. It is not
obvious however that the two-tiered system would help sort economically im-
112portant patents and focus examination efforts on these innovations. An impor-
tant dimension which determines selection between regular patents and gold-
plate patents is the ex-ante quality of the innovation. Innovators who believe
that invalidating prior art is less likely to exist are more likely to sort into the
gold-plate patent tier. This would imply that more intense examination effort
would be aimed precisely at those applications that are least likely to be in-
valid. Additionally, if cost of examination is convex in the probability of ﬁnding
invalidating prior art conditional on its existence, the marginal beneﬁt of an ad-
ditional dollar spent on examination effort might be higher if it is spent on the
less thoroughly examined applications. This raises concerns over the efﬁciency
of the two-tiered system, and may raise some doubt over how credible can the
patent ofﬁce be in maintaining a commitment for high examination standards
in the second tier.
In our analysis, we have not accounted for a possible liquidity constraint
that would prevent some innovators from patenting if patenting fee is too high.
Binding liquidity constraints on the part of small innovators may prevent them
from gold-plating patents even if their ex-ante probability of validity is high. It
this case, the two-tiered system might disadvantage small and ﬁnancially con-
strained innovators who would be pooled with lower quality applicants in the
ﬁrst tier. A fee schedule that allows discounts for small entities, as exists in the
current system, can alleviate this concern.
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116CHAPTER 4
DO JOURNALS ACCEPT TOO MANY PAPERS?
4.1 Introduction
Everyone makes mistakes. Journal referees are no exceptions. Refereeing a pa-
per for a journal to judge whether it is of high enough quality and whether it
satisﬁes the goals of the journal is difﬁcult enough in the best of times and it
is sometimes even tougher because of the innovative and unfamiliar methods
used in papers trying to scale scientiﬁc heights. Hence many papers of really
good quality get rejections from journals. For example, George Akerlof’s No-
bel Prize winning paper, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism,” was rejected by three different journals before it was
ﬁnally accepted by the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Gans and Shepherd,
1994; Shepherd, 1994). Paul Samuelson admits that some of his ‘classic’ papers
were initially rejected by some journals. Paul Krugman said, “I would estimate
that 60% of my papers sent to refereed journals have been rejected on the ﬁrst
try.” (Gans and Shepherd, 1994; Shepherd, 1994). The reverse mistake of accept-
ing papers that ought not to be set in print also no doubt occurs. Error in the
refereeing process is not conﬁned to the ﬁeld of economics only, it happens in
every area. In 1977, Jerzy Kosinski, the National Book Award winner for one of
his novels in 1969, allowed a free-lancer to resubmit the manuscript of the same
novel with a different title and author’s name. Surprisingly, all the publishers
refused to publish it and more astonishingly, the original publisher of the novel
did not notice the disguise and also rejected it (Peters and Ceci, 1980).
The larger problems of peer-reviewed journals will need a lot of research and
117effort to address. However, discrepancies between ideal acceptance rate and the
actual acceptance rate can also occur for reasons of pure ‘market structure,’ that
is, stemming from strategic matters of inter-journal competition. The present
chapter is a contribution to this latter source of inefﬁciency.
What the chapter does is to take this tiny slice of the large problem of ef-
ﬁcient peer review and analyze if there are inefﬁciencies that stem from this.
Indeed, I ﬁnd that there are such inefﬁciencies that can be corrected. In par-
ticular, I ﬁnd that in the presence of errors in estimating the true quality of a
paper, journals lower their quality cutoffs while competing against each other.
Apart from these speciﬁc ﬁndings, the chapter also tries to contribute to provid-
ing a theoretical structure for analyzing journal behavior—a subject that has not
received as much attention as it should.
There has been a rising concern about the ﬂaws in the peer-review system
(Blank, 1991; Hamermesh, 1994; Ellison, 2002). Ellison (2002) found that there
has been an increasing time-gap between the submission and acceptance of a
paper. However, he found that, this increasing review time is not a result of
more thorough review or more complex papers, rather because the journals re-
quire more extensive revisions. In addition, Ellison (2002) concludes that “top
general-interestjournalshaveraisedtheirqualitythreshold(relativetotheother
journals), which suggests that there is now more competition for their space.”
Note that this ﬁnding is not in contrast with the results of my model. In this
chapter, there is a constant pool of paper submissions. However, in case of top
journals, the competition is much severe among the authors compared to the
competition among journals. And my chapter does conﬁrm that as severity of
competition between journals decreases, they raise their quality cut-offs.
1184.2 The Model
Consider two journals - A and B; similar in every aspect to start with, i.e., they
have the same rank initially in a particular ﬁeld of publication, same cost of
publishing a given number of papers, they make similar mistakes in reviewing
an article and so on. Suppose that each journal receives a continuum of papers,
each of quality q 2 [0;1]; for review and the journal publishes it if it is of a
sufﬁciently high quality. Assume that, quality-wise, the papers are uniformly
distributed over [0;1]: After review, journal k; k 2 fA; Bg; observes quality qk
i
for paper i; qk
i is uniformly distributed over

qi   ";qi + "

where qi is the true
quality of the paper and " is the error in the review process while assessing the
true quality. Assume that the errors are the same for both the journals. Each
journal k sets a cut-off qk on the observed quality of a paper for publishing it.
Thus, paper i is accepted by journal k if and only if qk
i  qk; otherwise rejected.
If a journal rejects a “ﬁrst-time submission,” then the paper is submitted to the
other journal. I shall refer this as “second-time submission” in this chapter. If a
paper is rejected by both journals, it is abandoned.
For each journal, cost of publishing n papers is
C (n) = cn: (4.1)
Linear cost is just for the technical simpliﬁcation of the model. However, all
the main results of this chapter hold (qualitatively) with a strictly convex cost
function as well.
It is reasonable to assume that a journal’s objective is to improve its rank.1
Different analysts suggest different ways to rank a journal. Some rank journals
1Note that this is just a horizontal competition between journals.
119according to the number of citations others make to the articles in the particular
journal (see, for example, Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984), whereas some others
rank journals according to the ranks of the economic departments afﬁliating the
corresponding authors of the articles published in that particular journal (see
Moore, 1972). I take the ﬁrst approach. Hence, in this chapter, the objective of
a journal is to maximize the total quality of the papers published each period2
minus the cost of publishing.
For journal k; let Qk denote the expected total quality of accepted papers and
nk denote the expected volume of papers accepted. By “volume of papers,” I
mean the total number of papers accepted in the journal, not the size of each
paper. Therefore, nk can be written in two parts:
n
k = f1

q
k
+ f2

q
k;q
l
;l 2 fA; Bg;l , k; (4.2)
where f1

qk
denotes the expected volume of papers accepted by journal k from
the pool of ﬁrst-time submissions and f2

qk;ql
denotes the expected volume of
papers accepted by journal k from the pool of second-time submissions. Simi-
larly, we can break Qk into two parts:
Q
k = 1

q
k
+ 2

q
k;q
l
(4.3)
where 1

qk
denotes the expected total quality of papers accepted by journal k
from the pool of ﬁrst-time submissions and 2

qk;ql
denotes the expected total
quality of papers accepted by journal k from the pool of second-time submis-
sions.
Let k be journal k’s payoff:

k = Q
k  C

n
k
: (4.4)
2For simplicity, there is only one period.
120Therefore, each journal’s objective is to set the cut-off on observed quality
of a paper qk; k 2 fA; Bg; such that its pay-off is maximized. Assume that qk 2
(2";1   2"); that is, journals set the cut-off neither very low so that they end up
accepting most of the papers submitted to it, nor very high to avoid rejection of
too large a number of submissions.
Assume that the error in the review process is small enough:
0  " 
1
5
(4.5)
and the cost of publishing is neither very high so that journals don’t want to
publish at all, nor very low so that the cost does not affect the pay-off much:
2"  c  (1   3"): (4.6)
4.2.1 First-time Submissions
Since, for each journal, the observed quality of a paper of true quality qi is uni-
formlydistributedover

qi   ";qi + "

;theprobabilityofacceptanceofthispaper
by journal k 2 fA; Bg; is given by
Pr

q
k
i  q
k j qi

=
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
1; if qi > qk + "
0; if qi < qk   "
1
2"

qi + "   qk
; if qi 2
h
qk   ";qk + "
i
Let us now ﬁnd the expected volume of papers to be accepted by journal k from
the pool of ﬁrst-time submissions.
f1

q
k
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Z 1
0
Pr

q
k
i  q
k j qi

dqi
=

1   q
k
: (4.7)
Similarly, the expected total quality (for this pool) of accepted papers is given
by
1

q
k
=
Z 1
0
qi Pr

q
k
i  q
k j qi

dqi
=
1
2
"
1   q
k2  
"2
3
#
: (4.8)
4.2.2 Second-time Submissions
As seen in the previous section, the probability of rejection of a paper of true
quality qi by journal l; l 2 fA; Bg; l , k; is given by
Pr

q
l
i < q
l j qi

=
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
0; if qi > ql + "
1; if qi < ql   "
1
2"

ql + "   qi

; if qi 2
h
ql   ";ql + "
i
Hence, the probability of acceptance of the paper of true quality qi by journal k,
which has been rejected by journal l; is given by
Pr

q
k
i  q
k j qi and q
l
i < q
l
=
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
0; if qi > ql + " or qi < qk   "
1; if qk + " < qi < ql + "
1
2"

qi + "   qk
; if qi 2
h
qk   ";min
n
qk + ";ql + "
oi
122Therefore, the expected volume of papers accepted by journal k from the
pool of second-time submissions is
f2

q
k;q
l
=
Z ql+"
0
Pr

q
k
i  q
k j qi and q
l
i < q
l
Pr

q
l
i < q
l j qi

dqi
=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0; if ql + 2"  qk
1
24"2

ql   qk + 2"
3
; if ql  qk  ql + 2"

ql   qk
+ 1
24"2

qk   ql + 2"
3
; if ql   2"  qk  ql

ql   qk
; if qk  ql   2"
(4.9)
Similarly, expected total quality of accepted papers in journal k for this pool of
papers is
2

q
k;q
l
=
Z ql+"
0
qi Pr

q
k
i  q
k j qi and q
l
i < q
l
Pr

q
l
i < q
l j qi

dqi
=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0; if ql + 2"  qk
1
24"2

ql   qk + 2"
3 (ql+qk)
2 ; if ql  qk  ql + 2"
1
2

ql2   qk2
+ 1
24"2

qk   ql + 2"
3 (ql+qk)
2 ; if ql   2"  qk  ql
1
2

ql2   qk2
; if qk  ql   2"
(4.10)
4.2.3 Cut-off Quality in Nash Equilibrium
We have now all the information needed to ﬁnd out the Nash equilibrium of
this model. Recall that the pay-off of journal k; k 2 fA; Bg is given by:


q
k;q
l
= 1

q
k
+ 2

q
k;q
l
  c
h
f1

q
k
+ f2

q
k;q
li
where l 2 fA; Bg; l , k: Each journal k maximizes its pay-off by choosing an
appropriate cut-off for the observed quality of a paper, qk 2 (2";1   2"); taking
123the cut-off quality of the other journal as given.
A Nash equilibrium of this model is given by a pair of cut-off qualities

qA;qB
2 (2";1   2")
2 such that each journal maximizes its pay-off given the
other journal’s cut-off and no one wants to deviate unilaterally to choose some
other cut-off level. Hence,

qA;qB
are such that the following conditions3 hold:
@

q;qB
@q
jq=qA= 0 and
@

q;qA
@q
jq=qB= 0: (4.11)
From equations (4:7); (4:8); (4:9) and (4:10); we get the ﬁrst order condition
as follows:
@

qk;ql
@qk
=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
 

qk   c

; if ql + 2"  qk
 

qk   c

  1
24"2

ql   qk + 2"
2 
2qk + ql   3c   "

; if ql  qk  ql + 2"
 2

qk   c

+ 1
24"2

qk   ql + 2"
2 
2qk + ql   3c + "

; if ql   2"  qk  ql
 2

qk   c

; if qk  ql   2"
(4.12)
In the following lemma, it is shown that the cut-off on the observed quality of a
paper for each journal has to be same in a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2 There does not exist any Nash equilibrium with
  qA   qB   > 0:
Proof. This can be proved in two steps.
First, suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium with
  qA   qB    2": Without
loss of generality, let qA 

qB + 2"

: Then from the ﬁrst order condition (4:12)
and (4:11); we have
q
A = c (4.13)
3Theseconditionsarenecessaryandsufﬁcientsincethepay-offfunctionsarestrictlyconcave.
124and
q
B = c = q
A; (4.14)
a contradiction.
Next, suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium with 2" >
  qA   qB   > 0: With-
out loss of generality, let qA > qB >

qA   2"

: Then, from (4:12) and (4:11); the
two ﬁrst order conditions are given by
 q
A  
1
24"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
A + q
B   "

+ c
"
1 +
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
= 0 (4.15)
and
 2q
B +
1
24"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
B + q
A + "

+ c
"
2  
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
= 0: (4.16)
Since qA > qB >

qA   2"

; we have
 2q
B +
1
24"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
B + q
A + "

+ c
"
2  
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
=
1
24"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
q
A   q
B + "

+
"
2  
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
 q
B + c

>
1
24"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
q
A   q
B + "

+
"
1 +
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
 q
A + c

=  q
A  
1
24"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
A + q
B   "

+ c
"
1 +
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
:
Therefore, both ﬁrst order conditions cannot hold together when qA > qB >
qA   2" and hence there is no Nash equilibrium with 2" >
  qA   qB   > 0:
The intuition behind the lemma is that if a journal sets its cut-off quality
higher than that of the other journal, then it can strictly increase its proﬁt by
reducing its cut-off marginally This happens because although the fall in cut-
off will cause the average quality of the papers to be published in this journal to
fall slightly, however, the total quality of accepted papers increase sharply since
125the number of papers accepted increases. Not only that, the rise in total quality
more than offsets the extra cost of publication.
With this lemma in hand, we can now proceed to describe the Nash equilib-
rium in this model.
Proposition 19 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium,

qA;qB
= (q;q) where q =
c + "
9: The equilibrium cut-off quality increases with the error in the review process "
and the cost parameter c:
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that in a Nash equilibrium, qA = qB = q:
Therefore, from the ﬁrst order conditions given by (4:12) and (4:11); ﬁnd that
 
3
2
q
 +
"
6
+
3
2
c = 0 (4.17)
and there is a unique solution to the equation above:
q
 = c +
"
9
: (4.18)
4.3 Cut-off Quality while under Same “Management”
This section tries to work out something akin to the social planner’s problem.
However, since I have totally ignored the beneﬁts the authors get from publish-
ing a paper and the larger public’s need for “knowledge,” I cannot get a com-
plete social welfare function. Instead of maximizing the social welfare, let the
social planner choose the quality cutoffs for each journal to maximize the sum
of their payoffs. Alternatively, this can be thought of the pay-off maximization
126exercise of the management had both the journals been under the same man-
agement. One should be a little careful in noting that this is not monopoly or
collusion or merger. They are still two separate journals.4
If a journal rejects a paper, then the author submits the paper to the other
journal. Depending on the quality of the paper revealed after review and the
cut-off quality, the second journal accepts or rejects the paper. If it accepts, then
thepay-offofthejournalchanges—increasesordecreasesdependingonthecost
of publishing the paper and its quality. Hence, rejection to a paper by a journal
has an externality on the pay-off of the other journal. While choosing their pay-
off maximizing cut-off level on the observed quality of a paper, journals do not
consider this externality on the other journal, however, the management does.
The objective of the management is to maximize the total pay-off for both the
journals keeping this externality in mind. Therefore, the objective function of
the “management” can be written as follows:
max(qA;qB)2(2";1 2")2

q
A;q
B
= max(qA;qB)2(2";1 2")2
h


q
A;q
B
+ 

q
B;q
Ai
The ﬁrst order conditions for this maximization problem are given by
@

qA;qB
@qA = 0 and
@

qA;qB
@qB = 0:5 (4.19)
From equations (4:7); (4:8); (4:9) and (4:10); we get that
@

qk;ql
@qk
4However, due to linear cost function, the management’s optimum choice of quality cut-offs
match exactly with those chosen when the two journals collude but do not know if a paper has
been rejected by the other journal or not.
5Second order conditions hold since the pay-off function is strictly concave.
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8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0; if ql + 2"  qk
  1
12"2

ql   qk + 2"
2 
2qk + ql   3c   "

; if ql  qk  ql + 2"
 2

qk   c

+ 1
12"2

qk   ql + 2"
2 
2qk + ql   3c + "

; if ql   2"  qk  ql
 2

qk   c

; if qk  ql   2"
(4.20)
Analogous to Lemma 2 in the previous section, we have the following
lemma for the management’s optimization problem.
Lemma 3 The “optimum” choice of cutoffs on the observed qualities for both the jour-
nals have to be same, qA = qB:
Proof. It is very east to check that optimum

qA;qB
cannot be such that
  qA   qB    2"; because if so happens, then the total pay-off can be increased
by reducing the cut-off of the journal with higher one.
To see that
  qA   qB    0; let us suppose that there exists

qA;qB
that max-
imizes the total pay-off and 2" >
  qA   qB   > 0: Without loss of generality, let
qA > qB >

qA   2"

: Then, from (4:19) and (4:20); the two ﬁrst order conditions
are given by
 
1
12"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
A + q
B   "

+ 2c
"
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
= 0 (4.21)
and
 2q
B +
1
12"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
B + q
A + "

+ 2c
"
1  
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
= 0 (4.22)
Since qA > qB >

qA   2"

; we have
 2q
B +
1
12"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
B + q
A + "

+ 2c
"
1  
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
=
1
12"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
q
A   q
B + "

+ 2

c   q
B"
1  
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
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1
12"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
q
A   q
B + "

+ 2

c   q
A"
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
=  
1
12"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2 
2q
A + q
B   "

+ 2c
"
1
8"2

q
B   q
A + 2"
2
#
:
Therefore, when qA > qB >

qA   2"

; 

qA;qB
can be increased either by reduc-
ing qA slightly or by raising qB a little. Hence, at the optimum, qA = qB:
Proposition 20 There exists a unique cut-off level for both the journals that maximizes
the total pay-off and it is higher than the Nash Equilibrium cut-off level on the observed
qualities. The gap between them decreases as the error in the review process decreases.
Proof. By Lemma 3, we know that qA = qB = b q; at optimum: Therefore,
 b q +
"
3
+ c = 0 (4.23)
and there is a unique solution to the equation above:
b q = c +
"
3
: (4.24)
From equation (4:18); comparingb q and q; ﬁnd that
b q   q
 =
2"
9
> 0 (4.25)
and as "  ! 0;b q  ! q:
So journals, left to themselves, accept too many papers.
4.4 Conclusion
Using a simple duopoly model, I have shown that how the error in review pro-
cess leads journals to choose a lower cut-off on observed quality than the one
optimal for them collectively.
129Admittedly, theanalysisinthischapterisrestrictive. Iassumedthattheerror
term " is same for both the journals across all individual papers. However, ﬁrst
of all, different journals might have different errors because their referee pools
are different. Secondly, errors might vary author-wise. It has been found that
there is a signiﬁcant difference between the referee reports when the author’s
identity is unknown and when the author is well renowned (see Blank, 1991;
Hamermesh, 1994; Peters and Ceci, 1980). This suggests different " for each
individual paper. My analysis above does not address this issue. There are
some more serious assumptions. I considered only two journals and that too
of same rank which is far from reality. I did not consider the beneﬁts that an
author gets from publishing a paper. The beneﬁts of the larger public from the
knowledge diffusion by publishing a paper also do not enter into the set-up of
the model in this chapter.
The peer review system has its problems, but it keeps a lot of “bad”-quality
papers out. The journal review process has a large impact on the growth of
the economics literature and it has a very signiﬁcant impact on the growth of
knowledge, the design of policy and the careers of the researchers. Hence, it
is very important to raise awareness of journal editors and referees. The error
in the system might make them compromise on the quality threshold which
in turn may increase the number of low quality paper submissions raising the
pressure on the referees and thus increasing the error even more. This calls for a
reform of the peer review system. This chapter provides no blueprint for reform
but a basic analytical structure that can be a ﬁrst step towards such a blueprint.
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131APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THE LEMMAS AND PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 2
A.1 Lemma 1
Proof. The innovator’s payoff when she faces the choice of novelty search effort
is given in (3:12). Using the deﬁnition of B(XR;XE) in (3:10) we write the payoff
in two ranges of search efforts. In the range x1 + x2 = XR  XE; the proﬁt of the
researcher is given by
q(x1)
[1   F (x1 + x2)]
[1   F (x1)]
(B + g) + (1   q(x1))(G   P)   I   (x1 + x2) (A.1)
and in the range x1 + x2 = XR < XE; the proﬁt of the researcher is given by
q(x1)
[1   F (x1 + x2)]
[1   F (x1)]
"
B +
(1   F (XE))
1   F (x1 + x2)
g
#
+ (1   q(x1))(G   P)   I   (x1 + x2):
(A.2)
Differentiating with respect to x2 in each range, we ﬁnd that
@(x1; x2)
@x2
=
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
q(x1) [ f(x1+x2)]
[1 F(x1)] (B + g)   1 if x2 > XE   x1
undefined if x2 = XE   x1
q(x1) [ f(x1+x2)]
[1 F(x1)] B   1 if x2 < XE   x1
(A.3)
and
@2(x1; x2)
@x2
2
=
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
q(x1) [ f0(x1+x2)]
[1 F(x1)] (B + g) if x2 > XE   x1
undefined if x2 = XE   x1
q(x1) [ f0(x1+x2)]
[1 F(x1)] B if x2 < XE   x1
(A.4)
We need to ﬁnd the optimal novelty search effort x2 given the early state of
the art search level x1: We consider several cases.
132Case 1: 0  XE   x1
We are necessarily in the range x2  XE   x1: In this range,
@(x1; x2)
@x2
= q(x1)

 f(x1 + x2)

[1   F (x1)]
(B + g)   1: (A.5)
If (B + g) 
[1 F(x1)]
 q(x1)f(x1); then (x1; x2) decreases everywhere and there is a cor-
ner solution. Otherwise, (B + g) < 0 which implies that the payoff function is
concave and there is a unique solution that solves the ﬁrst order condition.
x

2 (x1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f  1 
[1 F(x1)]
 (B+g)q(x1)

  x1; if B <
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1)   g;
0; if B 
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1)   g:
(A.6)
Case 2: XE   x1 > 0
Case 2.1: Solution in the range x2 > XE   x1:
If there is a solution in the range x2 > XE   x1; then x2 = f  1 
[1 F(x1)]
 (B+g)q(x1)

  x1
and B <
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1)   g:
Because (B + g) < 0 and XE   x1 > 0; payoff function is concave on each
range x2 < XE   x1 or x2 > XE   x1 separately. In this case,
@(x1; x2)
@x2
jXE x1 =
 

q(x1) f (XE)

[1   F (x1)]
B   1 > 0 (A.7)
so the proposed x2 is a global Max.
Case 2.2: Solution with x2 = XE   x1
For this to be a solution, we need
from below :
@(x1; x2)
@x2
jXE x1 =
 

q(x1) f (XE)

[1   F (x1)]
B   1  0 and
from above:
@(x1; x2)
@x2
jXE x1 =
 

q(x1) f (XE)

[1   F (x1)]
(B + g)   1  0
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[1   F (x1)]
 f (XE)
 B 
[1   F (x1)]
 f (XE)
  g: (A.8)
If the above condition holds, then there is no solution in the range x2 > XE   x1
(from case 2.1). Additionally, in this case, B < 0: So (x1; x2) is concave and with
a positive derivative from below, thus we know there is also no solution with
x2 < XE   x1 either.
Case 2.3: Solution in the range 0 < x2 < XE   x1
If there is such a solution, then we have
x2 = f
 1
 
[1   F (x1)]
 Bq(x1)
!
  x1: (A.9)
For this to exist, B < 0 and thus (x1; x2) in this range is concave. Also, to be in
the range, we need
@(x1; x2)
@x2
jXE x1 =
 

q(x1) f (XE)

[1   F (x1)]
B   1 < 0
and
@(x1; x2)
@x2
j0 =
 

q(x1) f (x1)

[1   F (x1)]
B   1 > 0
or,
[1   F (x1)]
 f(x1)
> B >
[1   F (x1)]
 f (XE)
: (A.10)
Case 2.4: Solution with x2 = 0
We have a solution with x2 = 0 if
B 
[1   F (x1)]
 f (x1)
: (A.11)
Summarizing the results, for any level of early state of the art search effort
x1  XE; the payoff maximizing novelty search is given by:
x

2(x1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0; if B 
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1)   g;
f  1 
[1 F(x1)]
 (B+g)

  x1; if B <
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1)   g:
(A.12)
134For any level of early state of the art search effort x1 < XE; the payoff maximizing
novelty search is given by:
x

2(x1) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0; if B 
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1) ;
f  1 
[1 F(x1)]
 B

  x1; if
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1) > B >
[1 F(x1)]
 f(XE) ;
XE   x1; if
[1 F(x1)]
 f(XE)  B 
[1 F(x1)]
 f(XE)   g;
f  1 
[1 F(x1)]
 (B+g)

  x1; if B <
[1 F(x1)]
 f(XE)   g:
: (A.13)
Therefore, when B  0; then x
2 = 0.
A.2 Sufﬁcient Condition for Investment
Lemma 4 A sufﬁcient condition for the innovator to choose to invest (that is for (3.13)
to hold) is [B + (1   )(G   P)]  I:
Proof. From (3.13); we ﬁnd that after putting some effort on the early state of the
art search x1; the researcher invests in the R&D project if the following condition
holds:

2
6 6 6 6 6 6 4q(x1)
h
1   F

x1 + x
2
i
[1   F (x1)]
B(XR;XE) + (1   q(x1))(G   P)   x

2
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 5  I: (A.14)
Now, consider the left hand side of the above condition:

2
6 6 6 6 6 6 4q(x1)
h
1   F

x1 + x
2
i
[1   F (x1)]
B(XR;XE) + (1   q(x1))(G   P)   x

2
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 4q(x1)
h
1   F

x1 + x
2
i
[1   F (x1)]
B(XR;XE) + (1   q(x1))(G   P)   x

2
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 5 jx2=0
= 

q(x1) B(XR;XE) + (1   q(x1))(G   P)

 [B + (1   )(G   P)]:
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that x
2 is the optimum ex post search
effort that maximizes the total expected pay-off and the second inequality holds
135because   q(x1) 8x1 and (G   P) > (g   P)  B(XR;XE)  B: Thus we get the
sufﬁcient condition for investment by the researcher as
[B + (1   )(G   P)]  I: (A.15)
A.3 Proposition 1
Proof. We show that there are parameter values for which XR = XE. Recall that
by Lemma 1, x2 = XE   x1 if XE > x1 and
[1   F (x1)]
 f (XE)
 B 
[1   F (x1)]
 f (XE)
  g (A.16)
which is a non empty range for all  > 0:
When x
2(x1) = XE   x1; innovator’s payoff is given by

 
x1; x

2 (x1)

= (1   )(G   P) + [1   F (XE)](B + g)
 [1   F (x1)](I + XE   x1)   x1
and

0(x1; x

2(x1)) = f (x1)(I + XE   x1)   1 + [1   F (x1)];

00
(x1; x

2(x1)) = 

(I + XE   x1) f
0(x1)   2f(x1)

< 0:
Hence, the payoff is a concave function of x1 when x
2(x1) = XE   x1 and has a
solution x1 2 [0;XE] whenever 0(0;XE) > 0 and 0(XE;0) < 0 which holds true
if I is such that 1 
f(0)   XE < I < 1 
f(XE) +
F(XE)
f(XE) . This is a non-empty range. The
solution x
1 does not depend on P: Hence we can always ﬁnd P so that (A.16)
holds for this solution.
136A.4 Proposition 2
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that when B 
[1 F(x1)]
 f(x1) =  1
q(x1)(x1); then x
2 = 0: This
holds true for x1 = 0 when
B 
 1
(0)
: (A.17)
Since q(x1) and (x1) decline with x1 when the condition holds at x1 = 0; it holds
for x1 > 0 too. Hence, x
2(x1) = 0 and the researcher’s payoff in the range x1 < XE
becomes
(x1;0) = 

(1   F (x1)) B + (1   F (XE))g

+(1   )(G   P)   [1   F (x1)]I   x1:
Differentiating, we get

0(x1;0) = (I   B) f (x1)   1: (A.18)
If B  I
; then the proﬁt is decreasing in x1 in the range x1 < XE as well as
in x1  XE: Therefore proﬁt is maximized at x1 = 0: If B < I
; then the proﬁt is
concave in the range x1  XE: Therefore, its maximum in the range x1  XE is at
x1 = 0 if and only if

0(0;0) = (I   B) f (x1)   1  0 (A.19)
or,
B 
(0)I   1
(0)
: (A.20)
Under these conditions, proﬁt also decreases in the range x1 > XE since the
derivative close to XE is negative from the left and it is even lower from the
right.
137To sum up, if
B  max
(
 1
(0)
;
(0)I   1
(0)
)
; (A.21)
then x
1 = 0 and x
2 = 0:
A.5 Proposition 3
Proof. Consider the proﬁt function given in (3:15). Differentiating this function
in each of its regions, we obtain
@(x1; x
2(x1))
@x1
=
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
 (B + g) f(x1 + x
2)

1 +
@x
2
@x1

+f(x1)

I + x
2

  (1   F(x1))
@x
2
@x1   1
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
if XR > XE
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
 Bf(x1 + x
2)

1 +
@x
2
@x1

+f(x1)

I + x
2

  (1   F(x1))
@x
2
@x1   1
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
if XR < XE
(A.22)
(i) Suppose x
1 = 0 and x
2 > 0: This implies that x
1 < XE and XR = x
2. Using (A:13)
in Lemma 1 for the range x
2 > 0; we have
x

2(0) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
f  1 
1
 B

< XE; if 1
 f(0) > B > 1
 f(XE);
XE; if 1
 f(XE)  B  1
 f(XE)   g;
f  1 
1
 (B+g)

> XE; if B < 1
 f(XE)   g:
(A.23)
Substituting into (A:22); we get
@(0; x
2(0))
@x1
= f(0)
 
I + x

2 (0)

  (1   ): (A.24)
Now, x
1 = 0 implies that
@(0; x
2(0))
@x1
= f(0)
 
I + x

2 (0)

  (1   )  0 (A.25)
which can hold true only if
I 
(1   )
f(0)
  x

2 (0); (A.26)
138where x
2 (0) is given in (A:23). Hence, if I is large enough

I 
(1 )
(0)

; then x
1 = 0
implies x
2 = 0.
(ii) Suppose x
1 > 0 and x
2 = 0: This implies that XR = x
1. Substitution into
the ﬁrst order condition and setting
@(x1;x
2(x1))
@x1 = 0; we obtain
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
 (B + g) f(x
1) + f(x
1)I   1 = 0 if x
1  XE
 Bf(x
1) + f(x
1)I   1 = 0 if x
1 < XE
(A.27)
which implies
I =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1+(B+g)f(x
1)
f(x
1) if x
1  XE
1+Bf(x
1)
f(x
1) if x
1 < XE
(A.28)
By Lemma 1 and the fact that x
2 = 0; we have
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(B + g)  [1 F(x
1)]
 f(x
1) if x
1  XE
B  [1 F(x
1)]
 f(x
1) if x
1 < XE
(A.29)
and therefore it must be that
I 
1   
h
1   F

x
1
i
f(x
1)
; (A.30)
where x
1 is derived from (A:27): Hence, if I is low enough

I <
(1 )
(0)

; then x
2 = 0
implies x
1 = 0.
A.6 Proposition 4
Proof. Given ﬁxed search efforts

x
1; x
2

, payoff is higher the higher is the  :
@(x
1; x
2;)
@
= 
 
1   F(x

1)


 
1   F(XR)
1   F(x
1)
@B(XR;XE;)
@
!
> 0
139because
@B(XR;XE;)
@
=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
F (XE)g if XR  XE
(1   F (XE))
F(XR)
1 F(XR)g if XR < XE
(A.31)
and hence
@B(XR;XE;)
@
 0 if g  0: (A.32)
Let x
i () denote the optimal search efforts given . Then for two correlation
parameters h > l; we have
(x

1 (h); x

2(h);h)  (x

1 (l); x

2(l);h)  (x

1 (l); x

2(l);l): (A.33)
A.7 Proposition 5 and 6
Proof. In the assumed range of parameters, x
2(x1) = 0 and thus
(x1;0) = (1   )[(G   P)   I] + [1   F (x1)][B(x1;XE)   I]   x1; (A.34)
where,
B(x1;XE) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
B + g if x1  XE
B +

1 F(XE)
1 F(x1)

g if x1 < XE
: (A.35)
In an interior solution with 0 < x1 < XE; the following ﬁrst order condition must
hold:

0(x1;0) =  f (x1)(B   I)   1: (A.36)
In an interior solution with x1 > XE; the following ﬁrst order condition must
hold:

0(x1;0) =  f (x1)

(B + g)   I

  1: (A.37)
140Implicitly differentiating 0(x
1;0) with respect to any parameter  and using the
second order condition, we ﬁnd that
sign
 
dx
1
d
!
= sign
 
@0(x
1;0)
@
!
: (A.38)
We now differentiate with respect to each of the parameters in the range 0 <
x
1 < XE :
@0(x
1;0)
@I
= f
 
x

1

> 0:
@0(x
1;0)
@
= f
 
x

1

(I   B) =
1

> 0:
@0(x
1;0)
@P
= f
 
x

1

> 0:
@0(x
1;0)
@XE
= f
 
x

1

(1   ) f(XE)g > 0:
@0(x
1;0)
@g
=  f
 
x

1

(1   )(1   F(XE)) < 0:
Similar derivatives conﬁrm these results when x
1 > XE:
The effect of  depends on the optimal level of search:
@0(x
1;0)
@
=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
 f

x
1

F(XE)g < 0 if x
1 > XE
f

x
1

(1   F(XE))g > 0 if x
1 < XE
: (A.39)
A.8 Lemma 5 and its Proof
Lemma 5 When B > 0; then
dp(XR();XE;)
d
< 0: (A.40)
141Proof. We have shown that
p(XR;XE) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(1   )F(XE) if XR  XE
(F(XE) F(XR))+(1 )(1 F(XR))F(XE)
(1 F(XR)) if XR < XE
: (A.41)
Differentiating in each range, we ﬁnd that
dp(XR();XE;)
d
=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
 F(XE) if XR  XE
 
(1 F(XE))
(1 F(XR))
h
F (XR) + 
f(XR)
(1 F(XR))
dXR
d
i
if XR < XE
: (A.42)
When B > 0; then x
2 = 0: In Proposition 5, we established that in this case, when
x
1 < XE; search increases with correlation,
dx1
d > 0: Under the conditions of this
lemma, XR = x
1, hence
dXR
d > 0 and therefore
dp(XR();XE;)
d < 0:
A.9 Proposition 7
Proof. Assume that  = 0; i.e., innovator’s search process is independent of
examiner’s search process. Assume an exponential search technology which is
more efﬁcient after the innovation, i.e., the search technology for ex ante search
is given by Fs(x1) = 1   e sx1 and for novelty search is given by Fn (e x1 + x2) =
1   e n(e x1+x2); where s < n and e x1 = F 1
n [Fs(x1)] =
s
nx1:
We ﬁrst derive the optimal search efforts. We show that, in this set-up, for
parameter values satisfying the investment condition (3:14), the payoff maxi-
mizing search intensities by the researcher are given by:
1. if I >

n s
sn

; then
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
x
1 = 1
s ln
h
s(+nI+nx2)
n (1 )s
i
; x
2 = x2; if  
1+(1 )sI
n (1 )s > B;
x
1 = 1
s ln[s (I   B)]; x
2 = 0; if
sI 1
s > B   
1+(1 )sI
n (1 )s;
x
1 = 0; x
2 = 0; if B 
sI 1
s ;
(A.43)
1422. if I 

n s
sn

; then
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
x
1 = 1
s ln
h
s(+nI+nx2)
n (1 )s
i
; x
2 = x2; if   1
ne
(n s) snI
s > B;
x
1 = 0; x
2 = 1
n ln[ nB]; if   1
n > B    1
ne
(n s) snI
s ;
x
1 = 0; x
2 = 0; if B    1
n;
(A.44)
where B =

(1   FE (XE))g   P

and x2 is the unique solution to
x2 =
1
n
ln
"
 Bfn   (1   )sg
1 + (1   )s (I + x2)
#
: (A.45)
To derive these search efforts, we use the optimal novelty search x2 as we
derived in Lemma 1, and consider the optimal choice of x1 given x
2 (x1) that
maximize the researcher’s payoff as given in (3:15): From Lemma 1, we know
that
x

2 (x1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
f  1
n

[1 Fn(e x1)]
 B

  e x1; if B <
[1 Fn(e x1)]
 fn(e x1) ;
0; if B 
[1 Fn(e x1)]
 fn(e x1) :
=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1
n ln

 nB
[(1 )esx1+]

; if B <
(1 )esx1+
 n ;
0; if B 
(1 )esx1+
 n :
(A.46)
Maximizing the expected payoff from early state of the art search given by
equation (3:15); we get the ﬁrst order condition as
 Bfn(e x1 + x

2)
 
s
n
+
dx
2
dx1
!
  [1   Fs(x1)]
dx
2
dx1
+ fs(x1)
 
I + x

2

  1 = 0: (A.47)
Therefore, when x
2 is interior, then substituting (A:46) into (A:47); we get that
 [1   Fs(x1)]
dx
2
dx1
+ [1   Fs(x1)]
 
s
n
+
dx
2
dx1
!
+ fs(x1)
 
I + x

2

= 1
or, 
s
n
[1   Fs(x1)] + fs(x1)
 
I + x

2

= 1
or, (1   )
s
n
+ se
 sx1
 
I + x

2 +

n
!
= 1
or,
s

I + x2 + 
n

1   (1   )
s
n
= e
sx1
143where (using (A:46)) x2 is the unique solution to
x2 =
1
n
ln
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 4
 nB
n
1   (1   )
s
n
o
1 + (1   )s (I + x2)
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 5: (A.48)
Similarly, when x
2 = 0; then substituting (A:46) into (A:47); we get the ﬁrst
order condition as
 Bfn(e x1)
s
n
+ fs(x1)I   1 = 0
or, se
 sx1 (I   B) = 1:
Therefore,
x

1 =
1
s
ln[s (I   B)] > 0 and x

2 = 0 if s (I   B) > 1: (A.49)
Combining all the above, we obtain the optimal search efforts as stated ear-
lier.
Now, from the optimal solutions listed above (or the ﬁrst order conditions),
it is easy to ﬁnd the comparative static results (all results are weak, e.g. rises
could mean rise or remain unchanged):
1. as I increases, x
1 rises, x
2 falls, but

x
1 + x
2

rises;
2. as B increases, i.e., as g rises or P falls or XE falls, we have lower x
1 and x
2;
3. as  increases, both x
1 and x
2 rise.
A.10 Proposition 8
Proof. Using the social parameter values ˆ g; ˆ P and XE = 0, we see that B =
(g   P) >

ˆ g   ˆ P

= ˆ B. In Proposition 7, we have seen that as B increases, the
144search efforts by the researcher, both before investment and after investment
but before ﬁling for a patent, decrease. Since ˆ B < B; we can conclude that the
researcher under-invests in prior art search than the socially optimal level.
A.11 Proposition 9
Proof. The innovator never has an incentive not to disclose results of novelty
search, or else she would have been better off not to have searched. Suppose the
innovator has searched for prior art before innovation and revealed invalidating
prior art. Pursuing a bad path and applying for a patent (not disclosing the
invalidating prior art references) yields payoff (B   Im): If B > Im, and if when
both paths where found to be bad, pursuing a bad path and not disclosing is
better than not pursuing any path. If B < Im; pursing a bad path is inferior to
not investing, hence if invalidating prior art is revealed, the innovator does not
pursue that path. Therefore, no non-disclosure issue arises.
A.12 Proposition 10
Proof. Suppose 0 < B < Im; then x
2i = 0 for i 2 f1;2g: Therefore the pay-off from
the ex ante search (x1; x21; x22) is given by
(x1;0;0) = (1   1)[(G   P)   I] + 1 [1   Fs (x1)](B   I)
+1Fs (x1)[(1   2)[(G   P)   I] + 2 [1   Fs (x1)](B   I)]   x1
Differentiating the payoff w.r.t. x1; we get

0 (x1;0;0) = 1 (1   2)fs (x1)

G   (1   FE (XE))g

145+212fs (x1)Fs (x1)(I   B)   1:
Assume that we are in a range with interior solution x
1 > 0: Then we have
sign
 
dx1
d
!
= sign
 
@0 (x1;0;0)
@
!
(A.50)
Differentiating w.r.t. each of the parameters, we get the following:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@I
= 212fs
 
x

1

Fs
 
x

1

> 0:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@1
= (1   2)fs
 
x

1

G   (1   FE (XE))g

+ 22fs
 
x

1

Fs
 
x

1

(I   B)
=
1
1
> 0:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@2
=  1fs
 
x

1

G   (1   FE (XE))g

+ 21fs
 
x

1

Fs
 
x

1

(I   B)
=
1
2

1   1fs
 
x

1

G   (1   FE (XE))g

? 0:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@G
= 1 (1   2)fs
 
x

1

> 0:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@g
=  1 (1   2)fs
 
x

1

(1   FE (XE))   212fs
 
x

1

Fs
 
x

1

(1   FE (XE))
< 0:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@P
= 212fs
 
x

1

Fs
 
x

1

> 0:
@0 
x
1;0;0

@XE
= 1 (1   2)fs
 
x

1

fE (XE)g + 212fs
 
x

1

Fs
 
x

1

fE (XE)g > 0:
A.13 Proposition 11
Proof. If P > G(1); then the innovators’ payoffs from applying for a patent, as
given by (3.22), is always negative, hence innovators do not apply for a patent.
146If, on the other hand, P < (1   p)B(q1(0)); then any innovator’s payoff from
patent application is positive and hence everyone applies.
Consider the range of interior equilibria (1   p)B(q1(0))  P  G(1): Let us
deﬁne
h1(p;P;q1) =
P   (1   p) B(q1)
G(q1)   (1   p) B(q1)
; (A.51)
h2(p;P;1) =
R 1
1f ()d
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f ()d
:
We denote 1(p;P) and q1(p;P) the equilibrium outcomes that solve
1 = h1(p;P;q1); (A.52)
q1 = h2(p;P;1):
Consider now the function h1(p;P;q1):
@h1
@q1
=  
(1   p) B0 (q1) + 1

G0 (q1)   (1   p) B0 (q1)


G(q1)   (1   p) B(q1)

=  
(1   1)(1   p) B0 (q1) + 1G0 (q1)

G(q1)   (1   p) B(q1)
  0:
Therefore, h1(p;P;q1)changescontinuously(weaklydecreases)fromh1(p;P;q1(0)) >
0 to h1(p;P;1) < 1 (these inequalities follow from the assumption that (1  
p)B(q1(0))  P  G(1)).
Taking the derivative of h2 with respect to 1; we get
@h2
@1
=
 1f (1)
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f ()d +

1   p(1   1)

f (1)
R 1
1f()d
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f ()d
2
= f (1)
R 1
1

(1   p(1   1))   1 (1   p(1   ))

f()d
R 1


1   p(1   )

f ()d
2
= (1   p) f (1)
R 1
1 (   1) f()d
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f ()d
2 > 0:
147Hence, the function h2 is strictly increasing in 1: Moreover, h2(p;P;0) =
q1(0) 2 (0;1) and h2(p;P;1) ! 1:
An equilibrium is an intersection between the increasing function h2(p;P;1)
and the weakly decreasing function h1(p;P;q1) in the (1;q1)-space. Thus the
graph of h1(p;P;q1) must intersect with that of h2(p;P;1) and only once. Hence
we can conclude that there always exists an interior equilibrium for this range
of parameter values and the equilibrium is unique.
A.14 Proposition 12
Proof. We derive comparative statics around an interior equilibrium. In such
equilibrium, G(q1) > P: We denote by 1(p;P) and q1(p;P) the equilibrium out-
comes that solve (A.52).
For any parameter  2 fp;Pg;
d1
d
=
@h1
@
+
@h1
@q1
dq1
d
=
@h1
@
+
@h1
@q1
 
@h2
@
+
@h2
@1
d1
d
!
;
where hi are deﬁned in (A.51). Rearranging, we ﬁnd
d1
d
=
@h1
@ +
@h1
@q1
@h2
@
1  
@h1
@q1
@h2
@1
: (A.53)
Similarly,
dq1
d
=
@h2
@ +
@h2
@1
@h1
@
1  
@h1
@q1
@h2
@1
: (A.54)
We ﬁrst determine the sign of the denominator. We have shown in the proof
148of Proposition 11 that in an interior equilibrium,
@h2
@1
> 0 and
@h1
@q1
 0: (A.55)
These results imply that
1  
@h1
@q1
@h2
@1
> 0: (A.56)
Hence,
sign
 
d1
d
!
= sign
 
@h1
@
+
@h1
@q1
@h2
@
!
;
sign
 
dq1
d
!
= sign
 
@h2
@
+
@h2
@1
@h1
@
!
:
(i) Consider the effect of patenting fee P: Differentiating h1 and h2 with respect
to P; we ﬁnd that
@h1
@P
=
1

G(q1)   (1   p) B(q1)
 > 0;
@h2
@P
= 0:
Therefore,
sign
 
d1
dP
!
= sign
 
@h1
@P
!
> 0;
sign
 
dq1
dP
!
= sign
 
@h2
@1
@h1
@P
!
> 0:
(ii) Next we consider the effect of examination intensity p:
@h1
@p
=
B(q1)   B(q1)

G(q1)   (1   p) B(q1)

=
(1   ) B(q1)

G(q1)   (1   p) B(q1)
 > 0:
@h2
@p
=
 
R 1
1f()d
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f ()d
2
 
 
Z 1
1
(1   )f()d
!
=
q1
R 1
1(1   )f()d
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f()d
> 0:
149Therefore,
sign
 
d1
dp
!
= sign
 
@h1
@p +
+
@h1
@q1  
@h2
@p +
!
(A.57)
This effect is ambiguous. If beneﬁt functions were such that G = 1 and B = q;
then the increase in p would result in an increase in : However, if G = 1 and
B = qn; then for a large enough n we obtain a decline in :
The effect of increased examination intensity on patent quality, however,
must be positive.
sign
 
dq1
dp
!
= sign
 
@h2
@p
+
@h2
@1
@h1
@p
!
> 0: (A.58)
A.15 Proposition 13
Proof. (i) Since the exam intensity is chosen optimally, for the given p; we have
dW
dP
= 0 (A.59)
or,
h
1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1)   c(p)
i
f(1)
d1
dP
=
@W
@q1
dq1
dP
; (A.60)
hence, by assumption that @W
@q1 > 0; we have
1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1)   c(p) > 0: (A.61)
(ii) We know that
dW
dP
=  
h
1e G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)e B(q1)   c(p)
i
f(1)
d1
dP
+
dq1
dP
Z 1
1
h
e G
0 (q1) + (1   )(1   p)e B
0 (q1)
i
f()d
150>  

1G(q1) + (1   1)(1   p)B(q1)   c(p)

f(1)
d1
dP
=

c(p)   P

f(1)
d1
dP
:
The inequality follows from our assumption in the proposition and the equality
sign follows from the deﬁnition of 1 where we know that 1G(q1) + (1   1)(1  
p)B(q1) = P: Therefore, if c(p)  P; then dW
dP > 0; that is, welfare increases with P:
Hence, the optimal policy must be such that P > c(p):
A.16 Proposition 14
Proof. We ﬁrst show that an equilibrium exists. Our proof of existence will rely
on a ﬁxed point argument. An interior threshold equilibrium would be charac-
terized by the cut-off  below which no patent is applied for,  above which
gold-plate patents are applied for and patent qualities in each patent tier: qr;qgp:
We will deﬁne a function H : [0;1]4 ! [0;1]4 so that its ﬁxed point

;;qr;qgp

is a threshold equilibrium. If  were interior, then it would be derived from
Vr

;;qr;qgp

= 0; however we cannot guarantee an interior solution and
hence the cut-off below which no applicant applies for a patent may be 0 or
1: The following deﬁnitions will help deﬁne the function H taking into account
possible corner solutions.
Let
Tr

;
;qr;qgp

= min
(
max
(
0;
Pr   (1   pr)B(qr)
G(qr)   (1   pr)B(qr)
)
;1
)
;
Tgp

;
;qr;qgp

= min
8
> > > <
> > > :
max
8
> > > <
> > > :
0;
Pgp   (1   pgp)B

qgp

G

qgp

  (1   pgp)B

qgp

9
> > > =
> > > ;
;1
9
> > > =
> > > ;
;
Tr;gp

;
;qr;qgp

151= min
8
> > > <
> > > :
max
8
> > > <
> > > :
0;

Pgp   Pr

 
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i
h
G

qgp

 G(qr)
i
 
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i
9
> > > =
> > > ;
;1
9
> > > =
> > > ;
:
The intuition behind these deﬁnitions is as follows: when Tr 2 [0;1] is in-
terior, it represents the type who is indifferent between applying for a regular
patent and not applying for any patent; when Tgp 2 [0;1] is interior, it repre-
sents the type who is indifferent between applying for a gold-plate patent and
not applying for any patent; when Tr;gp 2 [0;1] is interior, it represents the type
who is indifferent between applying for a gold-plate patent and applying for a
regular patent. By our assumptions and the fact that the min and the max of two
continuous functions are continuous functions, we know that Tr;Tgp and Tr;gp
deﬁne three continuous functions.
Let us now deﬁne a function H : [0;1]4 ! [0;1]4 as follows:
h1

;
;qr;qgp

= min
n
Tr

;
;qr;qgp

;Tgp

;
;qr;qgp
o
h2

;
;qr;qgp

= max
n
Tgp

;
;qr;qgp

;Tr;gp

;
;qr;qgp
o
h3

;
;qr;qgp

=
R 
 f()d
R 


1   pr(1   )

f()d
;
h4

;
;qr;qgp

=
R 1
f()d
R 1

h
1   pgp(1   )
i
f()d
: (A.62)
The function H(;;qr;qgp) = (h1;h2;h3;h4) is continuous on [0;1]4 which is
a compact subset of the Euclidean space R4: Therefore it has a ﬁxed point
(;;qr;qgp): Now deﬁne r = [;] as the set of innovators that apply for
a regular patent, and the set gp = (;1] as the set of innovators that apply for a
gold-plate patent, and if  > 0; then the set of innovators [0;) do not apply for
any patent. Because (;;qr;qgp) solves the system (A.62), it is easy to verify
that the equilibrium conditions are met.
152Wenow show that any interior equilibrium is a thresholdsequilibrium. Con-
sider an interior equilibrium so that some innovators apply for each type of
patents and some do not apply for any patent. If it were the case that, in equi-
librium, qgp  qr; then for all ; the regular patent would be preferred and no one
would apply for a gold-plate patent. Hence, in the interior equilibrium, qgp > qr:
Let the difference between the value of a gold-plate patent and a regular
patent be
V() = Vgp(;qgp)   Vr(;qr); (A.63)
or, after substituting these values,
V() = 
h
G

qgp

 G(qr)
i
+ (1   )
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i
 

Pgp   Pr

:
(A.64)
Given patent qualities qr and qgp, V is linear in ; and we argue that its slope
must be positive. The slope is given by
h
G

qgp

 G(qr)
i
 
h
(1   pgp)B

qgp

  (1   pr)B(qr)
i
: (A.65)
Evaluating this at qgp = qr; we have

pgp   pr

B(qr) > 0: Moreover, for a given
qr; this slope increases with qgp because of our assumption (3.33). Therefore, it
is positive for all qgp  qr:
We now argue that every interior equilibrium has the form of a threshold
equilibrium. Because the equilibrium is interior, there is some value 0 for which
a gold-plate patent is applied for. Then, because V(˙ ) and Vgp() are increasing,
a gold-plate patent is applied for all  > 0: Let  denote the inﬁmum of all
 such that gold-plate patent is preferred. We know  > 0 or else no regular
patents are applied for. Because in an interior equilibrium not all innovators
apply for a patent, there is a type 
00
that does not apply. Because Vr() and
153Vgp() increase in ; any lower type does not apply for a patent. Let  denote
the smallest  for which Vr(;qr) = 0: This is a threshold level for applying for
a regular patent, that is, Vr(;q)  0 for    and Vr(;q) < 0 for  < : Finally,
because at least some regular patents are applied for,  < , otherwise, gold-
plate patents are preferred wherever regular patents yield positive payoffs, and
no regular patents would be applied for.
A.17 Proposition 15
Proof. (i) Suppose, by contradiction, that   1: Then, in the two-tiered system,
the quality of regular patents qr would be lower than the quality of a patent
in the single-tiered system for two reasons: (a) more low ex-ante probability
of validity innovators apply (  1 and
dqr
d > 0) and (b) some high ex-ante
probability of validity innovators apply for a gold-plate patent instead ( < 1
and
dqr
d > 0). To establish these effects formally, we show that
dqr
d
= (1   p) f()
R 
 (   ) f()d
R 


1   p(1   )

f()d
2 > 0;
dqr
d = (1   p) f(
)
R 
 (   ) f()d
R 
 (1   p(1   )) f()d
2 > 0:
This would imply that qr < q1: But then, applying for a regular patent becomes
less appealing than applying for a patent in the single-tiered system which
would imply  > 1; a contradiction. Hence, in the new system, there must
be less applications:  > 1:
(ii) If qr > q1; then   1 which, as we just saw, yields a contradiction. Thus,
qr  q1.
154(iii) As in the proof of Proposition 11, we can write that
q1 = h2(p;1) =
R 1
1f()d
R 1
1

1   p(1   )

f()d
;
qgp = h2(pgp;
):
We have already shown before (while proving Propositions 11 and 12) that
@h2
@ >
0 and
@h2
@p > 0: By assumption, pgp > pr = p: Again, by Proposition ?? and part (i)
of this proof,  >  > 1: Therefore, qgp > q1:
(iv) Expected number of bad patents in a single-tiered patent system is
N1 = (1   p)
Z 1
1
(1   ) f()d (A.66)
and expected number of bad patents in a two-tiered patent system is
N2 = (1   pr)
Z 

(1   ) f()d +

1   pgp
Z 1

(1   ) f()d: (A.67)
Since  >  > 1 and pgp > pr = p; we have
N1   N2
= (1   p)
Z 1
1
(1   ) f()d   (1   p)
Z 

(1   ) f()d  

1   pgp
Z 1

(1   ) f()d
= (1   p)
Z 1

(1   ) f()d + (1   p)
Z 
1
(1   ) f()d  

1   pgp
Z 1

(1   ) f()d
=

pgp   p
Z 1

(1   ) f()d + (1   p)
Z 
1
(1   ) f()d
> 0:
A.18 Proposition 16
Proof. Consider a single-tiered system with examination intensity p and a
patent fee P that has an interior equilibrium f1;q1g:
155The system of equations (3.36) can be written as
   h1(qr;Pr; pr) = 0;

   h2(qr;qgp;Pgp; pgp;Pr; pr) = 0;
qr   h3(;
; pr) = 0;
qgp   h4(
; pgp) = 0;
where the functions hi represent the right hand side of equation i in the system.
The Jacobian matrix of the system is given by:
J =
0
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B @
1 0  
@h1
@qr 0
0 1  
@h2
@qr  
@h2
@qgp
 
@h3
@  
@h3
@ 1 0
0  
@h4
@ 0 1
1
C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C A
(A.68)
Given our assumptions on the model, it is easy to show that
@h1
@qr
< 0;
@h2
@qr
> 0;
@h2
@qgp
< 0;
@h3
@
> 0;
@h3
@ > 0 and
@h4
@  0: (A.69)
The determinant of the matrix J is given by
det(J) = 1+
 
 
@h2
@qgp
!
@h4
@ +
 
 
@h1
@qr
! 
 
@h2
@qgp
!
@h3
@
@h4
@ +
 
 
@h1
@qr
!
@h3
@
 
@h2
@qr
@h3
@: (A.70)
The ﬁrst four terms in this sum are all positive. But the last term is  
@h2
@qr
@h3
@ < 0:
If gold-plate patenting fee is Pgp = Pr +

G(1)  G(q1)

; then (;;qr;qgp) =
(1;1;q1;1) is the (unique) solution to the system of equilibrium inequalities. In
this special case, in equilibrium, the set of innovators that apply for a regu-
lar patent is the same as that in the single-tiered system. We assumed that for
(;;qr;qgp) = (1;1;q1;1); det(J) > 0: This can be shown to hold when the func-
tion G is not too steep at q1 (i.e. G0(q1) is sufﬁciently small). We will now apply
156the implicit function theorem to obtain a solution to the system of equilibrium
equations in the neighborhood of (1;1;q1;1):
To apply the implicit function theorem, we need the system of inequalities
to be continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of point (1;1;q1;1): In our
application, we deﬁned the functional forms in the range qr  1 and   1: We
can augment the range of the system by deﬁning the functions B(q) and G(q) for
q > 1 as B(q) = B0(1)q + [B(1)   B0(1)] and G(q) = G0(1)q + [G(1)  G0(1)] and also
deﬁning f() = f(1) for  > 1: Now the system is continuously differentiable
in a neighborhood of (1;1;q1;1): Since det(J) > 0; from the implicit function
theorem, we can represent the solution of the system in the neighborhood of
(1;1;q1;1) as functions of the parameters (Pgp; pgp;Pr; pr): Moreover,
d
dPgp
= det(K)=det(J) (A.71)
where K is the same as the matrix J only its second column is replaced with
the vector of partial derivatives with respect to Pgp; (0;
@h2
@Pgp;0;0)T: Under our
assumption that det(J) > 0; we have d
dPgp > 0: Hence, if Pgp is set close to but
below Pgp = Pr +

G(1)  G(q1)

; then there is an interior solution to the system
of equilibrium equalities ( < 1 which also implies qgp < 1).
Forexpendituresofthepatentsystemnottoincreasewiththeintroductionof
the new policy, it is sufﬁcient that Pgp  P+
h
c

pgp

  c(p)
i
= Pr+
h
c

pgp

  c(pr)
i
:
When pgp is sufﬁciently close to pr; then Pr+

G(1)  G(q1)

> Pr+
h
c

pgp

  c(p1)
i
sothatthereexists Pgp forwhichthereisaninteriorequilibriuminthetwo-tiered
system and the expenditure of the patent ofﬁce declines.
157A.19 Proposition 17
Proof. We derive comparative statics around an interior equilibrium. Given
assumptions of the linear model and pgp = 1; in an interior equilibrium, the
system of equations become
 = h1 (qr; pr;Pr) =
Pr   (1   pr)(B + B0qr)

G   (1   pr) B

+ qr

G0   (1   pr) B0;

 = h2

qr; pr;Pr;Pgp

=

Pgp   Pr

+ (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
(1   qr)G0 + (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
;
qr = h3 (;
; pr) =
( + )
2(1   pr) + pr ( + )
:
Fromthesecondequation,G0 >

Pgp   Pr

:Wedenoteby(Pgp;Pr; pr);(Pgp;Pr; pr)
and qr(Pgp;Pr; pr) the equilibrium outcomes that solve
 = h1 (qr; pr;Pr);

 = h2

qr; pr;Pr;Pgp

;
qr = h3 (;
; pr):
For any parameter  2 fPgp;Pr; prg;
d
d
=
@h1
@
+
@h1
@qr
dqr
d
=
@h1
@
+
@h1
@qr
 
@h3
@
+
@h3
@
d
d
+
@h3
@
d
d
!
and
d
d
=
@h2
@
+
@h2
@qr
dqr
d
=
@h2
@
+
@h2
@qr
 
@h3
@
+
@h3
@
d
d
+
@h3
@
d
d
!
:
Rearranging, we ﬁnd
d
d
=

@h1
@ +
@h1
@qr
@h3
@

 
@h3
@

@h1
@
@h2
@qr  
@h1
@qr
@h2
@


1  
@h1
@qr
@h3
@  
@h2
@qr
@h3
@
 ;
158d
d
=

@h2
@ +
@h2
@qr
@h3
@

+
@h3
@

@h1
@
@h2
@qr  
@h1
@qr
@h2
@


1  
@h1
@qr
@h3
@  
@h2
@qr
@h3
@
 :
It is easy to ﬁnd that
@h1
@qr
=  
(1   )(1   pr) B0 + G0
(G + qrG0)   (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
< 0;
@h2
@qr
=
(1   )(1   pr) B0 + G0
(1   qr)G0 + (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
> 0;
@h3
@
=
2(1   pr)

2(1   pr) + pr ( + )
2 > 0;
@h3
@ =
2(1   pr)

2(1   pr) + pr ( + )
2 =
@h3
@
> 0:
Now we can determine the sign of the denominator.
1  
@h1
@qr
@h3
@
 
@h2
@qr
@h3
@
=
@h3
@
0
B B B B B @
1
@h3
@
 
@h2
@qr
 
@h1
@qr
1
C C C C C A
=
@h3
@
2
6 6 6 6 4

2(1   pr) + pr ( + )
2
2(1   pr)
 
(1   )(1   pr) B0 + G0
(1   qr)G0 + (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
3
7 7 7 7 5
+
@h3
@
(1   )(1   pr) B0 + G0
(G + qrG0)   (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
=
@h3
@ (1   
)(1   pr)
 
2  
B0
(1   qr)G0 + (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
!
+
@h3
@

 
2  
G0
(1   qr)G0 + (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
!
+
@h3
@
"
2pr +
p2
r ( + )
2
2(1   pr)
+
(1   )(1   pr) B0 + G0
(G + qrG0)   (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
#
> 0 since B
0 > G
0 
1
2
B
0 and pr 
1
2
:
Hence,
sign
 
d
d
!
= sign
" 
@h1
@
+
@h1
@qr
@h3
@
!
 
@h3
@
 
@h1
@
@h2
@qr
 
@h1
@qr
@h2
@
!#
;
sign
 
d
d
!
= sign
" 
@h2
@
+
@h2
@qr
@h3
@
!
+
@h3
@
 
@h1
@
@h2
@qr
 
@h1
@qr
@h2
@
!#
;
sign
 
dqr
d
!
= sign
 
@h3
@
+
@h3
@
d
d
+
@h3
@
d
d
!
:
159From the proof of Proposition 15, the number of bad patents in this two-tiered
system is
N2 = (1   pr)
Z 

(1   ) f()d
= (1   pr)
" 
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  
2
2
!
 
 
  
2

2
!#
:
Using these ﬁndings, we now derive all the results in Proposition 17. For
convenience of proof, we follow a different order of derivations than the state-
ment in the proposition, (implicitly) taking derivatives with respect to each pa-
rameter at a time.
(a) Everything else being ﬁxed, differentiating h1;h2 and h3 with respect to
Pgp; we get
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(b) As we have done above, everything else being ﬁxed, differentiating h1;h2
and h3 with respect to Pr; we get
@h1
@Pr
=
1
(G + qrG0)   (1   pr)(B + B0qr)
> 0;
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(c) Finally, keeping everything else ﬁxed, differentiating h1;h2 and h3 with
respect to pr; we get
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163Although the last term can be negative, the following derivation establishes that
the sum is positive.
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And, for similar reasons, we have
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A.20 Proposition 18
Proof. To establish the ambiguity of the effect of economic signiﬁcance on the
volume of gold-plate patent applications, we provide two numerical examples
with effects going in opposite directions.
164Let the patent policy be such that the examination intensity pr = 0:25 for
regular patents and pgp = 1 for gold-plate patents; application fees Pr = 2:3 for
regular patents and Pgp = 2:4 for gold-plate patents. Suppose that the value of
an economically less signiﬁcant patent conditional on it being good or bad is
given by
B0(q) = 1:75 + 2:25q;
G0(q) = 2 + 2q:
Numerically solving for the equilibrium in a two-tiered system with these
functional forms, we have  = 0:15346;  = 0:71983; qr = 0:50822:
Let the value of an economically signiﬁcant patent for the ﬁrst example be
B1(q) = 2 + 2:25q;
G1(q) = 2:25 + 2q:
Let the value of an economically signiﬁcant patent for the second example be
B2(q) = 1:1 + 3q;
G2(q) = 2:1 + 2q:
Note that as assumed, Bi(1) = Gi(1); Bi(q)  Gi(q) and G0
i(q) < B0
i(q) for all
q: Comparing the more signiﬁcant patents to the less signiﬁcant ones, we have
higher values G1(q) > G2(q) > G0(q); and a steeper slope for the value of a bad
patent: B0
1(q) = B0
2(q) > B0
0(q):
Numerically solving for the equilibrium in a two-tiered system for each
of these examples, we ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst case, = 0:05305;  = 0:70012;
qr = 0:44611: Therefore, in this example, more signiﬁcant patents result in more
165patent applications, more gold-plate patent applications, and a lower quality of
regular patents. In the second case,  = 0:21936;  = 0:72613; qr = 0:54452:
Comparing to the less signiﬁcant patents, we have less patent applications, less
gold-plate patent applications and a higher quality of regular patents.
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